[p. 73]
Dear Comrade Cannon,
I feel it is now necessary to write you this letter to discuss with you the question of reunification of our movement. I am afraid that, unless very great attention and effort is given to this question to bring about rapid and rational solution, our whole movement will inevitably suffer incalculable damage and even disaster.
In your reply to Comrade Goonewardene's letter of March 12, 1957, you clearly pointed out the preliminary condition which would make reunification possible: the drawing closer of the political views of both sides. In your letter addressed to the IS representative, Patrick [Mangan], at the end of April 1957, you made further concrete proposals for reunification. This shows that you have paid very great attention to this question and have expressed a responsible opinion on it. I was then in complete support of your views and propositions. (Ref. my letter to the members of the IC, June 1957)
But your views and propositions have encountered objections from certain comrades, particularly strong opposition and resistance from Comrade Burns [Healy] (ref. his letter to you last May), which resulted in a complete breakdown of the process of reunification, or at least a temporary setback.
In view of the historical interests of our movement, I feel deeply that any more delay in reunifying the movement is inadmissible.
Our movement has gone through thirty years of the most painful struggles, and today it comes to an historical turning point: Since the 20th Congress of the CPSU declared the liquidation of the "cult of the individual" of Stalin, his "personal dictatorship," and other crimes, and particularly after the revolutions broke out in Hungary and Poland, an unprecedented crisis has been unfurling throughout the Stalinist parties and has resulted in a general and profound movement of polarization and disintegration. This new situation opens up for the Trotskyist movement an entirely new and favorable objective condition. This is recognized by all of us.
But under this favorable objective condition, a most serious obstacle lies in the way of progress, and this obstacle is subjective: the split of our movement throughout the whole world. This state of things has already had a very bad influence in a number of countries and is preventing a real development of our movement there.
Now let me enumerate a few concrete examples to show how the situation has become intolerable and necessitates immediate change.
In France, within the Stalinist party (the strongest one outside the Soviet bloc), an organized left opposition has been created for the first time in over two decades. This opposition has published its bulletins, putting forward the demand for democratic discussion within the party, openly criticizing the bureaucratic leadership of the party, and examining the origins of Stalinist ideology. Most important of all: A great number of the members of this opposition are seeking and reading Trotsky's works and Trotskyist publications, and some among them have come to complete agreement with Trotskyism in its ideology. But on the other hand, owing to the division among Trotskyists, it is not only impossible to coordinate Trotskyists' action in a systematic intervention in the crisis of the Stalinist party; on the contrary, confronting the mutual attacks between hostile Trotskyist groups, especially in face of the Stalinophobic tendency (represented by the group led by Lambert) many belonging to the left opposition who agree or sympathize with Trotskyism become confused or even troubled. For instance, a militant of the left opposition once said to another militant who already adhered to a Trotskyist organization: "Disputes and splits have been occurring among the Trotskyists themselves, so even if we agree with Trotskyism, what shall we do? In which Trotskyist organization should we enter?" This feeling and hesitation is quite natural and rather general. Consequently, although there are a number of young militants who have already entered Frank's organization, the result of the active work done by the latter in the movement of left opposition, yet there are still many CP militants, who are in ideological agreement with Trotskyism and could easily be in our movement, who adopt an observer's attitude, and even become demoralized. This constitutes not only an obstacle for the development of our movement, but objectively helps the bureaucratic leadership of the Stalinist party to ease the tension of its crisis.
The crisis existing in the Italian Stalinist party has of course its own characteristics, but its dimension had attained a greater proportion than in the French Stalinist party. Numerous oppositional factions appeared in the party. Despite the fact that great confusion reigns in these groups, ideologically and politically, there exists a unanimous demand for democratic discussions within the party, criticism and opposition to the bureaucratic leadership. This situation is undoubtedly the best ground for the development of our movement in Italy. But unfortunately, owing to the division of our movement, it has not been possible to intervene effectively, this intervention being most necessary. In view of this, not only Livio's group belonging to the IS has been in favor of reunification, but the group who supports the IC is also firmly for reunification.
In Latin America, Chile is a country which is at present in a prerevolutionary state, and moreover, the crisis of the Stalinists there is most profound. The Trotskyist movement was divided among four organizations: One belonging to the IC and one to the IS, whereas the other two were neutral. I have met the representatives of the last three organizations. They unanimously affirmed that the objective conditions in Chile were very favorable to our movement, but the splits we had among ourselves were a great obstacle to their work. Therefore they all agreed that unity is absolutely necessary and very urgent. The representatives of the two originally neutral groups, not being satisfied with the leadership of the Latin American Bureau of the IS and even opposed to certain views and practices of this leadership, were nevertheless in favor of unity in the interests of the movement. Therefore, they have now fused with the organization belonging to the IS and strongly demand that both the IS and the IC proceed immediately to reunify the whole movement, so that the four Chilean groups could be completely absorbed in a really unified party, capable of exploiting the present favorable situation, which first of all consists in intervening systematically in the crisis developing within the Stalinist party, to win over the best revolutionary elements to our movement.
[p. 74]
I also met a delegate of the Japanese organization belonging to the IS. This organization was officially constituted after the Polish and Hungarian events, and a majority of its members came from the Stalinist party. It has already started to publish 4th International in the Japanese language. Hence there exists today two Trotskyist organizations. This Japanese comrade told me that the present situation in Japan was rather good for the development of our movement, and the existence of two Trotskyist organizations was an obstacle. He therefore demanded imperatively the unification of the whole movement so as to eliminate the subjective obstructing factor and to seize every opportunity for the progress of our movement.
I believe you know that in India, the objective conditions are also favorable for the development of the Trotskyist movement, but since there exists several autonomous Trotskyist organizations, it is vain to talk about exploiting such favorable conditions for the benefit of our movement. The unification of all Trotskyist organizations in India is conceivable only with the help of a unified international Trotskyist movement.
These concrete examples of a number of countries described above are sufficiently demonstrative of the absolute necessity for the reunification of our international movement under unprecedented favorable historical conditions, and delays can be tolerated no longer.
Now the central problem is: whether there is a lessening of the differences between the political positions of both sides, or the distance remains the same as in 1953, the year of the split, or even "the gulf between Pabloite revisionism and ourselves grows wider and wider." (ref. "The Struggle Against Pabloite Revisionism," published by the British comrades.) If the second assertion is the correct one, of course, there cannot be a question of reunification. Yet, the facts shown in the last two years only prove the correctness of the first assertion.
In this regard, in your reply to Goonewardene's letter, you pointed out a tendency toward the coming closer of the political positions of the two sides since the open anti-Trotskyist activities of Cochran, Collins [Lawrence], and Mestre, etc., and under the pressure of the evolution of events in the recent years. Precisely for this reason, you made further concrete proposals for reunification negotiations. According to some documents of the IS which I have read, including the "Decline and Fall of Stalinism" criticized by Comrade Sinclair [Hunter], particularly the impressions which I have drawn from my contacts with a number of representatives of sections of the IS and my discussions with them on some important political questions. It is possible for me to show that your judgement is objective and correct.
The British comrades, when asserting that "the gulf . . . grows wider and wider," have not furnished convincing arguments and proofs. This is reflected in Sinclair's criticisms on the "Decline and Fall of Stalinism." If we try to read this document, "Decline and Fall of Stalinism," calmly, though we can easily discover certain ambiguities and mistakes, and especially in Germain's academic approach, in general this cannot be considered as a document going farther away from our position, but rather more progressive in comparison with the contents of "The Rise and Decline of Stalinism," and therefore closer of our position. The fact that this document stresses and affirms that the political revolution in the USSR and the East European countries is inevitable and is more and more approaching its explosive point, shows an rapprochement on a principled question, such as the question of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, since Germain retorted to Sinclair's criticisms, there has been only silence, which also reveals the fragility of the assertion of a "gulf growing wider and wider."
In reality, the best explanation can be furnished by turning to the tactics adopted by Frank's group in France in their work within the Stalinist party. As you know, according to the "entrism" discovered by Pablo, we Trotskyists, in integrating ourselves into the Stalinist party, have only to push the leadership of this party to the left, to respond to the pressure of the masses; then it would enter on the road of revolution. But in the last two years, the tactics employed by Frank's organization in their work within the Stalinist party is rather the opposite. Their influence of Trotskyist ideas has caused the rank-and-file masses in the Stalinist party to struggle against its bureaucratic leadership, and their principal objective is to win over all revolutionary militants and to crush this party. It is precisely so that they have played an important role in the movement of left opposition within the Stalinist party and have influenced and drawn a considerable number of young militants into their organization. This is precisely the traditional position of Trotskyists towards the Stalinist party. Unfortunately, our Lambert group, having adopted an extremely sectarian attitude towards the left opposition within the Stalinist party, have gained very little from the crisis of Stalinism.
Comrade Burns, in his letter to you, particularly underlined that Pablo had not changed his "political method" as the main argument to reject and refuse negotiations for reunification. As to this, I expressed my views in my letter addressed to the members of the IC last June in the following words: "I personally deem it most difficult for Pablo to change his revisionist viewpoints based on impressionism and his bureaucratic methods and maneuvers in organizational matters. Nevertheless, we cannot refuse or delay the unification. Our object is not a few individuals like Pablo and etc., but the majority of the comrades in the national sections remaining with the IS who are loyal to the Trotskyist movement."
Comrade Burns in his reply to my letter, posed the question as follows: "If the majority within Pablo's movement are Trotskyists, how does it happen he gets away with his policies so easily?"
[p. 75]
No political discussions were held before the split except in the SWP for over a year and a brief dispute in the British Section, and hence no dividing line was traced between orthodox Trotskyism and Pablo's revisionism. In France, the principal factor which led to the split was that: A great majority of the leading comrades of the international, including some of those who later joined and participated in the movement of the orthodox Trotskyists, gave their full support to Pablo's views and measures, both politically and organizationally. Consequently, there was a lack of clear political understanding among the rank-and-file militants in the sections which the IS was able to control. Moreoever, the extraordinary measures adopted by us (such as the "Open Letter" of the SWP and the constitution of the International Committee), though at that time compelled by the circumstances and even necessary, were, however, not easily understood by all the comrades of the International. It was under such very particular conditions that Pablo has been able to "get away with his policies so easily." These facts must be patiently explained to the members of all sections.
I can give you a few examples in relation to the above. At first when the Chinese comrades received the "Open Letter" of the SWP, a great majority among them agreed with the political positions of this letter. But at the same time, they thought: To publish the "Open Letter" before any documents were submitted to the sections of the International and before any political discussions took place was not in conformity to the principle of democratic centralism and was therefore wrong. Regarding this, we have written long letters, enumerating in detail how Pablo controlled the International's leading organ by bureaucratic methods and excluded, at his will, opponents, which rendered impossible any normal democratic discussion inside the organization; it was under such unusual circumstances that we were forced to adopt exceptional measures, such as the "Open Letter." The Chinese comrades were then convinced of the necessity of the "Open Letter" and entered into the struggle. If there had not been a comprehensive explanation based on our own experiences, they would certainly have approved the political positions of the "Open Letter," but remained skeptical or even in opposition to the organizational measures.
An old German militant, Comrade Hippe, who was liberated from a concentration camp in East Germany in 1956, also expressed political agreement with the IC, but was skeptical on the organizational tactic (on the same ground as the Chinese comrades: No democratic internal discussions before the publication of the "Open Letter"). Consequently, he has adopted a neutral attitude organizationally and hopes to participate actively in a unified organization. I had a conversation with him on this question in February 1957 and pointed out a number of facts from my personal experiences with Pablo's bureaucratic arbitrariness and his violation of democratic centralism in organizational matters. He seemed to be ready again to take steps organizationally.
These two examples show us that even some loyal Trotskyists and old militants who agreed politically with us, still have had difficulty understanding and accepting the exceptional action in publishing the "Open Letter" and have expressed doubts or objections (Comrade Dowson of Canada had a similar attitude at the beginning). I am therefore quite convinced that, if the great majority of the comrades of the sections of the IS could not follow the appeals launched in the "Open Letter" and still remained with the IS, it was mainly because they could not understand why we adopted this "exceptional measure" before submitting a document criticizing Pablo's revisionism for internal discussion, to let them have an opportunity to discuss and to gain a clear idea about the differences in positions, and hence they became resentful.
If the document on Pablo's revisionism had been submitted to the whole International before the split and a thoroughgoing discussion had been engaged in to enable a clear and fundamental demarcation between orthodox Trotskyism and revisionism, such as during the fight against Burnham and Shachtman's revisionism, the result would have been quite different. As Marxists, we have to deal with this kind of question the same as with other problems: to make objective analysis and evaluation, so as to avoid a purely subjective judgement that all those who agreed with us (on the exceptional measure of the "Open Letter") are orthodox Trotskyists and those who were skeptical or did not agree with us are all Pabloites.
On the other hand, since there had been internal discussions in the U.S. and England beforehand, there had been a certain degree of political differentiation, the Cochran and Collins tendency was led in the logical development of their revisionist thought, initiated by Pablo, to the ultimate anti-Trotskyist and pro-Stalinist conclusions, and have since completely dropped away from the Trotskyist movement. It was precisely for reasons to the contrary, that is, no political discussion had been begun before the split, that the great majority of the comrades in the sections, although remaining with the IS, continue to fight under the banner of Trotskyism.
There is another important point: those comrades who remain in the sections of the IS have for a long period been under the influence of Pabloism. There has been certain ideological confusion. The iron facts of historical events, the 20th Congress which proclaimed a liquidation of the "cult of the individual" and Stalin's other crimes, the Polish and Hungarian revolutions, clearly expose Cochran's, Collins', and Mestre's anti-Trotskyist thoughts and validated the entire Trotskyist tradition, principle, and program, particularly analysis and prognostications on the Stalinist bureaucracy. It is precisely for this reason that they unanimously and insistently demand reunification with us—this tendency is reflected in the motion unanimously adopted by the "Fifth Congress" organized by the IS in favor of reunification.
From the above explanations, I am able to affirm that the great majority of the comrades in the sections of the IS are not "Pabloites," but they are the same as us, in general loyal to Trotskyism, and are making a great effort in their struggle for our movement. There are a quite considerable number of cadres formed by our movement during long years, who are a part of the precious property accumulated by our movement, and will play the important role of a motor force in the future progress of our movement in different countries. We should not simply blot them out under the name of "Pabloite" simply because they remain in the sections of the IS, and to refuse to unify and to collaborate with them.
[p. 76]
Comrade Burns, in his letter to you, referred to a telegram of congratulations addressed by the trade-union organization led by the Ceylon party to the trade-union leadership of the Soviet Union on the occasion of May Day, and made the following assertion: "They are now further away from us politically than at any time previously." This implies that there can be no possibility for our reunification with them.
A nationalist conservative tendency and a certain reconciling tendency towards the Stalinist parties which exist in the political attitude of some in the leadership of the LSSP is reflected not only in this congratulatory telegram for May First, but more in the open talks of their official delegation to China. Not long ago, I wrote an open letter to Comrade Goonewardene criticizing them for this. But we cannot, however, draw the conclusion that the Ceylon comrades have left Trotskyist positions and are further away from us politically. There is one thing that we have to recognize: The LSSP is not only a party which has a long history of struggles but also a party with real mass support. Especially in the last few years, it has actively and courageously led a great number of mass struggles of considerable importance, and has won the support from large layers of the population. It is today approaching the door of power. Although a few in its leadership have manifested a quite serious conservative and compromising tendency, the great majority of its cadres and militants are faithful to the revolution and to Trotskyism. (This has been clearly shown in the mass struggles led by them in the past years). Our role is not alienate them from us, to abandon them, but on the contrary, to secure close collaboration with them, to make necessary criticisms appropriately, to try to correct certain wrong tendencies in its leadership, so as to facilitate their taking power. This will not only have a decisive significance for the movement in Ceylon, but for the whole Far East, particularly the movement in India, it will play a very important role. This is possible only when our whole movement is reunified, and we are reunited with the LSSP, and under a leadership of a unified international organization. To reproach the Ceylon comrades behind their backs or to reject any attempt of reunifying with them is a negative and silly attitude, and irresponsible to our movement.
In a word, from your analysis and assertions, and the examples and explanations given by me above, it's quite clear that no matter what differences may still exist between the two sides politically, in general, we can say there is a tendency toward drawing closer together; especially we can see that the great majority of the comrades of the sections of the IS are loyal to the Trotskyist movement. All this proves that the preliminary conditions for reunification already exist.
There is also the important organizational problem of Pablo's bureaucratic method and maneuvering.
When discussing the parity committee at the IC meeting during the autumn of 1954, the French comrades stressed distinctly the horrible bureaucratic methods of Pablo, which was one of the reasons for them rejecting acceptance of the parity committee. And when discussing the unification at the IC meeting last September, I proposed an attempt at negotiations based on your "concrete proposals." Comrade Burns again stressed Pablo's bureaucratic maneuvers to prove that we could not negotiate with him. Therefore, I feel this question should be examined objectively. Because it is a key question not only as to whether the unification parley can be or not, but also as it closely relates to the internal system of the future International leading body.
Needless to say, I have specifically opposed and condemned Pablo's bureaucratic control and his maneuvers. But the formation of such bureaucratic control and maneuvers cannot be explained by his individual character and ambition. Of course, Pablo is the typical arbitrary bureaucrat and is ambitious. But at that time, if the leaders of all the sections, especially the leaders of the European sections had maintained and practiced the traditions and principles of democratic centralism and given the International leading organ and its leaders supervision such as the necessary criticism for misconduct and incorrect speeches, then Pablo's character and ambition would have had no chance to develop. At least it would not have reached such an uncontrolled degree. Unfortunately, just the contrary course developed.
When I first arrived here in the summer of 1951, I was told by a Chinese Comrade H. that the most authoritative person in the International leading organ was Pablo. (At that time I was not even familiar with this name). He further quoted Livingstone's [Clarke] words, that Pablo can match Trotsky politically and surpass the latter organizationally. When I protested to A., the representative of the IS at the Far East Committee of the 3rd World Congress, for breaking of my report on the Chinese question, Burns came to talk with me for Pablo. Besides attributing all the responsibility to A, he said: "Pablo is my intimate friend. He is a genius politically and organizationally and is capable of accepting others' views." Later, he said to my daughter: "Pablo should think of himself as the successor of Trotsky." Such propaganda for Pablo we often heard from other channels. Therefore, you can see that Pablo's "authority" and "individual cult" was fostered like that.
As Pablo had already gotten the worship and support of a part of the International leadership, particularly from the U.S. and England, naturally he felt his prestige was high and above all criticism and control, and that he could arbitrarily suppress and attack any opponents. So when Frank & Germain disagreed with him on some issues in the early part of 1951, he threatened to expel them from the IS and tried to get the support of the SWP through Livingstone for that action. On the dispute between the French majority and minority, Pablo suppressed the majority on his own by forbidding the democratic discussion with the party and arbitrarily suspending the functions of the sixteen members of the French Central Committee. Around this time he was supported by the leaders of some strong sections, especially the English section. These events I saw personally. For instance, when Germain, J[ungclas] from Germany, L[ivio] from Italy, and I all opposed his arbitrary action in suspending the functions of the French sixteen majority members of their Central Committee, Burns firmly supported Pablo. And when Pablo rudely and tyrannically attacked and suppressed me, not one among all the leaders of the International criticized him, and even more or less defended or excused him.
If there had not been this "personality cult" propagated by Livingstone and an English leader, if on many important political issues and organizational measures, particularly on the despotic measures of suspending the functions of the French sixteen members of the Central Committee, Pablo had been criticized and punished, then he could never have practiced his arbitrariness and maneuvers, and he would have been deprived of his position in the International leading organ. Then the later split could have been avoided. This would have proved that the correct and persistent practice of the principles and traditions of democratic centralism can prevent the grotesque growth of arbitrary bureaucracy and ambition.
[p. 77]
In fact, Pablo's "authority" and "personality cult" was attacked fatally by the exposure of Pablo in the "Open Letter" and in many articles and the leaving of the movement of his cothinkers, such as Cochran, Livingstone, Collins, Mestre, etc. He can continue to maintain his post in the IS mainly because he craftily takes advantage of our "extraordinary procedure" (such as the publication of the "Open Letter" and the formation of the IC without any internal democratic discussion), and there has been no political activity shown by the IC and also its unwise attitude towards the parity committee. But in spite of this, Pablo's "prestige" and "influence" has greatly declined among the sections under the IS. The numbers of his opponents and critics have increased greatly. (This showed clearly in the so-called 5th World Congress convened by the IS). He can never again act arbitrarily to expel others and maneuver.
Under such a situation, if we proceed with the unification parley with the IS, we need not fear Pablo's maneuvers. Because as soon as one is discovered, we can reveal it to the rank and file on both sides. He will then have no place to hide from the light of criticism of the rank and file.
Also, we have to understand that the reason that the IS has appealed to us over and over again, and even sent a delegate to negotiate with you, is not because of Pablo's simple individual maneuvers, or Burns said, "A Pabloite trap under the patch quilt of false unity," (in the letter he sent to me) but the pressure of the imminent demand for unity by the rank and file of sections belonging to the IS. The conditions are such that Pablo does not dare maneuver. In case he does, he will be attacked indignantly by the rank and file of all sections, and they will blame him for breaking up the unity movement.
Therefore, I consider that those who refuse to negotiate for the unification by stressing Pablo's bureaucratic measures and maneuvers or "traps," either don't fully understand the situation mentioned above or attempt to maintain the split condition in our movement in order to benefit their own aims.
Because of the control of the International leading organ by Pablo in the past, which led to the split, certain comrades now suspect that it would happen again after the unity. I consider that this problem is not very hard to solve. If we understand the cause of Pablo's "authority", his "personality cult", his arbitrary actions and maneuvers (as pointed out above), then from now on, all the sections will share the responsibility and collective leadership within the leading organization according to the tradition and principle of democratic centralism. And there will be no room for individual arbitrariness and maneuvers to exist. Also, it is very important, after the bitter lesson and experience of this split that the candidates for the future international leading organ will necessarily be selected carefully. And those who abuse or are incapable of fulfilling their functions, can be criticized or even recalled according to the International constitution. (If the existing constitution is not adequate, we can revise or implement it.)
In a word, there is no material basis for our International to become bureaucratic. If we strictly observe and practice the principles and traditions of democratic centralism, we will not only avoid bureaucratic arbitrary actions, but also unprincipled splits.
As to what Healy said: "We are completely opposed to the return to the old Pabloite conception of International organization: The draining of national section resources, so that some globe trotter could stiffen up Pablo's faction in some small groups thousands of miles away; the constant spate of meetings in Paris which meant sections raising funds to send representatives; our International work must be organized on a realistic basis in line with the resources of sections and not along lines which tend to imitate the old Comintern." (His letter to you of May 13 last year.)
It is true, "we are completely opposed to the return to the old Pablo conception of international organization", that is the over-concentrated power in the general secretaryship (not simply limited to the "draining of national section resources"). And at the same time, we should refuse absolutely to have our international organization become a loose and inactive organization similar to the 2nd International, and which has been the true picture of the IC during the few years it has existed.
During the four years of the existence of the IC, it has accomplished almost nothing except in the earlier period when it engaged in the anti-Pabloist movement. On the other hand, it is far from a position of political leadership. For example, it issued no proclamation or resolution on such important historical events as the Russian 20th Congress revelations. (A French comrade was assigned to write a draft of the resolution at the IC meeting of March 1956, but it has never been written.) What a "conception of the International!" It was formally decided at the IC meeting of Nov. 1956 that the World Congress would be convened in the summer of 1957, (I was assigned to draft the political resolution, which was sent to England in Jan. 1957, but they delayed publication till Aug. 1957), but was cancelled by the IC secretary without announcing any reason. Again, what a "Conception of International Organization!"
The Italian section is one of the most important sections among the European countries. In spite of the numerous suggestions to invite the Italian comrades to the IC meetings made by me to the English comrades, there has not been one single Italian representative invited to the IC meetings during the past three years. The reason given was the financial difficulty, and yet there had been no difficulty in sending two British delegates to every IC meeting. (In fact, the IC has never made a financial statement, and I know nothing about its financial status.)
In a word, the IC is not a workable set-up but is very slovenly; there is no office like the IS to work in collectively; no publications in which to issue propaganda material and put forward our slogans; no internal bulletin to exchange opinions and information among all the sections. As far as IC meetings are concerned, they are not only always held late but there is also little discussion of political questions. The resolution for preparing the World Congress was not even formally discussed. And worse yet, there is no preparation work done before meetings (especially the preparation of the political documents), and very often the resolutions passed in the IC meetings are never carried out. (For instance, several discussion drafts written by the SWP for the IC have neither been discussed by the IC itself nor has a decision to translate them into French and German for discussion among all the sections which was made at an IC meeting been carried out. The IC neglected this matter completely.)
[p. 78]
The arbitrary action in dealing with some matters by the secretary of the IC inevitably rose from the slovenly and irresponsible situation of the IC as I mentioned above. For instance, the cancellation of the resolution of calling for the World Congress and the rejection of the suggestion to invite the Italian delegates to the IC meeting on the pretext of financial difficulty. If our international organization is not a decoration, but one to serve our movement and the world revolution, this extremely slovenly and even paralyzing situation within the IC during the recent few years is inadmissible.
It is a pity that Comrade Burns completely forgot or did not understand the deplorable working conditions within the IC developed in recent years: its extreme slovenliness and inactivity, when he criticized Pablo's "Conception of International Organization." This proves that his understanding of the "International Conception" by stressing "Our international work must be organized on a realistic basis in line with the resources of the sections. . . ." is in doubt.
In the letter Burns sent to you, he said: "For some time now the propaganda resources of Pablo and Germain have been assiduously spreading the story that they can only negotiate directly with Cannon. Our section and the IC are looked upon as some sort of hangers-on to the SWP. The visit of P.O'D. [Mangan] is designed to strengthen such gossip. This 'big boss' conception of negotiations is typical of the 'cultism' in general. Because of this the IC and the SWP must march in step together. Nothing can or must be decided without the fullest discussion." I feel that when one uses distortion to evade one's duty, it is imperative that the facts be made known.
In the first place, I should point out that P.O'D. was assigned by the IS to negotiate directly unity with you, not because "the British Section and the IC are looked upon as some sort of hangers-on to the SWP," but as a result of the ignoring of the appeal for unity by the IEC and the irresponsible attitude shown towards the parity committee by the IC and particularly by Burns himself.
The parity committee originated from the "direct unity parley" by Burns and the Ceylon delegates in July 1954 as an important proposal which Burns put forward in the IC of Aug. 1954 and was then rejected vehemently by the French comrades. However, after a vehement discussion, his motion was passed by the great majority. To be cautious, the IC decided it should be discussed and approved by all the sections. When the IC rediscussed the parity committee in Nov. the same year, Burns put forward the concrete conditions of participating in the parity committee, which was approved by the great majority: For general political discussion by the rank and file of both sides through the parity committee, I was assigned by the IC to write a draft of "Criticism of Pabloism" and the British comrades to write the political drafts, which were written by the U.S. comrades later at the request of Burns. Finally three representatives to the parity committee was elected from the IC. Comrade Bloch of France, Secretary of the IC, was one of them. Bloch refused to accept, and Burns even asked for his resignation as secretary of the IC. Hence, Burns became the secretary of the IC. This shows that the parity committee arose after very serious consideration and discussion by the IC with the approval of all sections.
A first meeting of the parity committee was held in Nov. 1954. The IS request of early 1955 for a second meeting was ignored by the secretary of the IC. At the IC meeting April the same year, Comrade Burns proposed to abolish the parity committee. The only reason he gave was that it was an error for the IC to accept the p.c. at its very beginning. But why it was an error, he didn't explain. Thus the parity committee was abolished without any reason and by this it became impossible to negotiate unity. Later, Burns attributed the responsibility of abolishing the p.c. to the Ceylonese, because the latter did not fulfill their promise of sending delegates to the parity committee (see his letter sent to me last June). Neither had he pointed out that the participation of the Ceylonese delegates to the parity committee was the condition for us to accept it in the two IC meetings of August and November 1954, when discussing the question of the parity committee nor had he included it in the few conditions, he drafted, for the IC to participate in the parity committee. This shows that he tried to shift his responsibility to the Ceylonese.
The inconsistent, contradictory and irresponsible attitude of Burns towards the parity committee (I pointed this out in my letter to him April 15, 1955) caused the IS to lose all hope of trying to negotiate unity with the IC. This feeling extended to the great majority of comrades of the IS, that the IC was not seriously interested in unity. (Also, it helped to stabilize Pablo's position in the IS). Thus, the Parity Committee has become a joke to sections under the IC, because before accepting the Parity Committee, they were asked for approval.
Although the IC blocked the road to a unity parley by abolishing the Parity Committee unilaterally, it does not negate the desire of the majority comrades under the IS to unify with us. Particularly after the unprecedented crisis of the Stalinist parties in every country caused by the 20th congress of the CPSU, and the Polish and Hungarian revolutions. They feel the imperative necessity for unity. So the IEC of the IS was pressed to appeal for unity to us at its meeting of Nov. 1956, which was ignored by the IC. Under such circumstances, the IS sending a representative directly to you to negotiate unity was forced, on the one hand, by the strong pressure of its rank and file demanding unity; (this kind of pressure was manifested distinctly by Frank faction) on the other hand, because the IC had fully blocked-off the unity parley. According to this, I cannot see any tendency within the IS to look upon the British Section and IC as "some sort of hanger-on of the SWP," but rather in order to achieve unity, they look for a serious and responsible person who is capable of representing our movement in negotiations.
Comrade Burns scorned this imperative act of the IS as "this big boss conception is typical of cultism in general." But scorn cannot cover the fact, which is that after abolishing the parity committee advocated by him and rejecting any unity parley, he tried to use these loathesome phrases to prevent you from pushing the unity movement forward, and thus kept alive a split when the historical situation was favorable for unity.
[p. 79]
His statement "because of this the IC and the SWP must march in step together" means that the SWP must reject any unity parley with the IS. The resolution concerning the unity was passed by the convention of the SWP last June. Burns took it up in the IC meeting in September and had it passed, instead of discussing the letter sent by the IS to the IC last August, in which, it was clearly stated that they had accepted the first proposal mentioned by your letter to Mangan which is to arrive at a mutual political agreement as the condition for beginning the unity parley. It seems that he will use any opportunity and method to block the unity parley. Although he said in his letter sent to me that "we are in favor of a unity that will work," he affirmed privately to me in the meeting last September that "it is impossible to unite with Pablo's faction." So, what he said in his letter to me is a diplomatic phrase.
Comrade Burns also said in the letter he sent to you: "The movement here has been largely educated on the experiences of the SWP and its long struggle for principle. We would like to believe today we are reaching a position where we can help our American comrades as a result of the favorable conditions under which we work. . . . for the first time in our history we are assembling a first-class intellectual cadre, alongside a trade union fraction which is steadily increasing its influence, . . . we shall, we believe, in time win over most important dissident elements from the CP."
In here, Comrade Burns particularly enumerated the achievements of the British Section which "can help our American comrades." This is fine, but he neglected to say that the one who desperately needs help is not the "American comrades," but those of Europe, especially the Trotskyist movement in Italy and France. Also, though the achievement of the British is very valuable, it is only in a preliminary stage. Tremendous time and effort remains to be spent before they win over the great majority of militants from the British Stalinist party, especially the worker militants (not only "the most important dissident elements"). Before the British can achieve this, our international movement, especially the French and Italian sections must intervene effectively in the crisis of the Stalinist party everywhere. But Comrade Burns neglected this aspect to which our International should give special attention and effort.
We must understand that France and Italy are in a real prerevolutionary stage. The Stalinist parties there are the most important backbone of the Stalinist movement outside the Soviet bloc. As far as the members of French Stalinist party is concerned, there are 300,000 of them (10 times more than the British Stalinist party), controlling the trade unions of 3,000,000 members and supported by 5,000,000 voters. In case this party disintegrates (the refusal of the majority of its members to participate in the demonstration of September 17, 1957, clearly reflects that the crisis of the party is developing intensely and extensively) the Italian Stalinist party will follow the same path and hence the Stalinist parties of all the capitalist countries, especially those in Europe (including England) will be fatally struck. Also it will stimulate the anti-Stalinist sentiment of the masses in the Soviet bloc and the Soviet bureaucracy will be more and more isolated and shaken. So from the international viewpoint, our movement must pay special attention to the Trotskyists in France and Italy by concentrating all their efforts to intervene effectively in the crisis of the Stalinist parties there, and win over their militants to our movement. This will not only solve the crisis of the revolutionary leadership in France and Italy and will lead to a victorious revolution, but also will be the important preliminary step to solving the crisis of world revolutionary leadership. To achieve this, the Trotskyist organizations in France and Italy must first be unified for the purpose of exploiting the present favorable situation and the coming more favorable situation; to correctly, systematically, and resolutely work in the Stalinist parties. By stubbornly opposing the unity (first the unity of France and Italy), it is shown that Comrade Burns either does not understand or completely neglects the important and decisive role of our movement in Italy and France.
From the above analysis and explanation, it is my opinion that the attitude and opinions of Comrade Burns toward the unity question as the secretary of the IC rises from a narrow cliquish base or sectarian viewpoint and is inconsistent with the historical interests of our movement. If he persistently maintains his viewpoint, I consider that it is necessary to let all the sections under the IC know, discuss, consider, and express their opinions on the question of unity. It is feasible to quote Burns' works here: "Everybody has the right to speak out and get things clear" (in the letter he sent to you).
"Without a socialist revoution, in the next historical period at that, a catastrophe threatens the whole culture of mankind." This sentence written by Trotsky in our program is more emergent in the present nuclear epoch. "The crisis of proletarian leadership, having become the crisis in mankind's culture, can be resolved only by the Fourth International." These words, under the present unprecedented crisis of the Stalinist parties in every country is particularly realistic. The question remains: Can we, subjectively, fully recognize the "emergent" and "realistic" situation, which is, in the first place the unification of all Trotskyist strength and systematically intervene in the increasing crisis in the Stalinist parties and win over their militants to be our basic cadres to help solve the crisis of revolutionary leadership, and further unify all the revolutionary strength and the masses to form a revolutionary party to prepare for the coming revolutionary situation.
I believe you understand the trend of the world situation, the historical role and the present imminent tasks of our movement. So I, particularly, hope that you, due to your long experience and participation in the revolutionary movement, and your knowledge of the history of the three internationals, and especially your collaboration with Trotsky, will contribute to our international movement by giving more attention and effort to help the international solve this important and imperative issue, which is, at present, to solve the problem of unity in our movement. This is not what Burns scorned as "big boss" and "typical cultism," but the prestige of an individual formed by long experience in the general revolutionary movement, particularly in our Trotskyist movement.
You knew that Trotsky had been engaged in building a unified revolutionary international from the time he was forced to leave Russia in 1929, particularly after the defeat of the German revolution of 1933. For this, he not only wrote a most perfect program but spent a lot of effort patiently convincing the sections in all the countries to unify so as to form the foundation of a united revolutionary international (in his many letters to all the sections). If he was still alive, seeing the movement split under the present favorable situation, I believe he would try his utmost to unify it without delay.
[p. 80]
Our anti-Pabloist movement successfully proved our political correctness, as is shown by the open resignation from the movement by Pablo's intimate cothinkers: Cochran, Collins, Clarke, Mestre, and etc. and the retreat of Pablo himself in ceasing to openly express his revisionism, and the strong demand for unity by the great majority of comrades of the sections under the IS. But organizationally, we have achieved almost nothing, because of our "extraordinary measure" which was not easily understood by the majority of comrades and the mistakes (its attitude towards the parity commission) and inertia of the IC. This is shown irrefutably by the fact that a great majority of comrades remain in the IS with Pablo as general secretary.
Therefore, the nub of the matter is, it is imperative to unite all the Trotskyist strength by maintaining our political position (which has been successful), that is, the orthodox Trotskyist position based on our Transitional Program, in order to meet the immediate needs of the historical movement in this most favorable objective situation. To achieve this, I propose: (a) To deal with such an important question as unity, we should actively, instead of passively, as formerly, adopt a responsible attitude. Ask the IS to give us a more concrete answer to all proposals concerning unity mentioned by your letter to Patrick. (b) At the same time, we should accept the IS request that a representative from the U.S. participate in the unity parley. This request is not only rational but is a necessity if unity parley is to be effective. Because of the irresponsible attitude towards the parity committee shown by the IC in the past, any unity parley without the participation of the U.S. representative will have no good result.
Finally, I would like to see you propose that the leadership of the SWP reconsider their stand on the unity question based on the fact of the imminent demands of the Trotskyist sections of every country and take a strong position. Although the SWP is not affiliated to the IC because of the Voorhis Act, but due to its contributions to our movement and its prestige in the International, its advocacy of unity will have an important and decisive influence. On the other hand, since the SWP openly mobilized the struggle against Pabloism, it has a responsibility to help our movement reunify organizationally.
Due to the extraordinarily favorable objective situation, our movement is at the historical turning point. I urge you to pay special attention to the time element which will have a decisive significance in solving the important question, at present, the question of unity.
With the best fraternal greetings,
S.T. Peng