Dear Com. Burns [Healy]:
We have just concluded a highly successful convention. It was well attended and enthusiastic. The party is recruiting members. The circulation of the press and literature is increasing. We are beginning to break out of isolation. The membership is facing the future with confidence. The main task guiding the party's activity for the period ahead is that of the regroupment of revolutionary socialists. This has proved a very fruitful arena for us at a time when all other radical tendencies are in crisis. We have registered gains among all of them, including not only Stalinists, but also the moribund SP and the Shachtmanites.
A left wing has been formed inside the Shachtmanite youth organization. It has been waging a principled offensive against Shachtman's craven capitulation to the Social Democracy. We have found that among them there are serious, devoted young revolutionists, who will undoubtedly represent an important acquisition for us.
The convention action on the recent developments in the World Movement has already been communicated to you.
In conjunction with the convention the comrades at the center had an opportunity to discuss the unity question with Comrade Cannon present. The opinions expressed here represent our collective views:
1. We will be only too glad to include in our unity proposals the amendment you request in your letter adopted by your EC May 13th. You are quite right in insisting that there is no question of healing a split in Britain. The split with Lawrence left your group the only legitimate and undisputed Trotskyist section. Today, as you report, Lawrence is seeking unity not with Trotskyists, but with Stalinists.
In any negotiations to heal the split of 1953, the Grant group can have no claim to special consideration. If they wish to reintegrate themselves in the British Section, they should apply to the section for admission and you could if you wish accept them and extend to them the rights of a minority with proportional representation on leading bodies.
2. We heartily endorse your statement of being "completely opposed to a return to the old Pablo conception of international organization . . ." We were troubled by Pablo's organization methods even when we thought we saw eye to eye with him politically. But it took a serious political disagreement to point up the full danger of the excessive centralism which Pablo and Germain preached and practiced.
The Pabloite organization method has been detrimental to the development of cadres, especially in France, where the IS had hovered over the organization ever since the end of the war, intervening not only in the political struggles but also in all the petty squabbles and personality conflicts. Even if all the world's wisdom and experience were concentrated in the IS, such a method would hinder the development of a native leadership in France. The record of Pablo's interventions in France, if someone took the trouble to compile it, would make a good manual on how not to lead an international organization. You of course have had your own experience, including the constant financial squeeze you refer to in your letter.
3. We can assure you also that we are fully aware of the remaining political differences between us and the Pabloites, especially of the differences in method. Pablo is essentially an impressionist and an opportunist in his politics. Such kindred souls as Clarke and Lawrence gravitated towards him naturally. The difference between them is that Pablo proved far more sensitive than either Clarke or Lawrence to the changes in the objective situation signaled especially by the uprising of the East German working class in June 1953. Their parting came shortly after that.
[p. 37]
Everything we said in our Open Letter about Pablo's capitulationist line at that time was correct. But Pablo began at that time to pull back from the consequences of his line, while Clarke and Lawrence did not. This type of an about-face is not new for Pablo. He executed earlier a similar turn in relation to Yugoslavia. You will recall the time he staked everything on Tito—when he was going to convert the Yugoslavs by sending delegations, etc. All criticism of Tito's line disappeared from the Pablo-controlled press and we were reprimanded by him for carrying critical articles in our paper. Germain wrote a series of articles after a visit to Yugoslavia which had nothing but enthusiastic praise for everything there.
This happened at the very time when Tito was preparing to back the West in the Korea war. Germain's articles became an embarrassment. Pablo left him suspended in midair while he himself came forward with the 3rd Congress line that the military showdown between the Kremlin and Washington was not far distant and that all the problems be resolved in that war. Germain had great difficulty at that time in readjusting himself to the new line and Pablo was on the verge of a complete break with him, just as he broke later with Clarke and Lawrence when they failed to make their adjustment after German events.
When we speak today of the changed objective situation and its effect on the Pabloite tendency we are not thereby according them any special credit. All we say is that they have zigzagged between Trotskyism and alien tendencies depending on the prevailing wind—when the wind is favorable they speak and act like Trotskyists.
In connection with the Polish and Hungarian events, their line, as reflected in their press, has paralleled ours in all essentials. It is important to note this fact despite the contradictory character of their resolutions. If these events were momentary, we could say that tomorrow it would all change once again. But we do not think so. We think we are in the period of the definitive crisis of the Stalinist bureaucracy. That henceforth it cannot have any attractive power capable of engendering significant capitulationist currents in our movement. We therefore think that the objective situation is favorable to a reunification.
The objective situation has come powerfully to our aid. It has helped us attract elements who only yesterday were hostile to us. Why shouldn't it apply also to the Pabloites.
4. We can easily lose the advantage of a favorable objective situation if we were to behave in a narrow factional manner, or if we gave cause for anybody to charge that we are behaving in such a manner. The Pabloite appeal for unity must therefore be answered so as to leave no doubt that we favor unity. This is especially important when unity appears plausible and realistic, and when a continued split becomes more and more difficult to justify. The very fact that the press of the two tendencies speak in similar terms about the major world events leaves no other course for us but to say in no uncertain terms, "Yes, we are for unity."
The only stipulation we can reasonably make in responding to such a unity proposal, is that the respective tendencies have adequate organizational guarantees against abuses by one or the other. Cannon's organizational proposals are designed to serve that end.
5. A unification would not at all mean the abandonment of the conquests of the split of 1953 which were in the main positive. It enabled us to overcome the liquidationist tendency with the least cost. It exposed Pabloism, its political line and organizational methods. It facilitated the consolidation of our tendency and the elaboration of our own political line on the major world problems in a series of documents written in the manner and tradition of orthodox Trotskyism. None of these gains will be abandoned in a unification. They remain the tools with which we operate. Unity would only mean another form of struggle for the same ideas which had previously led to a split. It would not mean acceptance of any of the Pabloite documents either of the Third of the Fourth Congresses. All these documents, including our own, are part of the record. So is the world reality these documents were supposed to depict. We believe the record is favorable to our tendency.
A discussion at the present time of this record would appear sterile because it would deal with events which have receded into history and given way to new events which need examination and analysis. If the differences between the tendencies are to come to the fore once again, it is far better that they be based on new events and situations. The new people in the movement will more easily understand such disputes and the old ones will be freed from the need of self-justification and be able to reorient themselves more easily. Those who have gone through the split do not need such a discussion at this time. They had it when it had real meaning. Those who did not experience the split would only see in such a discussion a sectarian withdrawal from the world as it is today.
If and when differences appear in a unified world movement, we would be favored by the fact you mentioned in your letter, namely; "that the rank and file members of his groups are undoubtedly impressed by the revulsion of CP and ex-CP members against Stalinism. They instinctively tend to approach this situation with the basic ideas of orthodox Trotskyism."
* * *
Everything points in one general direction: The crisis of Stalinism means inevitably a crisis for all the tendencies in the movement which in any way tied their fortunes to that of the Stalinist bureaucracy. Pabloism was one of those tendencies. We can make gains among all of them, if we act with political firmness, confidence in the future and a readiness to adapt the forms of struggle to the needs fo the times.
It is essential that we come to an early agreement on the above questions, so that we can take full advantage of the opportunities before us. This means not only the broader opportunities in the labor movement, but also the specific opportunities in the Fourth International movement as it has been constituted historically.
Here is what we mean specifically: The Pabloites have initiated the unity proposal. We have given the reply which seems indicated. We said we favor unity provided it is based on parity. This means we favor unity but not on the old basis. That this is to be a unification of two tendencies in which neither one can have the organizational advantage. What gave Pablo his power in the past is precisely the fact that he controlled mechanically the International bodies. This is the advantage he does not wish to give up. He would settle for anything short of that. Can he get away with it? Can he prevent a unification by opposing parity? We believe that any attempt to do so would lead to a struggle in his group. The unfoldment of this struggle will depend on us. If we drag our feet on this question, the Pabloites can have a new lease on life by blaming us for a breakdown of negotiations. If on the other hand we do not retreat in our readiness to unite on the stated conditions and stand pat, we can be sure to make gains.
[p. 38]
We are eager to hear from you. You can treat this if you wish as a personal letter. But let us know what you think of it.
Fraternally,
Smith [Dobbs]