Germain, who had asked to see me, was more friendly this time. Obviously he was anxious to please, and this facilitated a clear and relatively calm definition of our respective positions.
He claimed there was practically no difference now between our positions and theirs since, he contended, we had finally come around to their position on the Soviet Union and the crisis of Stalinism. Therefore, the reunification of the International was entirely possible, and it was becoming a very urgent matter. Without reunification, he insisted, the unique opportunities offered by the crisis of Stalinism would be lost. He insisted on the urgency of the matter and added that if we made no move in that direction, they would have to call another world congress of their own, for it was about time to have another one, and this would then inevitably deepen the split.
Of course, I made our views as clear as possible, rejecting the view that we had finally come around to their position. He said they had been right in their evaluation of the USSR and the crisis of Stalinism, while we had seen the true nature of the U.S. minority before the IS realized it. This did not warrant our expulsion of the minority which he considered wrong; for, he said, we should have waited until they openly proclaimed their revisionist theses. We expelled them, he said, because we suspected them to possibly develop into a revisionist group, and that was not yet a sufficient reason to expel them. He did not consider our discussion with the minority before the split a serious political discussion; and their alleged acts of indiscipline, he asserted, were within their rights as a faction and no ground for an expulsion either.
No political discussion with the IS had taken place before the SWP split from them, Germain said. The SWP, he said, had engineered the split because its leaders did not want the IS to eventually interfere in their sphere of interest. As long as they could do as they pleased in the U.S., he added, they had abstained from intervention in Europe. Even if we felt the IS was wrong or had become revisionist, he concluded, we would not have needed a public declaration of war against it and could have denounced it in an internal bulletin or declaration for members only, thus starting a thorough discussion of the question and avoiding a split.
He "sympathized with our difficulty now" to come to our members with something that was in contradiction to the slander we had heaped upon the IS; but that was our problem and had to be faced by us if we wanted reunification. They had never really slandered the SWP, he claimed. As to my suggestion that they try to seriously analyze their own policies of the past few years, political and other mistakes, he indignantly replied that this was out of the question. Never would they consent to a public admission of guilt. They might as well ask us to do the same; and it would make any reunification impossible.
[p. 12]
He defended the entire policy of the IS since the Third Congress; it had always been correct and respected democratic centralism. I challenged this affirmation. He told me that party democracy did not depend on respecting the forms of English parliamentarism (which as I pointed out, Lenin recommended to the Bolshevik Party) but much more on the level of political education of the rank and file. He did not think that level was so very high in the SWP, while it was quite satisfactory in most of their sections.
He attacked Burns' [Healy] attitude at the IS and claimed Peng had always been given ample opportunity to express his views. Their complaints were unjustified, according to him. When I asked him why—if he was so intent on reunification—they had tried to set up a new section in England and had threatened Burns, he replied that we had organized splits in many countries and they were only rallying their friends too. Just now, he said, Lora was splitting the Bolivian section at a very unfortunate moment, claiming to represent Cannon.
In France, they had not approved of Lambert's proposal for united action of all Trotskyist groups, since the Trotskyists did not represent a force able to engage in any important mass action of their own. Moreover, they were in favor of some kind of a framework establishing a greater amount of unity among the French Trotskyist groups. He was not against trying everything possible to unite the French Trotskyists, but for the present he was somewhat skeptical in this respect. The French situation, he contended, was very complicated and unsatisfactory; the policies of Lambert in the Algerian and all the other questions were disastrous and irresponsible. It was a big mistake, he insisted, to only support Messali Hadj against the Liberation Movement, to which most of the active fighters in Algeria belonged, which made Lambert appear to the Algerians as an agent of the Messalists whose money he was accepting. It was extremely tactless, he added, to slander the Liberation Movement and its heroic partisans, and Lambert's activities in the Algerian question had no positive result whatever.
To start reunification in France, he said, would hardly lead to a good result; it should be started by the most responsible elements of the movement; the SWP leaders and the IS: and it should be started soon. It was not right, he complained, to send our resolutions, etc., to the various sections, ignoring the IS. We could not have reunification without passing through the IS. Any exchange of texts would have to go through the IS and the International Committee or through a special parity commission. The SWP should declare where it stood on reunification and what its suggestions and conditions are. We should express our opinion as to how we think reunification should be achieved.
At a certain moment, when Manuel [Novack] left Europe, he said, Pablo had even offered his resignation in case this was wanted; but Manuel had assured him it was not wanted at all and that we had confidence in him. According to Germain, Pablo's thesis of the centuries of transition had been misinterpreted. He did not really approve of it; yet he did not consider it a revisionist or unreasonable theory at all. (He explained his view on this in detail.) As for the theses of the Third Congress, he (Germain) still thought the danger of a third world war probably had not been eliminated; he was not sure at all this danger had disappeared for the time being.
I made it clear to him that we considered the question of reunification a political one, not a question of diplomatic arrangements or maneuvers. He seemed to minimize the political differences and the organizational ones. He replied that, of course, we could have a serious political discussion if we wanted one, but there should not be any unnecessary delays. He seemed to consider the discussion of respective positions a secondary matter, since he claims there are no sufficient differences left to warrant a continuation of the split. But he did not oppose a discussion. I assured Germain I would correctly present his views and suggestions to the SWP leaders.
* * *
Burns said he was glad I had seen Germain. Germain's declarations exactly confirmed his (Burns') views on the Pabloites. Their support of the Algerian Liberation Movement and opposition to our support of the Messalists was significant. Germain was always on the wrong side in such questions. The Liberation Movement did not have in its programs the social reforms that the Messalists were demanding. It was also significant that Germain wanted maneuvers and negotiations around the unity question among what he considered the "big bosses". He obviously thought the anti-Pabloites were fools and that the SWP leaders were giving orders to the other sections following them. "Let the big boys get together and settle this"—that was Germain's suggestion. Germain's declaration had made the Pabloite tactics much clearer.
He (Burns) urged the SWP to write, as quickly as possible, a declaration to be made public by the International Committee about the causes and history of the split and about our position concerning the question of a merger. This he considered extremely important. I told him I felt exactly the same way. He said the declaration could be written either by Cannon or another comrade; but that it should be written as soon as possible since it was overdue. By not making such a public declaration we would involuntarily facilitate the Pabloite propaganda on this question. Such a declaration was necessary for the comrades who follow the Pabloites without understanding their real nature; it was just as necessary for certain younger comrades in our ranks whose political education was incomplete. It would clear up some of the illusions and distortions spread by the Pabloites.