[p. 64]
The split of 1953 in the FI took place on political grounds, but in the attempt to condemn this split as a revolt against the central authority (IS) without justification by the one and as a measure of self-defense against a "bueaucratic central apparatus" by the other, one more controversy was added to it: What is democratic centralism on an international scale? The allegations of bureaucratic malpractices made by the splitters against Pablo and the IS as controlled by him, and the current topic in the FI and the flash of bureaucratic malpractices of the national leaders of the groups of the International Committee are only secondary. They lead us nowhere, except to the necessity of a control commission, independent of the authorities. However, the allegations of bureaucratic malpractices sometimes boil down to alleging prevention of free discussion by the leadership. This can be remedied
1) by the appearance of a regular internal discussion bulletin where it does not appear, 2) by taking less drastic and disciplinary measures than expulsion even if it appears a member has been expressing to the "outside" his contrary views and, 3) by discussing again and again important and controversial views and even 4) taking referendum or decision in special conventions if fundamentals are concerned.
In the present article I shall confine myself to an estimate of two conceptions, called by their opponents as "letter-box-internationalism" and "bureaucratic centralism." Since this difference evidently revolves around relationship between the international leadership and the national section, I shall put forward my own views about it.
In trying to reject the authority of the centralized international leadership of the FI, the International Committee (IC) states as follows: (In Defense of Trotskyism, p. 39, Labour Review—July-August 1959):
"The international will not be built by a group of impressionistic 'world strategists' handing down the tactical line to each country; nor by commentators charting an 'irreversible process? An international movement will be built by helping national movements to reach a thorough understanding of the realities of struggle in their own countries and of their tasks."
and again,
. . . . nationally and internationally alike the authority of leaders can be based on confidence born out of experience in their ability and the correctness of the practical and theoretical help they give to the revolutionaries participating in the class struggle.
The IC, therefore, proposes "to call an International Conference open to all (emphasis mine) revolutionary parties and groupings that are seeking to build Marxist movements in their countries." The Trotskyist character of the IC and the SLL excludes the possibility of the participation of any other grouping but the conditions for invitation are that the parties and the groups should stand for independent working-class parties and they should clearly understand that Stalinists and Social Democracy cannot be transformed into revolutionary forces. There is no mention of a prior acceptance of the Transitional Program or of the minimum political program they must accept. Presumably centrist organizations are also welcome.
In the absence of political cohesion, this International shall be really only a letter-box international. 'The building of the International is 'no doubt a more complicated process than the building of a national party," but "nationally and internationally alike" the organization has to begin on a clear political understanding and cohesion, much before confidence in the leadership is born out of experience. A revulsion from an international handing down the tactical line to various national sections cannot justify insistence on the acceptance of the rival tactical line of building open and independent working class parties with the exclusion of political cohesion. The tactical difference can always be discussed and decided in a single organization and this way of resolving differences is much better and practical than the complicated and impossible building of an international through politically heterogenous conglomeration of parties.
[p. 65]
Perhaps the IC only proposes to reorganize orthodox Trotskyists and none else.
FI's International Democratic Centralism
The FI (No. 7, Autumn 1959) replies to this concept in its Open Letter to the SLL-a recall to order (pp. 64-66). It notes down the accusation of the IC on p. 65 and replies by stating that the handing down of the line has never been of the Stalinist type. It is also stated that Burns [Healy], in reality, wanted much more centralism and speedy "intervention" by the International when he was on the International Executive Committee (IEC).
This may be a reply to Burns and the Labour Review but it does not prove its justification. It is no argument that it should be done.
The FI holds that by handing down the tactical line the national movements are helped to reach a thorough understanding of the realities of the struggle in their own countries and of their tasks.
This would be so, if the International, in handing down the line, only gives its opinion to the national sections and leaves it to the national sections to decide the issue on their own, freely, without direct or indirect pressure. The following extract shows that it is not so:
As long as he was a member of the International majority he (Burns) pushed the International leadership, again and again, to intervene in the British section in order to "speed" up the solution of the crisis, to intervene in many other sections with the same goal, to "expel," "crush" and "eliminate" all kinds of tendencies with whom he had tactical differences. Happily, the International never followed this kind of advice, and always discussed for many years (emphasis in original) tactical problems of sections, before taking any definite decision. What Burns really means, therefore is this: as long as I am with the majority, I want the right to apply strictly the rules of democratic centralism on an international scale. . . .
In short the "expulsion," "elimination," and the "intervention" that Burns advocated was and is, to the FI, nothing but a strict application of the rules of democratic centralism for the resolution of tactical differences within the national leadership or of the national leadership with the "much-discussed and cooly decided" decision of the International on the tactics to be applied by a section.
Statutes of the FI
Since "the national sections are formed on the platform and in accordance with the organizational structure de fined and established by the Founding Congress of the Fourth International (Sept. 1938)" and since in its platform as well as the organizational structure the FI concentrated the international experience of the revolutionary Marxist movement and assimilated and based itself upon all of humanity's progressive social experiences, we shall look to the International Statutes adopted in 1938 for our interpretation of democratic centralism on an international scale. Any addition in later Congresses is valid only in so far as it amplifies it not where it is in conflict with it, unless special national conventions or a sort of referendum has preceded the international decision and the amendment is thoroughly discussed, understood, its merits and demerits weighed coolly by an overwhelming majority of Trotskyists.
The Statute:
All the proletarian and revolutionary militants in the world who accept and apply the principles and the program of the Fourth International are joined in a single world organization, under a centralized international leadership and a single discipline. (Statute 1)
The qualification is the acceptance and application of the principles and program of the FI. No mention is made of the acceptance of the tactical line also.
The international leadership is explained as follews:
The Supreme body of the FI on the world scale is the International Conference, which determines the policy of the International and of its sections in all important political questions, adopts resolutions and decides in the last resort organizational questions and international conflicts. (Statute VII.)
Not even all political questions? No mention of tactical questions and not all organizational questions. The Statutes only define the sphere of activity of the centralized international leadership and hence it must be presumed that less important political questions, like what should be our attitude to the Kerala agitation and election should be left over to the national sections concerned. In the same way even the tactical questions and the. organizational questions in the first instance are to be left over to the national sections.
The IEC and the IS only do what the International Conference can do as is clear from the following:
During the intervals between the international conferences, the international leadership is entrusted to the IEC. (Statute VIII.)
The IEC is responsible before the entire International for the carrying out of the decisions and the application of the political line adopted by the International Conference. (Statute VIII.)
The day-to-day administrative and political work, as well as the regular liaisons with the sections is ensured by an International Secretariat. (Statute X.)
If the authority of the International is confined only to important political questions and to organizational questions in the last resort and in the rest it adopts only a resolution, the expulsion and the elimination carried on by the FI even if with the vote of Burns must again be reviewed for obviously it was wrong It was wrong for the FI to intervene in the "crisis" of the British or the French sections and force peace. It was the greatest sop to all the tactical opponents of the majority in their national sections to split and seek direct contact with the IS: a split which began on national scale in different sections and ended with an international split.
The Statutes defined the sphere of International leadership so accurately and expressly as to leave no doubt about the relationship between the national sections and the international leadership, between democracy and centralism, between decentralization and centralization and between nationalism and internationalism. Whatever has not been expressly reserved for the International is the domain of the national sections. Democracy is not a matter of convenience; it is the very essence of our life. This allocation of functions is really the best form of international democratic centralism.
* * *
[p. 66]
National Sections Must Not Be Split
The Statutes declare:
There can be but one single section of the Fourth International, i.e., only one single organization in each country can be regularly affiliated with the F.I.
Since the national sections must have the final say in tactical matters, the point arises as to what should the International do in case of a conflict within the section over a tactical question or between the section and the International over the tactical question.
Within a national section the majority wins. The conflict therefore naturally and democratically resolves if the majority is clear even if it is against the International view. The majority must prevail. Even the International must bow to the will of the revolutionary militants of that nation as expressed in the national majority. The minority, even if it supports the International view and is 100 per cent convinced of the correctness, must abide by the majority decision and propagate its view—the International view-inside the section and prepare for the next conference.
If the majority in the national section is not clear over a tactical question and the minority is not ready to abide by the majority decision, the International leadership has to take this question up for decision not on the tactical question but on the organizational question. The International leadership has to see that in spite of the special situation and the tactical differences the two factions work in the same organizations. It is possible to relax some organizational provisions, to allow the two factions to work out their tactics separately and yet decide political questions under the framework of a single organization, so that the member who changes his view on tactical line switches himself to the other side without difficulty. This arrangement may last for some years till the national conferences squeeze out the one view and adopt the other view finally.
In this conflict over tactics within the national sections, the suggestions of the International leadership is always welcome and the supporters of the IS view may thus get their hands strengthened but ultimate decision must be with the national sections themselves. If the minority splits the FI must ask it to go back in the section instead of recognizing it as a separate section.
In the conflict between the national and international leadership over tactical line to be applied, the national section must have its way. Just as the national headquarters of a party cannot order how a particular day is to be celebrated by a local, whether by taking out processions or only by holding meetings, the International cannot order a national section how to implement a political decision. The International is within its rights to coolly discuss the line and pass a resolution whether this or that line would be correct but if the section decides to ignore the FI view, the FI view must be allowed to be ignored. I do not mean any insult to the International leadership nor wish to take it lightly but the final say must rest with the section. The IS shall no doubt try to convert the majority with the help of the then minority which supports the IS view. The discussion must go on till the next conference when the two views must again be put to vote. As long as the controversy remains within the section the same procedure may be followed. The national majority cannot be punished by expulsion for having failed to implement a tactical decision. Split as well as expulsion of national sections is unwise. National leaders individually also cannot be so expelled.
In the present era of decreasing importance of national barriers, of a very advanced integration of different national economies and supra-national political alliances, politics has become very much internationalized and conditions have become so general that similar tactical lines are to be devised and adopted. An international tactical line may be very, very desirable and even necessary. Yet the different circumstances of any particular country or different stage of development or even a different stage of development of the section and its leadership may necessitate a flexible approach. In such circumstances the line may be suggested but it should be sought to be implemented when the national majority has adopted the line after a thorough discussion by the members in a conference. Till this happens the FI has to remain content with passing a resolution.
If the majority does not act constitutionally and refuses to call the conference or the requisitioned conference, the IS may intervene organizationally and as a last resort only to call a national conference of that section and let the democratic decision be taken.
Many instances of Trotsky's interference are quoted over tactical questions. They were suggestions to the sections, articles. No IS order was given at any time. The decision was always made by the national majority whether in France or in America.
* * *
As a side comment, it may be stated here that for unity in the FI, for the split in which both share responsibility, such application of democratic centralism as so far carried by the FI must be expressly renounced and the past doings rectified so that the national minority is rid of its misapprehensions about using the lever of international leadership for splitting the sections and for forcing tactical lines from above. All the Trotskyists in those countries must get together, as we have done in India or our comrades have done in Chile. All the Trotskyists must abide by that decision whether that is the FI line or not. FI must also accept that verdict. I am sure with this express declaration a proper atmosphere will be there and unity between the two wings achieved. Otherwise, no amount of FI resolutions for unity can bring about unity.
* * *
National Autonomy: Why?
:
Michel Pablo, in his booklet, Fourth International: What It Is; What It Aims At, p. 23, sallies at the idea of "an organization which is above all, national, setting up only "fraternal" links with other national organizations. This, he explains, will make an International which is in reality only an arithmetical collection of separate national organizations which co-operate in this or that field. He holds that the argument of national independence in reality often covers up the existence of a national bureaucratic apparatus which does not much like international democratic control over it.
[p. 67]
A national bureaucracy has to be controlled by enabling the ranks to exercise democracy so that (1) no bureaucracy is allowed to exist; (2) whatever bureaucracy has formed dissolves in democracy of the ranks, A control from above, by a higher International Committee, however democratic, is in itself bureaucratic. International democratic control, however democratic, is no alternative to a national bureaucracy. On the other hand, in order to avoid falling under the control of an international bureaucratic apparatus, we cannot reduce the international cohesion to a "fraternal" link only nor make the International an arithmetical collection of national organizations.
National peculiarities have to be taken into account. It is true, as Pablo states that "it is impossible to understand what is peculiar in a given national situation without setting it up against the background of a correct analysis and understanding of the international situation." It is also true that the particular is what it is only by way of comparison with the general. Yet it is also true that in spite of this age, as well as stage of imperialism, uneven national development is a fact. Internationalization of economy has not done away with the various forces and various levels of objective circumstances and subjective level of forces and line-up of various forces and such other factors which differ from nation to nation. The political cohesion and oneness of outlook resulting from acceptance of the platform of the FI and common decision on important political events and questions among all the revolutionary militants of the world under the banner of a single world organization ensures that general, international outlook which is so much emphasized by him. But understanding the general world situation does not ensure understanding by every revolutionary militant outside a country of the particular, specific, conditions obtaining in that country, simply because they do not have a direct impact of events on them and cannot, because of the limitations of human faculties, fully comprehend the importance or significance of national peculiarities or the possible reaction of the people of the nation among whom the national militant has to work. Hence, while all the world may come to the help of the militants of the national section and tell them where they are making national or nationalist mistakes, the decision must be entirely that of the national section.
Because of this autonomy in national political matters, tactical questions and certain organization matters, national sections do not become above all national, as long as they accept the discipline of the centralized international leadership and follow its political decision in all important political matters.
It is important for the International to allow national autonomy also because of its practical implications and consequences.
The prior acceptance of the platform of the FI excludes the possibility of vital, fundamental and irreversible differences on political questions. Although today's differences are both vital and fundamental yet they are [not] irreversible and even such occasions shall come rarely. The same is not true of the tactical differences.
The application of the platform of the FI or of the decisions of the International Conferences in the tactical spheres is bound to result in serious differences from time to time. Important and original analyses or lines may create such big controversies that every section is torn within itself. The international majority may be on the one side and the national majority on the other. If the International majority imposes its own tactical line on the unwilling national majority a rift is sure to occur in spite of the sanity, democracy-mindedness and discipline-loving nature of the leadership of the national sections. The tactical difference with the French majority resulted in their expulsion and of the British FI section with the SLL results in a bitter controversy and in the continuation of the 1953 split.
Even for those, who say politics-first, tactical questions are very, very important. These are more important to those who are actually building a movement. Imposition of a tactical line from above is little relished. In such a situation, if there is a modicum of democracy, the situation can be saved and the split avoided. Our organizational principles cannot ever be such absolute and immutable truths that they cannot be changed or modified even if the situation demands a change for the benefit of the organization. If the Statutes of the International are not interpreted as above by some, it is wiser to flex them to suit the needs.
The Degeneration of the Internationals
The degeneration of the earlier internationals is also an argument which Pablo disposes of in his booklet as follows:
Now the 2nd International, if it ended badly, did so.. . . . because it degenerated into a collection of separate national organizations, each dominated by its own bureaucratic apparatus.
As for the 3rd International, it degenerated only by falling under the control of the bureaucratic apparatus of a single party—that of the Soviet CP.
As if the objective conditions then obtaining were of no significance and had the villains of the piece not appeared on the scene everything would have been all right.
The objective conditions in general were in the main responsible for the degeneration and petrification of the Second and Third Internationals. The relative prosperity of capitalism in the late 19th Century created the well-paid union officials and well-paid skilled workers-workers' aristocracy and labor bureaucracy. Not only one but all the national sections degenerated. The degeneration did not come about because of national bureaucratic leaders but because of the changed outlook from top to bottom. The revolutionaries in those sections had been reduced to a small percentage and that is why in spite of the efforts of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg the ranks of the said section did not rally round the program of revolution.
The Third International also degenerated because of the objective circumstances. The victory of the Russian Revolution brought so many petty-bourgeois worshipers of power to the workers' movement that the degeneration of the Soviet Communist Party was automatically transferred to the other CPs. Lenin could save one section of the Second International because the objective conditions there permitted him to take the leadership. Trotsky tried his best and yet failed. Not because the Russian State Power was being used against him, and he could not freely organize the people. That is true only in respect of the Soviet Union. But even the Communists of outside failed to rally round him. The strength, the aid, and the power of the Soviet Union seemed so decisive always that the petty bourgeoisie looked only to the Soviet Union and not to the working class of its own country.
[p. 68]
If it were only the degeneration of one or two national sections and the other sections had had autonomy, or the national sense or a proper training in deciding tactics of their own, they would have been as strong to resist and escape degeneration as Lenin's Bolshevik Party was.
Even in the case of the Third International, simple and chance organizational separation and tactical independence, in their special circumstance of extreme incapacity of the bourgeoisie to fight, the YCP and the CCP seized power empirically. It was only their past tactical dependence on the Third International and their ideological inhibition that prevented them from becoming revolutionary parties and hence, after the seizure of power, they behaved just like one more satellite of the Soviets with all the bureaucratic deformation.
It was possible for other sections also to escape degeneration if a training in independent tactical decisions would have been given and if they had been mature enough to make their own political judgment and assessment. That would have made other national sections less blindly loyal to the Comintern and capable of either projecting their own correct leadership or capable of discerning the lead of Trotsky—the alternative centralized international leadership—and of following him.
The confused state of political thinking today, the confounding gap between the subjective political consciousness of the people and the high level of political sermons, the contradiction between our fond hope of finding revolutionary militants, tendencies and groups in the mass parties of today and the unforeseen and unnoticed withdrawal of the masses in some countries from all political parties or any such development nationally may cause not only the national sections to indulge in unrealistic tactics, but may also lead to the distant theoreticians of the International to foist unreal tactics on the section. With the power of expulsion and discipline on tactical questions such an International may cause irreparable damage. On the other hand, such eventualities can be faced successfully and the national sections or as much as possible of them can escape degeneration if national autonomy has trained and given the section capacity to judge independently, and has permitted the national sections to stand in opposition to the International line on tactics without being penalized or split in the name of international loyalty.
The Split Can Be Healed
Taking this view of the matter it appears that the political differences over the movement's attitude toward the CPs and the bureaucracies of the Soviet states, although fundamental, were not irreversible and not important by themselves to cause a split. The dissenters, it seems, found themselves faced with a situation where the tactics flowing from the majority document reverberated in their midst and the prospect of the expulsion of majority and split by the minority made them forget all about the identity of bigger revolutionary principles and caused such a quick and strong reaction in them to withdraw before it was too late for the defense of their cadres. As the SWP put it, the defense of their cadres became their first principle.
Anybody else in that situation would have most likely reacted in that same way.
Even today this apprehension remains the main hurdle to unity. The qualification that the IC proposes for the participants in its International Conference shows that the tactical differences are the most important ones. If the two wings can leave it to the section concerned to work out its tactics, in Algeria, in Britain and in Canada to be decided by the majority-whether they work inside the MNA or FLN or in cooperation with one of them; in the Labour Party totally or through the SLL, etc.—this fear would end and a proper atmosphere for unity would develop.
Whatever remains of the differences can be buried in democratic discussions over a given period by treating the split as unfortunate and by enabling both the views to be published in the FI or the sectional periodicals as the majority and the minority view as a special case till the next Conference. In this connection I would point out to the traditions of the Indian Militant which published the IS resolution, with which it disagreed.
This can be done. The pursuit of unity by the Indian Trotskyists on a minimum acceptable program shows that for the sake of unity less important differences—those that can be settled within a single organization can be ignored and an acceptable formula or draft can be presented for unity. The unity of the Chilean Trotskyists shows that the Trotskyists themselves find it more necessary to present a united front within the country than quarrel over less important differences. If the present apprehensions are removed, the good political sense in the ranks of the organizations of both the wings shall push their leaderships to unity.
February 1, 1960