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History › Second series, vol. 3

How Healy and Pablo Blocked Reunification (Documents, 1956-58), Plus Documents on Algeria and Ceylon

Towards a History of the Fourth International, Second series, vol. 3 · July 1978 · edited by Fred Feldman

From Towards a History of the Fourth International, Second series, vol. 3: How Healy and Pablo Blocked Reunification (Documents, 1956-58), Plus Documents on Algeria and Ceylon (Education for Socialists, Socialist Workers Party, New York, July 1978). Reproduced with the permission of Pathfinder Press. Scan: Encyclopedia of Trotskyism On-Line.

Introductory note

[p. 3]

This is one of a series of volumes devoted to documentary material related to the reunification of the Fourth International, spanning the period from 1954 up to the successful conclusion of the reunification effort in 1963. These volumes constitute Part 7 of Towards a History of the Fourth International, prepared by the National Education Department of the Socialist Workers Party.

Previous volumes in this series have included articles on the postwar history of the Trotskyist movement and a documentary history of the 1953 crisis and split in the Fourth International.

This new series deals with the aftermath of that split, the period of the independent existence of the two factions that took shape in the struggle (the International Committee and the International Secretariat), and the various efforts to mend the rift.

Included is material on the first parity commission of 1954; political documents produced by components of the International Committee; the response of both world factions to the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1956, to the Polish and Hungarian upheavals in that year, and other events; the effort to reunify the international in 1957 and the causes of the breakdown of that effort; and the successful drive towards reunification beginning in 1961.

The Struggle to Reunify the Fourth International includes correspondence, documents, circulars, and many other items—much of it previously unpublished. Material for this collection was made available by Karolyn and Tom Kerry, Tim Wohlforth, the Library of Social History in New York City, the archives of the Socialist Workers Party, and the late James P. Cannon.

Thanks are due to David Keil, among others, for translating several items published in this series.

The materials were selected and the introductory note preceding each section was written by Fred Feldman. Views expressed in the introductory notes are his own.

For the sake of historical accuracy the material has been subjected to minimal editing. Where comrades used pennames in their international activity, the real name is inserted in brackets. For instance Gerry Healy used the names Burns and Preston, Dobbs used the name Smith, and Sherry Mangan used the name Patrick O'Daniel.

The term "section" appears frequently in these documents. This word was used in two different senses within the world Trotskyist movement. On the one hand, it refers to those groups which are affiliated to the Fourth International. Secondly, it is used in reference to organizations that are barred from membership in the Fourth International by reactionary legislation, such as the SWP, but are in full political solidarity with the world Trotskyist movement and represent the continuity of Trotskyism in their countries.

This collection includes relatively little material from the French section of the International Committee (now the Organisation Communiste Internationaliste) or from Latin America. This was due to the limited amount of such material now available in the United States. It is hoped that the publication of this documentary collection will encourage others who participated in these events to help fill in these and other gaps remaining in the historical record of the Fourth International for this period.

Gerry Healy has issued a multi-volumed documentary collection, Trotskyism Versus Revisionism (London: New Park, 1974) which purports to cover the period from 1951 to the 1970s. The bulk of the items in that collection dealing with the years 1954-63 will also be found in this series.

However, there is much in this series that is not to be found in Healy's collection. It is hoped that this series will help in establishing the honest historical record of this period.

Gerry Healy's Problems of the Fourth International, to be found in Volume Four of Trotskyism Versus Revisionism, as well as Cliff Slaughter's introductory material to the various volumes, present a grossly distorted and tendentious account of this period. The need to uphold these distortions may help to explain why so much relevant material is left out of Healy's collection.

The introductory notes to a number of sections in this series refer to some of Healy's falsifications, pointing out how they are refuted by the actual documentary record of what took place, including letters written by Healy.

The factionally-motivated falsifications exposed in these pages were part of a process of degeneration that eventually led to Healy's current campaign to frame up Joseph Hansen, George Novack, James P. Cannon, and other SWP leaders on charges of complicity with or covering up for the Stalinist secret police.

Above all, however, this series demonstrates how principled revolutionaries approached the extremely difficult but vitally necessary task of reuniting the world Trotskyist forces. It will also help to deepen our understanding of how important this reunification was for the future development of the Fourth International.

Contents

Section IV: Growing Interest in Reunification

[The narrowing of the differences between the two factions inevitably raised the question of reunification. Peng continued to press for steps in this direction. After receiving a letter from Ernest Germain, George Breitman wrote a letter to the SWP Political Committee. Breitman held that while the struggle of the IC against Pabloism had been vindicated, the majority of the IS had evolved differently since its "Fourth World Congress" than the IC had expected. Cannon also took note of the convergence of views, while adding that difference of tone and emphasis might prove important. An initial face-to-face discussion with Germain was not very fruitful. Germain argued that the IC (and particularly the SWP) had come over to the positions of the IS. This conclusion, which became a theme of some of Germain's subsequent writings on the unity issue, was based on noting the similarities between the IS's conjunctural analysis of conditions in the USSR in 1953 and the SWP's analysis of conditions in the USSR after 1956. In Germain's opinion, these similarities proved that the IS had been correct in 1953. As part of this reasoning, Germain dropped from consideration questions of analysis and attitude toward Stalinism, Stalinist regimes, and Stalinist parties. In the view of the IC supporters, divergences over these questions had actually provoked the political dispute. While Germain held that an evaluation of who was right in 1953 was not a prerequisite to reunification, he found it hard to consistently maintain this stance. Instead he argued (according to the report of this conversation) that the SWP would now be obliged to "come to its members and tell them something that was in contradiction to the slander we had heaped on the IS." On the other hand, the IS would repudiate none of its earlier characterizations of the IC and the SWP. Gerry Healy's letters stressed the continued factional activities of Pablo in England and pointed to the IS position on Algeria as evidence of continuing grave differences. Healy was troubled by the fact that "we have to answer the question of why we split in the first place, if unity can be achieved now." Despite the continuing tensions reflected in the discussions and correspondence, interest in reunification continued to grow.]

  1. 1. "Essentially we are negligent of the centralized cooperative leadership": letter from Peng Shu-tse to LeePeng Shu-tse · February 1956 · pp. 5
  2. 2. "They actually come very near to the documents of the 4th WC": letter from Ernest Germain to George BreitmanErnest Germain [Ernest Mandel] · May 3, 1956 · pp. 5-6
  3. 3. "Pabloism minus Cochran and Co. has proved somewhat different than it was or seemed to be": letter from George Breitman to the SWP Political CommitteeGeorge Breitman · May 19, 1956 · pp. 7
  4. 4. "I am more interested in what the Pabloites do than in what they say": letter from James P. Cannon to George BreitmanJames P. Cannon · May 24, 1956 · pp. 7-9
  5. 5. "A tendency in the direction of a similar political orientation": letter from James P. Cannon to George Breitman (excerpt)James P. Cannon · May 25, 1956 · pp. 9-10
  6. 6. "Messali is a splendid supporter of our movement": letter from Gerry Healy to James P. CannonGerry Healy (signing as Burns) · June 1, 1956 · pp. 10
  7. 7. "No grounds for believing Pabloism is compatible with orthodox Trotskyism": letter from Gerry Healy to James P. CannonGerry Healy · September 28, 1956 · pp. 10-11
  8. 8. Summary of a conversation with Ernest Germain and Gerry HealyAuthor undetermined (as printed) · October 18, 1956 · pp. 11-12
  9. 9. Call by the Eighteenth Plenum of the International Executive Committee "To the Leaderships and Members of the International Committee"FI document18th Plenum of the International Executive Committee · November 1956 · pp. 13

Section V: The First Round of Reunification Discussions

[Serious discussions of reunification began with an exchange of letters between Leslie Goonewardene, secretary of the LSSP, and James P. Cannon. The similar positions of the IS and IC supporters on the Hungarian revolution convinced Cannon that an investigation of the possibilities of reunification was called for. The political basis for this move, viewed in the context of the long struggle to build the Fourth International, was presented to the Political Committee by Morris Lewitt (a leading party member who often wrote under the pseudonyms Morris Stein and M. Short). One aspect stressed by the SWP was the importance of focusing political discussion on current issues. Attempts to rehash the dispute of 1953 would not produce clarification but would encourage dead-end factionalism and attempts to settle old scores. Cannon told Goonewardene that, although political differences had diminished, the differences over organizational principles had not lessened. He proposed "a sweeping organizational compromise which would permit the formal unification of the international movement before the dispute is settled." Sherry Mangan, a former SWP member with long experience in international work both before and after the 1953 struggle, came to the U.S. as a representative of the IS. (In his international activity, Mangan used the pen-name Patrick O'Daniel.) Cannon proposed a unification of the two factions on the basis of equal representation ("parity") in the leading bodies. Mangan proposed that the "parties that left the International" should "re-enter" the IS, accepting a minority position. The IC forces would be protected only by a short-term guarantee against new suppressions in the name of "democratic centralism." Both Mangan and Cannon agreed on the desirability of efforts to unify the two groups in England, where Healy had won an overwhelming numerical advantage. In France, however, Mangan proposed that the upcoming World Congress be granted the right to decide the fate of the two organizations as it pleased. The key issue proved to be the proposal for parity in the leadership. The IS leaders raised opposition to this concept to the level of a principle, claiming that it violated democratic centralism. In fact, they tended to confuse democratic centralism with the ability of one faction to exercise unrestricted control of the central apparatus. The proposal for parity in the leadership had precedents in the history of Trotskyism. In 1934, the Communist League of America fused with the American Workers Party to form the Workers Party. Cannon, who had been the central leader of the Communist League of America, wrote of this merger in *The History of American Trotskyism:* "The National Committee was to have an equal number from each side and all other organization questions which might exist were to be settled on a parity basis. Such was our proposal. Its obvious fairness, even generosity, strongly impressed Muste and his friends. Our 'organizational proposals,' instead of precipitating conflicts and deadlock, as has so often been the case, greatly facilitated the unity." The Workers Party didn't lose its democratic-centralist character because of this arrangement. Nor was the "relationship of forces" between the two groups a basic consideration. The parity agreement assured that decisions in the Workers Party would be made through collaboration and discussion involving both sides, and would not be imposed by factional fiat. Because of this, the arrangement helped to break down organizational barriers, create an atmosphere of trust, and enabled the unity to take hold. In the case of the Fourth International, such a proposal would also provide guarantees against organizational measures such as the IS had taken against the French and British leaderships, and which had stirred bitter resentment. Although it was clear that agreement would not be reached easily and might not be achieved at all, Cannon insisted that a strong effort toward reunification was politically justified. He termed it a "calculated risk." The next step in the initial discussions—acceptance or rejection of Cannon's proposal for a "sweeping organizational compromise"—was up to the IS.]

  1. 1. "A direct appeal to the SWP to agree to arrange a united world congress": letter from Leslie Goonewardene, secretary of the LSSP, to James P. CannonLeslie Goonewardene (LSSP) · January 2, 1957 · pp. 15
  2. 2. "Advantages of a unification at this time would far outweigh the difficulties": letter from James P. Cannon to the SWP Political Committee (copy to the International Committee)James P. Cannon · March 12, 1957 · pp. 15-16
  3. 3. "A sweeping organizational compromise": letter from James P. Cannon to Leslie Goonewardene, secretary of the LSSPJames P. Cannon · March 12, 1957 · pp. 17
  4. 4. "The Situation in the World Movement," remarks by Morris Lewitt to the SWP Political CommitteeMorris Lewitt [Morris Stein] · March 12, 1957 · pp. 17-21
  5. 5. "Conditions and Guarantees for Reunification," proposed by James P. Cannon to Sherry ManganJames P. Cannon · April 27, 1957 · pp. 21
  6. 6. "Preliminary Proposals for a Basis for Reunification," proposed by Sherry Mangan to James P. CannonSherry Mangan [Patrick O'Daniel] · April 28, 1957 · pp. 21-22
  7. 7. "The first question is whether this letter to Goonewardene is acceptable as a basis for discussion": letter from James P. Cannon to Sherry ManganJames P. Cannon · April 29, 1957 · pp. 22
  8. 8. "A possible unification with the Pabloites is a calculated risk": letter from James P. Cannon to Tom KerryJames P. Cannon · April 30, 1957 · pp. 23

Section VI: Pablo Rejects the Proposed Basis of Reunification

[The correspondence between Michel Pablo (Michel Raptis), the secretary of the IS faction, and Sherry Mangan, the IS representative in the discussions, shows that Pablo was less than enthusiastic about the prospect of reunification. He was caught between the desire of his allies (the Ceylonese and others) to see moves toward unity and his own determination to retain his domination of the central apparatus. Pablo's letters reveal that he did not accept the official IS position that the differences had narrowed. On the contrary, he informed Mangan that the SWP suffered from "ideological rottenness" which had, if anything, worsened since 1953. He described the IC, including the SWP, as "a tendency in which a mixture of opportunist and sectarian ideas prevail and which is topped with organizational conceptions on the national scale which are decidedly Stalinizing (or at best Zinovievist)." Characterizations like "liquidationist" and "centrist" were bandied about as Pablo warned Mangan that Cannon's goal in the discussions was to render the international "impotent." The SWP's cothinkers in France, Switzerland, and Britain were characterized by Pablo as "nuts" with whom it was not worthwhile to negotiate and whose participation in a reunified international was hardly desirable. Pablo's more flexible attitude toward the SWP in these letters is perhaps explainable by the fact that there was no pro-IS grouping in the United States which could pose as an alternative. Efforts to sound out Cochran, described in the first letter in this section, got a negative response. Pablo's approach to the organizational side of reunification reflected his preoccupation with organizational control of any reunified apparatus. The very idea of reunification of two equal tendencies within the International must be rejected, he held. Instead, the IC must "re-enter" the International as a minority, subject after an interval to the discipline of its factional opponents and their leader, Pablo. This was accompanied by grandiloquent phrases about "the International's" generosity in offering undeserved "concessions." It hardly seems plausible that Pablo, an astute politician, believed that any section of the International Committee would accept such terms. The letter sent to the SWP by the IS on May 7, while phrased in more polite language than Pablo's directives to Mangan, hewed closely to his organizational requirements. Part of the political basis of Pablo's opposition to reunification is indicated by his reiteration of the theory of centuries of bureaucratically deformed workers' states, despite his attempt to reduce this theory to a mere speculation about timetables. While Pablo kept this position out of official documents, it played a part in determining his basic political perspectives and course. The full implications of Pablo's theory became clearer when Pablo split from the reunified Fourth International in 1965. A desire to avoid debate on this and other "private" political views of the central leader of the IS may have encouraged Pablo to take a hard line on reunification. Pablo's terms were unsatisfactory to the SWP leadership. Discussions were suspended while the SWP leaders sought consultation with Healy and other IC leaders.]

  1. 1. "I did see Bert": letter from Sherry Mangan to Michel Pablo and Pierre Frank (excerpt)Sherry Mangan · May 7, 1957 · pp. 25
  2. 2. "I am afraid that this ideological rottenness may have gotten worse since then": letter from Michel Pablo to Sherry Mangan (excerpt)Michel Pablo (signing as Gabe) · April 19, 1957 · pp. 25
  3. 3. "Centuries of transition": letter from Michel Pablo to Sherry Mangan (excerpt)Michel Pablo (signing as Gabe) · April 29, 1957 · pp. 26
  4. 4. "Representation of the IC tendency . . . cannot constitute a de facto overturn of the majority": letter from the International Secretariat to the leadership of the SWPFI documentInternational Secretariat · May 7, 1957 · pp. 26-27
  5. 5. "Their ideas about the International are flatly liquidationist and centrist": letter from Michel Pablo to Sherry ManganMichel Pablo (signing as Gabe) · May 10, 1957 · pp. 27-28
  6. 6. "Their reply to the JPC memo was unsatisfactory . . . further discussion was suspended pending consultation": letter from Farrell Dobbs to Gerry HealyFarrell Dobbs (signing as Smith) · May 20, 1957 · pp. 28

Section VII: Healy Voices Support for the Reunification Effort

[Gerry Healy's letters expressed support for Cannon's proposals on reunification, while showing little enthusiasm about the prospects for success. He was particularly concerned with the possibility that reunification would lead to a new factional struggle with supporters of Pablo in the British Section. He suggested that the proposals be clarified to protect his group against maneuvers on the part of the Revolutionary Socialist League, a group led by Ted Grant which had recently begun to collaborate with the IS. The SWP leaders readily agreed to Healy's proposal. Today, Healy claims to have openly opposed Cannon's proposals from the start. In writing to Goonewardene, Healy asserts, Cannon had "decided to sell out to the Stalinist bureaucracy and the imperialists." In *Problems of the Fourth International,* Healy wrote: "Immediately upon hearing about Cannon's letters to Goonewardene, we wrote to the SWP and disassociated ourselves from Cannon. "He wrote back the kind of a letter the lord of a manor writes to a serf. It was a letter from an arrogant American nationalist telling the English comrades where to get off. "We put the question about the importance of prior discussion before unification took place. Cannon said that there was no need for any discussion. "He had in effect completely capitulated to Pabloism." No trace of this alleged exchange could be found in the materials available to the editors of this collection. Nor is any trace of it to be found in *Trotskyism Versus Revisionism,* the multivolume documentary collection edited by Cliff Slaughter and published by the Healyites. Healy's version of the events appears to be a fabrication. The available record shows that Healy responded to Cannon's proposals by writing that "we agree with your proposals but would like to stress that these are a definite minimum." He expressed pessimism about the prospects for unity because of the remaining differences, particularly differences in method. In reply, Farrell Dobbs described the differences of method that existed and explained why differences of this type did not justify continuing the de facto split. Peng wrote a letter along similar lines. Healy never indicated any disagreement with Dobbs' reply of May 27 which took up the main points Healy raised in a May 10 communication. On the contrary, Healy repeatedly expressed his full support for Cannon's proposals, although his actions in the next period often seemed to contradict his words. "We are all agreed on the necessity to provide a positive answer to the 'unity' question, and we shall certainly allow no opportunity to slip by us in this respect," he wrote, promising that the next meeting of the IC would approve the Cannon proposals. Had Healy expressed differences with the analysis presented by Dobbs, a political discussion of reunification in the IC would have been possible. Healy forestalled this by strongly indicating general agreement with the approach of the SWP leaders. The evidence now indicates that Healy was maneuvering during these discussions of the possibility of reunification, seeking to block any agreement with the IS while hiding his objectives from the SWP. In this respect, his course paralleled that of Pablo in the IS.]

  1. 1. "Pablo's movement has not the same significance that it did even three years ago": letter from Gerry Healy to James P. CannonGerry Healy (signing as Burns) · January 15, 1957 · pp. 30
  2. 2. "If the Pabloites accept the proposal, your organization will be amply protected": letter from James P. Cannon to Gerry HealyJames P. Cannon · March 12, 1957 · pp. 31
  3. 3. "We are in agreement on the need for testing out this unity mongering": letter from Gerry Healy to Tom KerryGerry Healy · April 11, 1957 · pp. 31-32
  4. 4. "It is worth doing everything possible to get one world organisation if we can": letter from Gerry Healy to James P. CannonGerry Healy · April 24, 1957 · pp. 32
  5. 5. "The change in Pablo's line therefore does not at all imply a change in his political methods": letter from Gerry Healy to James P. CannonGerry Healy (signing as Burns) · May 10, 1957 · pp. 32-34
  6. 6. "The best we can hope to get is some kind of joint working relationship": letter from Gerry Healy to Farrell Dobbs (excerpt)Gerry Healy · May 23, 1957 · pp. 35
  7. 7. "Our objective is not Pablo, but the majority of comrades remaining with the IS who are loyal to the Trotskyist movement": letter from Peng Shu-tse to the members of the International CommitteePeng Shu-tse · June 1, 1957 · pp. 35
  8. 8. "The Situation in the World Trotskyist Movement," resolution of the 13th Congress of the British Section of the Fourth International13th Congress of the British Section (Healy group) · June 1957 · pp. 36
  9. 9. "We are fully aware of the remaining political differences between us and the Pabloites": letter from Farrell Dobbs to Gerry HealyFarrell Dobbs (signing as Smith) · June 27, 1957 · pp. 36-38
  10. 10. "We will be ready to seize any opportunity that may arise to press the JPC proposals along": letter from Gerry Healy to Farrell DobbsGerry Healy (signing as Burns) · July 2, 1957 · pp. 38

Section VIII: Healy Tries to Torpedo Reunification

[In his July 2, 1957, letter to Dobbs, Healy wrote that the British section had published an article by William Hunter, writing under the pen-name of W. Sinclair, in its internal bulletin. Hunter's "Under a Stolen Flag" was a polemic against the draft IS resolution, "The Decline and Fall of Stalinism." The final version of this resolution, adopted by the "Fifth World Congress" in the summer of 1957, can be found in the Education for Socialists publication, *The Development and Disintegration of World Stalinism* ($1.25). Healy's letter to Dobbs neglected to mention that an introduction to this article—apparently reflecting the views of the leadership of the British Trotskyists—declared that "the gulf between Pabloite revisionism and ourselves grows wider and wider." Healy, like Pablo, denied that the political differences had narrowed. Curiously, neither the introduction nor the article by Hunter made any attempt to *prove* that the differences had grown. This would have required comparing the IS response to key events in the class struggle in 1953 (the death of Stalin, the East German uprising, the French general strike) with their reaction to the events of 1956 (the Twentieth Congress, and the Hungarian and Polish rebellions). Such an effort could not demonstrate growing differences without outright falsifications of the record. Hunter restricted himself instead to a tendentious analysis of the draft resolution for the upcoming "world congress" of the IS. This approach differentiates Hunter's method sharply from that of such 1953 documents as the "Open Letter" and "Against Pabloist Revisionism," which analyzed Pablo's documents in the light of the actual political practice that flowed from them. A still graver action was Healy's ultimatum to the tiny Revolutionary Socialist League, the IS representatives in Great Britain. Healy demanded that the RSL "repudiate the recent Pabloite document, 'The Decline and Fall of Stalinism'" as the price of unity. This was a demand that the RSL break politically as well as organizationally from the IS before unification could be considered. Furthermore, it denied the right of members of the RSL to advocate the line of "The Decline and Fall of Stalinism" inside the British Section. Such bans were unheard of within the Trotskyist movement. The demand was an ominous early indication of how Healy's conception of democratic centralism was evolving, under the pressure of his factional attitude to the IS. Today, Healy appears to regard his ultimatum to the Revolutionary Socialist League as an embarrassment. His letter to the RSL is not reprinted in the many-volumed documentary collection published by the Healyites, *Trotskyism Versus Revisionism.* References to this letter in other documents have been omitted by the editors of the Healyite collection (for instance, in Volume 3 of the series, by excerpting rather than printing in full the July 9, 1957, letter from Healy to the IS which is reprinted in unabridged form in Section IX below). Ernest Germain replied to Hunter in "An Unprincipled Maneuver Against Trotskyist Unity." He challenged the accuracy of Hunter's description of the IS position. His contribution defended the line of the IS since 1953, described the "Open Letter" as "the document which engineered the split," and attempted once again to defend his view that the SWP had come around to the IS positions of 1953. Germain never challenged the assertion that the differences between the IS and the British Section had grown wider and wider. Instead, he attempted to demonstrate differences between the SWP and the British Section on events since the Twentieth Congress, using Hunter's factionally distorted article as a foil. However, the positions of the British Section and the SWP on these developments were essentially identical, as Germain could have readily demonstrated by reference to the literature and activity of both groups. The British Section reprinted the SWP resolution, "The New Stage in the Russian Revolution," as well as two speeches by Cannon on the Twentieth Congress revelations, in a pamphlet entitled *The 20th Congress (C.P.S.U.) and World Trotskyism* (London: New Park, 1957). An introduction to this pamphlet stated: "Here, in Cannon's two speeches and in the resolution of the S.W.P., are summed up, in clear Marxist terms, the reasons for the Kruschev speech." What a shift was to occur in Healy's politics over the next decade! In "Problems of the Fourth International" (1966), Healy wrote, "Immediately, that is from the split of 1953, Cannon rejected the ideas which led to Khruschev's speech." Healy, of course, does not acknowledge his 180 degree turn, since that would undermine his claims to political omniscience. The international resolution adopted by the British Section in 1957 presented, in a capsulized form, views similar to those of the SWP and endorsed the "process of regroupment and discussion" which the Twentieth Congress had produced in the U.S. Numerous articles in *Labour Review,* including articles by Hunter, gave concrete expression to what appeared to be a common approach to the crisis of Stalinism by the SWP and the British Section. By leaving unchallenged the assertion that Healy's differences with the IS had grown wider since 1953, Germain fed suspicions in the SWP that the IS was not interested in genuine unity of all Trotskyists, but was attempting to foment a politically unjustified split between the SWP and the British Section. Although Germain's reply focused on precisely the questions that Healy said were the most important to discuss with the IS (such as the question of who was right in 1953), neither Healy nor any of his supporters ever replied to "An Unprincipled Maneuver Against Trotskyist Unity." The rejection of parity by the IS (that is, Pablo's insistence on organizational control of a unified international) had already stalled the discussions. Healy's insistence that IS supporters must recant their political views in any fusion and the implicit denial that a political basis existed for reunification, helped assure that the impasse would not then be broken.]

  1. 1. Letter from Gerry Healy to the Revolutionary Socialist LeagueGerry Healy (signing as Burns), National Secretary · June 13, 1957 · pp. 40
  2. 2. "Introduction: The Fight Against Pabloite Revisionism," unsigned introduction to "Under a Stolen Flag"Unsigned (British Section leadership) · pp. 40-41
  3. 3. "Under a Stolen Flag," by William HunterWilliam Hunter (writing as W. Sinclair) · May 22, 1957 · pp. 41-47
  4. 4. An Unprincipled Maneuver Against Trotskyist UnityFI documentErnest Germain [Ernest Mandel] · June 20, 1957 · pp. 47-59

Section IX: Discussions at an Impasse

[With the rejection of parity by the IS and Healy's actions, discussions of reunification broke down in mutual recriminations. The IS and Sherry Mangan wrote letters demanding that the British Trotskyists repudiate the statement that differences had widened. Without such a repudiation, they indicated, reunification with the British Section would be ruled out. In addition, the IS threatened to take action to formalize the split unless further progress was made. The IS also made some verbal concessions to Cannon's proposals. It endorsed the first point in his letter to Goonewardene (March 12, 1957), agreeing that the two sides should attempt to prepare a joint memorandum that would indicate the extent of programmatic agreement. The IS replaced the formulation of "concessions" with that of "organizational guarantees." Pablo may have felt secure in making limited concessions, since Healy was now playing an obstructionist role that paralleled Pablo's. The letters and statements of IS leaders in this period strengthened the suspicion in the SWP leadership that the IS was more interested in splitting the IC than in uniting with it. (Pablo's letters in Section VI indicate that there was some basis for this estimate.) The "Fifth World Congress" held by the IS in August 1957 declared the International Committee to be "outside the Fourth International." The IS declaration noted that political differences had lessened with the SWP, but made no such assertion with regard to the IC as a whole. It was difficult for the SWP leadership to determine just where Healy stood. Was he attempting to block reunification? If so, why had he not frankly stated his differences with the SWP leadership on this, instead of endorsing the reunification effort and Cannon's proposals? Why did he reiterate his stand in favor of Cannon's proposals in the midst of the controversy over the Hunter article and the ultimatum to the Revolutionary Socialist League? In his letters to the IS and the SWP, Healy neither endorsed nor rejected the view that differences had widened. Cannon made no secret of his opposition to Healy's "factional ultimatism" and his concern about the exaggerations in the Hunter document. But Healy showed no inclination to probe these differences. Despite his criticisms of the IS, he hastened to assure Cannon that he (Healy) was in agreement with the SWP's overall approach to the unity question. It began to seem probable that Healy only had differences of emphasis with the SWP, perhaps stemming from the necessity of confronting an IS formation in England. Healy missed no opportunity to convey this impression. During the later stages of the reunification discussions and debates, Healy admitted that he had differed with Cannon's reunification proposals from the beginning, but chose to maneuver so as to prevent a political conflict with the SWP. The documentary record lends credence to Healy's claim. The first admission by Healy that he had hidden differences in order to avoid a political debate occurred in the February 3, 1962, meeting of the National Executive Committee of the Socialist Labour League. Joseph Hansen attended this meeting as a guest. The minutes issued by the Socialist Labour League (and reprinted in Volume III of the Healy-Slaughter documentary collection, *Trotskyism Versus Revisionism*) include the following exchange: "H N stated that in 1957 the SWP had the impression that we thought eye-to-eye about international Pabloism, etc. He said the present differences were a mystery to him. "HEALY explained some of the history of the leadership of the SLL, their experience in the RCP and the struggle with Pabloism. In 1957 when the SWP claimed differences were growing less, we were undergoing an important theoretical development. The British section at that time was winning members from the Communist Party. We did not want a conflict with the SWP." Healy's desire to evade a political discussion with the SWP may explain his failure to take the opportunity offered by Cannon's critical letters of July 3 and July 25 to present an alternative view of the desirability of reunification and of the issues in the Hunter-Germain exchange. Far from discussing differences, Healy presented to the International Committee a resolution adopted by the SWP Political Committee. This resolution appeared to take a view different from those Healy now claims to have held on the need for discussion of the 1953 split before reunification could take place, on the Cannon proposals, and on the Hunter-Germain exchange. This resolution expressed the SWP's view that reunification was not possible at that time. It denounced Pablo's factional activities in England, and took the following stand on debates over past differences, like the exchange between Hunter and Germain: "The tendentious and falsified polemics over past conflicts which cannot be resolved by argument at the present time, and which the letter to Goonewardene proposed to lay aside for future consideration in a calmer atmosphere, after unity had been effected on the political action of the day, obviously sharpen the situation and push the prospect of reunification backward. These actions, and the attitude expressed in them, plus the failure of agreement on the necessary organizational compromise, raise the direct threat that any formal unification effected in this atmosphere would provide only the springboard for another bitter conflict and split. "The PC of the SWP does not believe that any good could come to our international movement from that and will not recommend it. Neither do we see how any constructive results can be obtained by a continuation of the discussion of unification unless and until these two roadblocks are removed." The resolution adopted by the IC reiterated support for Cannon's proposals as the organizational basis of reunification. Why did Healy submit and vote for a resolution so at variance with the views he claims to have held? Perhaps Healy, acting as a pragmatic politician, felt that the "danger" of reunification had been successfully fended off and therefore felt no need for political clarification of the differences over this in the IC.]

  1. 1. "A most disturbing development": letter from Sherry Mangan to George Novack (excerpt)Sherry Mangan (signing s/P.) · June 21, 1957 · pp. 61
  2. 2. Letter from the International Secretariat to the International CommitteeFI documentInternational Secretariat · June 19, 1957 · pp. 61
  3. 3. "The factional ultimatism of the British": letter from James P. Cannon to Tom KerryJames P. Cannon · July 3, 1957 · pp. 62
  4. 4. Letter from Gerry Healy for the British Section to the International SecretariatGerry Healy (signing as Burns), Secretary, for the British Section · July 6, 1957 · pp. 62-63
  5. 5. "We fail to understand how this approach impedes a unification": letter from Gerry Healy for the British Section to the ISGerry Healy (signing as Burns), Secretary · July 8, 1957 · pp. 63
  6. 6. Letter from Gerry Healy, Secretary of the International Committee, to the International SecretariatGerry Healy (signing as Preston), Secretary, International Committee · July 10, 1957 · pp. 64
  7. 7. "Rest assured, we will walk in step with you": letter from Gerry Healy to James P. CannonGerry Healy · July 12, 1957 · pp. 64-65
  8. 8. "The only possible basis for getting agreement immediately": letter from Gerry Healy to Sal Santen, a leader of the Dutch section of the International SecretariatGerry Healy (signing as Burns) · July 12, 1957 · pp. 65
  9. 9. "As for the question of parity leadership, it is not a serious proposal": letter from Sal Santen to Gerry HealySal Santen · July 20, 1957 · pp. 65-66
  10. 10. "Compare all this with the line of the International and Sinclair's article": letter from the International Secretariat "to the leadership of the British organisation"FI documentInternational Secretariat · July 18, 1957 · pp. 66-67
  11. 11. Letter from the International Secretariat to the International CommitteeFI documentInternational Secretariat · July 18, 1957 · pp. 67
  12. 12. Letter from James P. Cannon to Gerry HealyJames P. Cannon · July 25, 1957 · pp. 67-68
  13. 13. "The Present Stage of the International Unity Discussion," resolution of the SWP Political Committee submitted to the International CommitteeSWP Political Committee · July 27, 1957 · pp. 68-69
  14. 14. Letter from the International Secretariat to the International CommitteeFI documentInternational Secretariat · August 25, 1957 · pp. 69
  15. 15. Letter from Gerry Healy for the International Committee to the International SecretariatGerry Healy (signing as Preston), Secretary · September 9, 1957 · pp. 69
  16. 16. Letter from Gerry Healy to Tom KerryGerry Healy · September 9, 1957 · pp. 70
  17. 17. "Resolution on Relations with the 'International Committee,'" adopted by the "Fifth World Congress" of the International SecretariatFI documentFifth World Congress (IS) · October 1957 · pp. 70
  18. 18. Letter from Sherry Mangan to the SWP National CommitteeSherry Mangan (signing as Patrick O'Daniel) · November 12, 1957 · pp. 70-72

Section X: Healy is Paralyzing the IC and Blocking Reunification: Letter from Peng Shu-tse to James P. Cannon (April 20, 1958)

  1. Letter from Peng Shu-tse to James P. CannonPeng Shu-tse (signing S.T. Peng) · April 20, 1958 · pp. 73-80

Section XI: Criticisms of the Ceylonese Trotskyists

[During the ten-year split in the Fourth International, the world movement was far too weak to exercise strong political influence on many of its sections. Strong centrifugal tendencies developed. This was true in both the IS and the IC, despite the great emphasis placed by the former on a strong central apparatus. In Ceylon, the powerful Lanka Sama Samaja Party began to adapt to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois nationalist currents. A political softening was also reflected in the stance adopted by the LSSP toward the Mao regime in China. The political decline of the LSSP was gradual, and was combined for a time with leadership of militant working-class struggles and adherence to the main programmatic positions of Trotskyism. A more detailed analysis of the evolution of the LSSP will be found in *Towards a History of the Fourth International, Part VI: Revolutionary Marxism versus Class Collaboration in Sri Lanke* (Education for Socialists, $.60). Although Peng Shu-tse and the SWP were willing to cooperate with the LSSP in reunifying the world movement, they criticized some of its weaknesses sharply and publicly.]

  1. 1. "Chou and the Chinese Revolution"The Militant (editorial) · March 11, 1957 · pp. 82
  2. 2. "An Open Letter to Leslie Goonewardene, Secretary of the LSSP," by Peng Shu-tsePeng Shu-tse (signing S.T. Peng) · December 27, 1957 · pp. 82-85

Section XII: "The Truth About the Algerian Revolution: An Open Letter to the Militant," by Sherry Mangan

[One of the areas of difference that still remained between supporters of the IS and IC was over tactical orientation in the Algerian revolution. The IC and its supporters backed the Algerian National Movement (MNA), led by Messali Hadj. The IS became deeply involved in support and assistance to the struggles of the National Liberation Front (FLN). In the years after 1954, the FLN emerged as the main force in the armed struggle against French imperialism. The factional struggle between the two groups was bitter and violent, with both sides using assassination as a means of settling differences. As the rural and urban struggles came increasingly under FLN influence, the MNA began to adapt to French imperialism and finally capitulated to it, while the FLN fought on. The experience brought home to the SWP the importance of giving full support to all anti-imperialist struggles in the colonies, without becoming overly committed in the obscure power struggles that can erupt among competing petty-bourgeois nationalist formations. Such a policy would have led to a course similar to that of the IS, which supported the group with the broadest mass support and the most active policy of struggle. The following letter by Sherry Mangan, writing under the pen-name of Patrick O'Daniel, was a reply to a series of articles by Shane Mage (under the pen-name of Philip Magri). Mage's articles appeared in the December 16, 23, and 30, 1957, and January 6, 1958, issues of the *Militant.* Mangan's open letter was printed, along with a reply by Mage, in SWP Discussion Bulletin, Vol. 19, No. 2 in 1958. The open letter was also published in the Spring 1958, issue of *4th International,* the quarterly English-language journal published by the IS under the editorship of Mangan. Events in Algeria, and also consideration of some of the points made by Mangan, led to a correction in the posture of the SWP. By 1960, the SWP press was fully and clearly supporting the struggle of the FLN against French imperialism. The SLL and the French Trotskyists of the La Vérité group also recognized their error (although the French did not do so publicly until some years later). They tended to react to their disappointment in the MNA by shifting towards a sectarian attitude to the Algerian revolution. Healy made the correction in a typical way. His historiographers simply tried to deny that their chieftain ever made the error. Thus in the 1961 document, "A Reply to Comrade Peng," the National Committee of the Socialist Labour League stated: "We conditionally supported both wings of this movement in so far as they fought the French, but we reserved our right to criticize them from a Marxist point of view if we considered this necessary. . . . "Of course we greeted Messali in his struggle in 1955 as a national leader. We published his declaration of policy in English. But we never gave him whole-hearted support as if he were a Marxist leader." Such a position would have been commendable, but it was not the position of the IC or of Healy, as a reading of the resolution of the IC on Algeria (reprinted in Section I of this collection) will show. To avoid confusing their readers with facts, the editors of Healy's documentary collection, *Trotskyism versus Revisionism,* omitted this resolution. Healy's position was stated succinctly in his June 1, 1956, letter to James P. Cannon (reprinted in Section IV) where he stated: "As you know, there are two forces involved in the national struggle in that country [Algeria]; the forces of Messali Hadj, which include the vast majority of Algerian workers living in France, as well as extensive support in Algeria. . . then there are the forces of the 'Liberation Front,' armed, financed and equipped from Cairo. This consists of some former Messalists, which include several army officers trained by the French together with a sprinkling of corrupt politicians like Ferhat Abbas. Bringing up the rear of this ragged crew are the Algerian Stalinists and the Pabloites. "The class issues in this struggle are quite pronounced. Messali is a splendid supporter of our movement and as you will see from his pamphlet which we have just shipped, reasons things out as a socialist. The 'Front' represents a typical petty-bourgeois formation who desires 'a deal' with the French (they accept the Nehru proposals)." This policy was restated, in slightly modified form, in an article by Michael Banda in the March-April 1958 issue of *Labour Review:* "Whereas the FLN in its social composition is predominantly petty-bourgeois, the MNA, because of its overwhelming proletarian composition and its long traditions of struggle, is, though not a socialist party, the *precursor* of a revolutionary socialist party of the future. . . . "This much is certain. The future of Algeria does not rest with the FLN and its apologists but with the working class and landless peasantry. Only they can carry through the political and economic liberation of the country." Whatever its merits, this stance hardly resembles "conditionally" supporting "both wings of this movement in so far as they fought the French." This example, not too weighty in itself, is typical of the reliability of Healy's factionally-motivated "histories" of the Fourth International.]

  1. "The Truth About the Algerian Revolution: An Open Letter to The Militant"Sherry Mangan (as Patrick O'Daniel) · February 3, 1958 (prefatory note 14 April 1958) · pp. 87-96

Section XIII: Tim Wohlforth's Initial Views on Reunification

[Tim Wohlforth was the central leader of the grouping that was recruited to the SWP from the Shachtmanite Socialist Youth League during the regroupment period. This grouping opposed Shachtman's decision to lead the SYL and its parent group, the Independent Socialist League, into the Socialist Party. Wohlforth played a role in helping to rebuild a Trotskyist youth movement in the United States. At the time of this correspondence, he was the editor of the *Young Socialist.* Later he became the first national chairman of the Young Socialist Alliance. As a new recruit to the Socialist Workers Party, Wohlforth found it difficult to understand the continuing split in the Fourth International, given the apparent narrowness of the differences. He sought to establish contact with the IS in a series of letters to the editors of *4th International,* the quarterly magazine published by the IS. In addition, he made known his disagreement with the bitter factional tone which the British Trotskyist press was wont to adopt toward the IS. Discussions with party leaders and a new outburst of factionalism initiated by Pablo led Wohlforth to terminate this correspondence. Later, Wohlforth changed his mind about the desirability of reunification and became the leader of the American contingent of the international faction opposed to reunification. After Healy split from the reunified Trotskyist movement, Wohlforth became the leader of the American Committee for the Fourth International (later renamed the Workers League). After ten years of persistent effort to build this organization, Wohlforth was driven out in a Healyite witch-hunt against "CIA agents." This experience led him to rethink a number of political questions—including the reunification—and Wohlforth rejoined the SWP in 1976.]

  1. 1. Letter from Tim Wohlforth to Pierre Frank, editor of 4th InternationalTim Wohlforth · April 7, 1958 · pp. 98
  2. 2. Letter from Tim Wohlforth to Sherry ManganTim Wohlforth · May 21, 1958 · pp. 98-99
  3. 3. Letter from Tim Wohlforth to the editorial board of the British Trotskyist magazine Labour ReviewTim Wohlforth · May 21, 1958 · pp. 99-100
  4. 4. Letter from Tim Wohlforth to Sherry ManganTim Wohlforth · July 18, 1958 · pp. 100-101

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