[p. 61]
(An examination of the basic document "Rise and Decline of Stalinism—Section I")
(If this document is circulated amongst friends, it has to be made clear that the RWPI-RCPI to which I belong has not taken any decision on this point and the present estimate represents my own individual view. R.N. Arya)
In December 1953 or thereabouts, the International Executive Committee of the Fourth International passed a document- "Rise and Decline of Stalinism." This created a big controversy in the International movement and a section of it split. The 4th World Congress assembled in 1954 and passed the document without the participation of the splitters. The split has continued and the 5th World Congress has further amplified this document by adding to it "Decline and Fall of Stalinism." The 6th World Congress is to be held this year. The other group forming the International Committee are also slated to call a Reorganization Congress. Since this split has persisted for quite a long time and different policies are being advocated by the two wings, it is necessary that we make a political estimate of the split-document so that we may have a correct attitude towards the problem.
The difference is in the attitude towards Stalinism and as Stalinism dominates the political events of the world today, the difference engulfs everything. In the context of Indian events we have our own difference with the political estimates made by the FI: with the IS resolution on Tibet, with Pablo's article on the Sino-Indian border dispute and with the FI directive on Kerala agitation. Again and again we find the FI unreasonably inclined towards Stalinist positions. Com. Pablo's article can be cited as an instance in which he seems to swallow every word of the Chinese version, takes pains in quoting very unimportant texts of Chinese Foreign Embassy but dismisses the Indian account altogether. It seems he is ready to back up the Chinese to a war on this question. We do not intend to support the Indian claim but we are also not interested in supporting the Chinese claim. The interest of the international movement is more important to us than the truth of the border question.
The essence of the FI attitude to Stalinism and Stalinist bureaucracy is contained in the paragraphs 16 to 20 of the said document "Rise and Decline." It consists in making a distinction within the Stalinists and within the Stalinist bureaucracy. The process started when the FI leaders studied the development of the Yugoslav and the Chinese CPs. Justification for this attitude to Stalinism is sought from Trotskyism itself. Thus, in paragraph 15 it is stated:
"Traditionally the historically transitional and passing character of the Bonapartist dictatorship in the USSR was correctly analysed in the sense that this dictatorship could lead to two opposed paths of social development: either . . . . or thanks to . . . the aid brought by the world proletariat to the Soviet proletariat and (thanks) to the left tendency of the bureaucracy which will rally to the side of the proletariat for the defense of the social bases of the USSR, the overthrow of the Bonapartist dictatorship and the re establishment of Soviet democracy." (Emphasis added.)
[p. 62]
Com. Ernest Germain follows it up in his report to the 5th World Congress. In it he differentiates different sections of the bureaucracy and assigns different roles to them.
My reading and understanding of Trotskyism has not enabled me ever to find such a differentiation made in orthodox or traditional Trotskyism in sections of Soviet bureaucracy; no left tendency ever thought of and no such revolutionary role assigned to it. I am yet ready to be corrected with specific quotations and explanations.
The document "Rise and Decline" is very specific and very emphatic about this differentiation. It details its points in paragraph 17. Paragraph 18 adds to it its political effects. At first glance we find only facts enumerated in the paragraph and we are most likely to ignore this irrelevant portion until we consider its significance. The details of different social origins and of political powers of different sections of the bureaucracy have been given to elicit supposedly different roles of these sections-different not in rhythm but in its very basic character. It is now held, as the above quotation shows, that the lower rungs of the bureaucracy, the left tendency if you so choose to call it, shall ally itself with the proletariat against the upper rungs of the bureaucracy. This hope goes further when in paragraph 21, subparagraph 3, it states:
"It is not accidental that at the 19th Congress Malenkov. . . . referred to the activity of 'deviationist, anti- Leninist' groups in the Communist party in the Soviet Union, on which the victory of the political revolution depends." (Emphasis mine.)
In line with this thinking, fundamentally different from traditional Trotskyism, the document notes "the process of differentiation within the party and its party circles" (paragraph 20). The "regroupment of the revolutionary forces" in the Soviet Union, mentioned again and again (paragraph 19 end, 21 subparagraph 3 end), in this context, stands for an expected split in the bureaucracy and the CP of the Soviet Union. A section is expected to support the proletariat against the other section. This seems to be the main plank of the FI activity, in the hope that this regroupment will provide the main leadership, ideological as well as physical, of the political revolution.
One is inclined to ask whether it is because of this hope that the present policies of the FI are being adjusted to win the sympathies of this would-be leadership and its counterpart in the CPs of the world. There seems to be no other explanation for this allotment of revolutionary role to CP and different sections of the bureaucracies—revolutionary and not merely impulsive, and in general circumstances and not in special circumstances alone—for the irreversible process of the international revolution obtaining hereafter has made a drastic change. If there is any other explanation it is that there is a lack of faith in the capacity of the proletariat to throw up a leadership from its own ranks except through these mass parties, in spite of the existence of the "irreversible" revolutionary process and in spite of the fact that this same irreversible revolutionary process is considered to be capable of producing rifts and splits in the CPs and the Soviet bureaucracy. Fondly we hope that the capacity of the Soviet bureaucracy is "greatly limited for counterrevolutionary maneuvers with imperialists at the expense of the revolution" (paragraph 9).
The Nature of the Heterogeneity of the Soviet Bureaucracy
The heterogeneity of the bureaucracy is of the same order as that of the bourgeoisie and not as that of the peasantry or the middle class of the city. In the cases of the peasantry and the urban middle class, the interests of the different sections clash so much and so strongly that these different sections go to hostile camps. Thus, while the rich peasantry almost invariably follows the bourgeois, the poor peasants follow the proletariat. The same is the case with the urban middle class. Not so with the bourgeoisie. The liberal and the smaller bourgeoisie always clash with the monopolists and the colonial bourgeoisie with the imperialists, yet there is never going over by any one of them to the camp of the hostile working class. They have no locus standi, no independent economic interest apart from the imperialists, the monopolists and the financiers. They are upholders of the capitalist framework and relationship and they are all united against the working class. We have seen enough of this seemingly all important conflict between the colonial bourgeoisie and the imperialists, and between the liberal bourgeoisie and the monopolists which conflicts were always magnified out of proportion by the Stalinists and which always led them to support one section of the bourgeoisie against the other. This new-found love for any section of the bourgeoisie resulted invariably in the precaution that these friends may not be scared and thus in the suppression—consciously as well as unconsciously—of the workers' movement and revolution. We never denied the difference within the bourgeoisie but we always shunned the politics of playing one section against the other. Differences within the bureaucracy are of this order.
To imagine differences in the mentality of the old and young bureaucracy is day-dreaming (paragraph 11 c) Human nature cannot be changed and unless socialism comes about, the very desire to show off as having a higher standard of living creates needs. The Soviet bureaucrats are not yet as rich as the billionaires of America and they have yet too many desires. Their sons and daughters are young bureaucrats (of the lower rungs? The contradiction and conflict between the lower and the higher rungs would be interesting if the fathers and sons were arraigned on opposing sides in a revolution). They are no less fond of vodka and fun.
The Soviet bureaucracy can also be fruitfully compared with a capitalist bureaucracy. The interests of different sections of bureaucracy no doubt clash and you can always hear the lower rungs talk of the injustices and arbitrariness of the higher rungs. Yet when the popular outburst threatens the privileges of the bureaucracy as a whole, the bureaucracy acts as a whole. The only difference is that the capitalist bureaucracy has a master but the Soviet bureaucracy has no master.
[p. 63]
Whether the Bureaucracy Can Be Won to the People?
One can always refresh himself on this score by reading Lenin's State and Revolution—that the bureaucracy arises from the people but its interests are so opposed to the interests of the people that it can never go with the people. No factor has yet appeared to show that the interests of the Soviet bureaucracy are not such. The very fact that the bureaucracy enjoys the privileges which the proletariat has to wipe out once it enters the arena assigns a counterrevolutionary role to the bureaucracy. If the events of the Hungarian revolution are grasped clearly we know that the final crushing by the Soviets came when the workers' soviets refused to disband their own elected factory soviets. If it is understood why did the factory workers leave the question of state power, affiliation with the Soviet Union, stationing of its army, democratization of the State apparatus and of the Communist party to the Kadar regime and insisted only on one thing—the replacement of the appointed factory committee by the one elected by themselves—it becomes clear that the popular hostility to the immediate bureaucrats is very, very great. We know how the people hate the police constables and the peons, etc. The lower rungs directly oppress the people and suck [their blood]. It is impossible for the people to accept their lead or for them to lead the people.
The conduct of a haphazard section of the bureaucracy in the early part of the Hungarian revolution cannot make a rule. Trotsky narrates how a police officer in the interior of Russia heard about the Bolshevik power in Leningrad and Moscow and he himself took the red flag and marched in the streets calling for a Bolshevik power. The conduct of that police officer did not set us thinking that a section of the police or the capitalist bureaucracy would lead the revolution. Such things are always possible in a revolution when the class issues are not clear but as soon as they become clear the mistaken roles of individuals here and there are corrected.
The document pictures the upper circles as satisfied with the level of consumption and portrays them as not interested in the further growth of economy. It is a daydreaming without factual basis in its support. One who has read novels like Vorkuta can understand that the human nature of the Soviet bureaucrats is not different. When we find that the Five Year Plans are still being executed by them, under the direction of the upper bureaucracy who are amassing ever more privileges for themselves, it is really infantile to suggest (paragraph 13b) that, "having attained for themselves a high level of privileges as consumers, the top circles of bureaucracy no longer have a major interest in the maximum expansion of production."
The imagined brake that the upper bureaucrats are supposed to apply to production and to the ambition of the lower bureaucrats for more power and more privileges—supposedly compelling the latter to lead a revolt against the former and ally with the proletariat does not exist. The proletariat is not going to help any section to have more privileges but it has to snatch all privileges. The supposed revolt will degenerate into an impotent rumor and later into a full-fledged cooperation with the upper rungs In suppressing the workers' demand for the removal of all privileges.
If we care to recall what Trotsky said in his Revolution Betrayed, we shall find that he envisaged the bureaucracy as a whole to act as a relative brake for some time and then the whole of it to become an absolute brake. This change is not because of any "loss of interest" among the upper layers of the bureaucrats, but solely due to the fact that in spite of their best interest in increasing the production, the increase was possible only if a freedom of intellect is allowed and technology improved. Intelligent men not only talk science, technology, engineering and medicine, but also philosophy and politics and some of them cannot be corrupted by privileges. In a free atmosphere it becomes impossible to eliminate them and hence it will be that the upper and lower rungs of the bureaucracy alike will welcome a limitation on production rather than a trimming away of their privileges. The privileges of the lower rungs of the bureaucracy will also find protection only in the hands of bigger bureaucrats.
If the coming revolutionary rise in the USSR is defeated or if for any other reason a reaction threatens USSR through the bureaucracy, there will be yet no distinction between the lower and the upper rungs. A vertical cleavage may develop between those who are likely to share power and those who are likely to be left out as there developed between Kerensky and Kornilov in July 1917, but there will yet be no left tendency and no rift between the upper and lower sections. The lower rungs will get their share in the case of restoration and they will be quite happy with it. Sentiments for the defense of the Soviet system, if there are such of them in existence, will go down in favor of more privileges.
The same things may occur if the "irreversible" revolutionary rise forces the imperialists and the Soviet bureaucrats-now the Chinese are also likely to get their share—to strike a compromise and not only withdraw their hand of interference from the affairs of the other but also extend a helping hand in crushing the Soviet revolutions. This possibility always exists and it is well to include it in paragraph 22 after the 25th line, page 44, col. 1.
The Meaning of the Events after Stalin
If the role of the bureaucracy is understood correctly, the events after Stalin's death as well as the events after the war can be understood clearly and appear in a different light. There will be no need to be so hypnotized by the Soviet and the Chinese bureaucrats as to support Nasser when the Soviets support him and to support Kassem when the Soviets support him.
Stalin represented unity not amongst the lower and the upper rungs of the bureaucracy—the lower bureaucrats had no say—but amongst the higher ones. He was the chief of every section of the bureaucracy. After his death, each section pressed for its domination, for it feared its own decimation in case the other won. It is well known that dictators, including Stalinist dictators, never allow equals and rivals to exist. The emergence of a dictator could not be prevented, whether or not there was a mass pressure. There was a mass pressure even before Stalin's death but he continued to rule by purges. His removal left every section diffident a bout its strength in dealing with it and its own survival led it to try to win and utilize this pressure for itself. The police bureaucracy could not do it. Hence the rest of them acted quick. The army had to step forward to deal with the law problem or with the opponents. Hence came Zhukov and Bulganin. But the new mass pressure strengthened the hands of the party bureaucracy which made itself felt even within the army. The army bureaucracy was overthrown. Khrushchev made a correct estimate of the extent of this mass pressure and he has turned his attention on the agriculture to fill the party from bureaucrats from there. His foreign policy is designed to have more trade not only to relieve Soviet economy from the pressure of isolation but also to enable the "leaders of economy" to reap advantages. There is no molecular process of disintegration of Stalinism here but only a change from Stalinism to Khrushchevism, from a rule through terror to a rule through party bureaucracy and to a real and effective compromise with the world imperialism. There is no question of its moves being now in defense of the revolution. It defends only as long as its own fate is uncertain. If the imperialists can guarantee its power, which they are likely to do now, the bureaucrats will move themselves against the revolution.
[p. 64]
Paragraphs 16, 17 and 18 should be scrapped from the said document, "Rise and Decline" and other paragraphs rectified accordingly. The significance of victory in Yugoslavia and China has to be understood in this context and every idea that the CPs can be revolutionary has to be expunged from the mind. It is not only the physical link and direct instructions which matter but also ideological handicaps. The special atomization of the bourgeoisie in the two countries did not place a real class war before them in spite of the Chinese military fight. The possibility of their turning revolutionary has not yet been tested. Nor is the possible atomization of a national bourgeoisie in this period of its internationalization to be counted much. In any event, a distinction has to be made between revolutionary role and eclectic seizure of power. The CP is capable of the latter but not of the former. It cannot prepare for a revolution.
Seeing different roles of sections of Stalinist bureaucracies of the workers' states and of the CPs is a fundamental break with Trotskyism and the steps must be hastily retraced if the revolutionary potentialities of the FI are to be rescued. In this era of Soviet and Chinese successes, growth of a Stalinoid movement is likely to be very swift and we cannot take growth as the absolute proof of the correctness of policies.
January 25, 1960