1. The recent correspondence about conditions for the unification of the divided forces of the Fourth International was initiated by the January 2, 1957, letter of Goonewardene, secretary of the LSSP, to Cannon, national chairman of the SWP. The answering letter of Cannon to Goonewardene under date of March 12, 1957, proceeded from the assumption that, while a number of important differences remain unresolved and cannot be resolved by argument at the present time—with good will on both sides, a unification of forces for common political action on the most important problems of the day might be accomplished, and was designed to further that end.
This letter, and the subsequent letter of Cannon to Patrick [Mangan], dated April 29, 1957, expressed the deliberate and considered opinion of the leadership of the SWP as to the only possible premise and procedure by which unification might be realized on a workable basis in the foreseeable future, with the necessary provisions incorporated in the agreement to guard against the danger of a new conflict and split. These two letters, both of which were approved by the Political Committee of the SWP at the same time, constitute a single entity—the first letter setting forth the general premise for a serious discussion of a possible unification, taking all the realities of the situation as they are—the unresolved differences, and the hostility and distrust which have accrued from the conflict—and the second letter outlining the organizational proposals which follow unavoidably from the premises.
2. While it is possible, of course, that the five proposals of the letter to Patrick could be modified or changed in some matters of detail, or that other points could be added, it is the opinion of the PC that any substantial change, contradicting the nature of the organizational compromise aimed at by the proposals, would nullify the general premise set forth in the letter to Goonewardene and leave us without an acceptable basis for the continuation of the discussion. Similarly, any actions deliberately taken by one side or the other in opposition to the premise laid down in this letter would have to be understood in the same sense.
3. The conversations between National Committee members of the SWP and P[atrick] O['Daniel], which have been represented as "unity negotiations," were in reality not negotiations at all and could not have been, since the basis for joint consideration of a possible unification had not yet been agreed upon. These conversations were necessarily restricted, as stated in the Cannon letter to Patrick under date of April 29, to an "informal exploration of the possibilities of unification." (Moreover, the SWP hasn't the slightest intention to conduct "negotiations" independently of the International Committee.)
Since these conversations led to nothing and could lead to nothing in the circumstances, Patrick was asked (in Cannon's letter of April 29) to get a direct answer from the IS as to whether the Cannon letter to Goonewardene "is acceptable as a basis for discussion of concrete measures to bring about unification." And this was followed by the statement that "if the answer is 'no,' then it would be useless to continue discussions until a counterstatement is proposed."
4. The reply of the IS, addressed directly to the leadership of the SWP under date of May 7, avoids a direct answer to this direct question. Instead of that, proceeding as if the letter to Goonewardene did not exist, or was of no consequence, the IS simply offered some "concessions" to the forces of the International Committee, for which they have no need and still less interest; plus a gratuitous lecture on the principles of international organization, and the Socialist International and the London Bureau—which was not needed either, since all concerned have long ago been instructed in these matters by teachers of the highest authority.
The May 7 letter of the IS, in the opinion of the PC, implicitly constitutes a total rejection of the basic premise laid down in the letter to Goonewardene, according to which a possible unity could be realized only by way of an agreed upon compromise on the organizational question. The essence of such a compromise which could be acceptable to the forces of the International Committee, as stated in the April 29 letter to Patrick, would have to consist not of "concessions" which have no meaning and no value, but of "organizational guarantees." The May 7 letter of the IS contains no guarantees whatever and consequently provides no acceptable basis upon which negotiations for unification could proceed.
5. Subsequent communications from the IS to the International Committee, including the latest letter under date of July 18, offer nothing to change the stalemate. Consequently, as far as correspondence is concerned, the discussion of the question of unification has not moved forward by a single step since March 12, the date of the Cannon letter to Goonewardene. Moreover, on the field of action, it appears to the PC that several steps backward have been taken. The unrestrained and disruptive factional campaign launched against the British Section of the Fourth International by the improvised group headed by Grant, the former associate of Haston, simultaneously with "unity" propaganda, stands in flagrant contradiction to the latter and calls into question the good faith of its proponents.
[p. 69]
The tendentious and falsified polemics over past conflicts which cannot be resolved by argument at the present time, and which the letter to Goonewardene proposed to lay aside for future consideration in a calmer atmosphere, after unity had been effected on the political action of the day, obviously sharpen the situation and push the prospect of unification backward. These actions, and the attitude expressed in them, plus the failure of agreement on the necessary organizational compromise, raise the direct threat that any formal unification effected in such an atmosphere would provide only the springboard for another bitter conflict and split.
The PC of the SWP does not believe that any good could come to our international movement from that and will not recommend it. Neither do we see how any constructive results can be gained by a continuation of the discussion of unification unless and until these two roadblocks are removed.