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The CC considered the IS Resolution "Rise and Decline of Stalinism." The CC also considered the allegation that this resolution embodies certain revisions of the basic positions of Trotskyism on Stalinism.
1. In its consideration of the IS resolution, the CC proceeds from an acceptance of the following basic positions:
a. In contrast with the long period before the War, the present is a period of the World Revolution in flow. This is the key to the understanding of the achievements of the revolution in Yugoslavia and China despite the Stalinist leaderships of the mass movements in these countries.
b. The relation of forces between the Soviet bureaucracy and the Soviet working class has altered radically in favor of the Soviet working class. In consequence of the industrialization of the USSR, the specific weight of the working class has enormously increased in relation both to the bureaucracy and to the peasantry. The cultural level of the workers has also risen.
Further, the capitalist encirclement of the USSR has been importantly broken by the emergence of the Eastern European states and, especially, People's China.
Above all, the World Revolution is again in flow.
The situation is thus being created in which the working class leading the working masses can launch an offensive against the bureaucracy aimed at the bureaucracy's overthrow and the restoration of Soviet democracy. The East German events are a pointer to this fact.
c. World Imperialism under American leadership no longer seeks a modus Vivendi with the USSR but is openly engaged in preparing military intervention against the USSR. This intervention is for Imperialism the central task of its general war against the developing World Revolution. However, Imperialism's war preparations go forward in the context of a relationship of forces on a world scale which is developing fundamentally in favor of the World Revolution.
2. Although the IS Resolution too proceeds from substantially the same basic positions as set out above, nevertheless, the CC finds itself in disagreement with a number of points in the IS Resolution. In particular, the CC finds itself in fundamental disagreement with certain parts of the IS Resolution on the following questions:
The question of the political revolution in theUSSR.
The question of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy.
The question of the role of the mass Communist Parties.
3. In the view of the CC, the IS has opened the door to a departure from the basic positions of Trotskyism regarding Stalinism in respect of the above questions. This has been done as follows:
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Re Question 1 above: The IS Resolution has, in certain passages presented a line of development which leads to an abandonment of the concept of political revolution in the USSR.
Re Question 2 above: Certain passages in the IS Resolution amount in effect to the position that the Soviet bureaucracy has been compelled in practice to give up its treacherous policy of seeking to maintain the international equilibrium between itself and Imperialism and that, caught between the imperialist threat and the World Revolution, the Soviet bureaucracy aligns itself with the World Revolution.
Re Question 3 above: Certain passages in the IS Resolution appear to put forward the perspective that, through the gradual disintegration of Stalinist ideas in the mass Communist parties and through a progressive leftward turn in their policies, these parties are capable of projecting a revolutionary orientation under mass pressure without powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses taking place. This leads to the position that the Stalinist leaderships of the mass Communist parties are capable of a revolutionary role.
Political Revolution in the USSR
Regarding (1) above, the CC draws attention to the following:
4. Rise and Decline, section 18: The post-Stalin "New Course" of the Soviet bureaucracy is here treated as the expression of a basic tendency, namely, the "liberalization" of the regime. This is clear from the very formulation of the question of the terror. The passage says:
"Historically the Malenkov era thus signalizes the beginning of the decline of the Bonapartist dictatorship. That regime can now maintain itself only by suppressing temporarily or definitively the most hideous aspects, that is to say, the most characteristic ones of the regime. It is not excluded that before falling, the Bonapartist dictatorship will suddenly once again have recourse to the bloodiest terror."
The third sentence in the above passage makes it clear that the first two sentences are meant to express a basic trend within the dictatorship and not a change in the relationship of strength between the dictatorship and the masses. "Recourse to the bloodiest terror" is merely "not excluded"; that is to say, it will be in contradiction with the basic trend. In this view, the second sentence is seen really as the definition of the trend; and the definition is that of the regime itself "suppressing — temporarily or definitively — the most hideous aspects, that is to say the most characteristic ones of the regime." But that is really a conception of the regime progressively suppressing its most characteristic aspects, that is of the regime in fact setting out on the "new course" of changing its very nature!
This is not merely an over-optimistic estimation of the "New Course." It is a mis-estimation of the very meaning of the "New Course." It contemplates not a "liberalization" (within inverted commas) but an actual liberalization; the beginning of a qualitative change in the regime which gives to the term "decline" in the phrase "decline of the Bonapartist dictatorship" in the first sentence the meaning of a falling away from its very dictatorial nature rather than the sense of a fall in its strength in relation to the masses.
This impression is further strengthened by the following sentence which appears quite early in the Resolution "Rise and Decline": "The events which have taken place in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death do not constitute only the first stage of a process which must end in the socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union." That is to say, a process which must in time end in the socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union has already begun. The sentence as it stands thus strengthens the impression that the Resolution contemplates that a qualitative change in the regime has already begun.
We are fortified in our above interpretation of the IS resolution by a passage in Comrade Pablo's article, entitled "The Post Stalin 'New Course'" of July 1953, appearing in the magazine Fourth International of March-April 1953. The passage we refer to is the last section, entitled "The Dynamic of the New Turn" and reads as follows: "The dynamic of their concessions is in reality liquidatory of the entire Stalinist heritage in the USSR itself as well as in its relations with the satellite countries, with China and the Communist parties. It will no longer be easy to turn back.
"In reality events will oblige them as is being demonstrated in Eastern Germany, and partly in Czechoslovakia, to quicken and extend the concessions to keep the impatient masses in the other buffer-zone countries and in the USSR itself from taking the road of action. But once the concessions are broadened the march forward toward the real liquidation of the Stalinist regime threatens to become irresistible.
"What form will it then take? Will it be that of an acute crisis and of violent inter-bureaucratic struggles between the elements who will fight for the status quo, if not for turning back, and the more and more numerous elements drawn by the powerful pressure of the masses?"
The above passage, proceeding from an over-optimistic appraisal of the concessions made by the Soviet bureaucracy to the masses, raises a perspective of "the real liquidation of the Stalinist regime" taking place by an intrabureaucratic struggle as distinct from our traditional concept of struggle between the masses and the bureaucracy. The process contemplated is one of "more and more numerous" elements within the bureaucracy itself in violent struggle against the elements within the bureaucracy "who will fight for the status quo if not for turning back." The role ascribed to the masses is that of a powerful pressure-agency upon the bureaucracy. This perspective leads to the abandonment of the Trotskyist concept of the political revolution, namely the overthrow of the bureaucracy by the masses in struggle for the restoration of socialist democracy.
Soviet Bureaucracy's International Policy
Regarding (2) above, the CC draws attention to the following:
7. Rise and Decline section 9: The IS correctly states that the "new situation (after 1947) restricts more and more the capacity of counter-revolutionary maneuvers by the bureaucracy." But it seems to draw from this fact the incorrect inference that the aims and content of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy have changed in the present period.
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8. The aim of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy previously is admittedly that of maintaining the international "equilibrium" between itself and World Imperialism. The content of this policy in the pre-war period was the effort to play on inter-imperialist contradictions in order to "neutralize" the international bourgeoisie, and trading of the world revolutionary movement for agreements with imperialism. The continuation of this policy in the post-war period amounted to an actual alliance with World Imperialism against the World Revolution, or in the IS phrase, to a "total attempt by the Soviet bureaucracy to maintain a policy of equilibrium." The disruption of this alliance, or the failure of this "total attempt" in the period after 1947 is assessed as follows: "Caught between the imperialist threat and the colonial revolution, the Soviet bureaucracy found itself obliged to ally itself with the second against the first . . . Every general attempt to use the colonial revolution as small change in the transactions with imperialism had to be abandoned."
It is to be noted that the alliance spoken of above is with "the colonial revolution" and not with the new People's Republic of China which emerged with the success of the Third Chinese Revolution. The meaning of the phrase is made clearer by the statement that "every general attempt" to trade the colonial revolution in the Soviet bureaucracy's transactions with imperialism has been "abandoned." Manifestly, therefore, the suggestion is that the Soviet bureaucracy has now made a general alliance with the colonial revolutionary movements as a whole and not simply with the state which has emerged with the success of the (colonial) revolution in China. It has "abandoned" its former policy of trading the World Revolution to Imperialism at least as far as the colonial revolution is concerned. The shift therefore is a shift in the aim and content of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy and not merely a shift in the method by which it continues to follow its "policy of equilibrium."
9. It is in the light of the above assessment of the meaning of the new shift in the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy that the concluding sentences of section 9, in which the assessment appears, must be read. "The new situation restricts more and more the capacity of counter-revolutionary maneuvers by the bureaucracy. Attempts to utilize the inter-imperialist contradictions continue to subsist; so do attempts to gain the support of certain bourgeoisies in colonial and semi-colonial countries (India, Argentina, Indonesia) by muzzling on the sly the anti-capitalist struggle of the masses in these coun tries, by attempts to mobilize all the classes in these coun tries, including the 'national bourgeoisies' against imperialism, so do the attempts to arrive at a temporary and partial agreement with imperialism. But the practical effects of these attempts become more and more limited and ephemeral in proportion as, on the one side, the upsurge of the masses becomes more accentuated despite all attempts to curb them and, on the other, as the pressure and the march of Yankee Imperialism towards war is stepped up."
The perspective here is obviously the continuance (under compulsion of external events no doubt, but nevertheless the continuance) of alliance with the colonial revolution as the basis of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy. The old policy of trading the colonial revolution stands basically abandoned; any continuance of such "attempts" in the present period is regarded really as an exception, as lapses from the "New Course" rather than as indicative of its true policy content.
10. The point becomes clearer from the Report of the IS Secretary to the 12th Plenum of the IEC of November 1952. Here, the reporter states (page 17): "On the one hand it should not be forgotten that the unquestionable desire of the bureaucracy for compromise is not enough now for the practical realization of compromise and class collaboration, which require the consent of the other party — in this case of the bourgeoisie. However, the bourgeoisie is rejecting compromise; the objective basis for compromise no longer exists; this fact imposes in fact on the bureaucracy, and the Communist parties under its influence a line which cannot be likened to that of the people's fronts and of class collaboration, such as we knew between 1934-1938 or between 1941-1947.
"Objective conditions are essentially different now, and, despite what other desires the bureaucracy might have, in practice they bring about a different line." (Our italics).
What is this different line?
In the case of the colonial countries, as we have seen, it is that of alliance with the colonial revolution. But further passages in the IS Secretary's Report open the road to the concept of a "different line" even in the imperialist countries; that is, to the concept of the Soviet bureaucracy aligning itself with the revolution in the imperialist countries. Thus, in regard to the decisions of the 1952 Moscow Congress of the CPSU, the Report declares: "The leaderships of the Communist parties seem to consider that its principal directive which concerns them is not the alignment with their respective bourgeoisies against the United States but on the contrary the ideas contained in Stalin's closing speech, namely that the bourgeoisie has become definitively and totally 'reactionary' and 'anti-national'; that they should consider themselves as 'the new shock brigades' having as their task and perspective the seizure of power in their respective countries following the example of the Russian CP."
The perspective opened up in this way is one of the Soviet bureaucracy being compelled in practice to give up the treacherous policy of seeking to maintain the international equilibrium between itself and imperialism, and that, caught between the imperialist threat and the World Revolution, the Soviet bureaucracy aligns itself with the World Revolution.
Role of the Mass Communist Parties
Regarding (3) above, the CC draws attention to the following:
13. Rise and Decline, section 45: "In countries where the CP's are a majority in the working class, they can under the pressure of the masses be led to project a revolutionary orientation counter to the Kremlin's directives, without abandoning the political and theoretical baggage inherited from Stalinism. They will do this all the more so because the masses, which are still seeking, as they will continue to seek for a whole period to come, to make use of those parties to satisfy their aspirations, have acquired a more critical attitude toward their leaderships than in the past and are no longer prepared to follow any turn of these parties, regardless of what it may involve. Under these conditions, the disintegration of Stalinism within these parties ought not to be understood in the next immediate stage as an organizational disintegration of these parties or as a public break with the Kremlin but as a progressive internal transformation, accompanied by a political differentiation within their midst. It is even possible that such a process of Stalinist disintegration may be accompanied in some Communist mass parties by a certain consolidation or an organizational strengthening, to the extent that, under pressure of circumstances, they modify their policies to conform closer to the interests of the masses. This perspective, the understanding that what is involved is not an organizational disintegration of the mass Communist parties, but rather a disintegration, molecular in its nature for an entire period, of the Stalinist ideas inside these parties as well as of the bureaucratic relations which extend from the Kremlin down to the ranks of these parties — such an understanding is essential for determining the forms of intervention by our movement in this process in order to make it evolve in a direction favorable to revolutionary Marxism."
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This passage appears to put forward the perspective that, through the gradual disintegration of Stalinist ideas in the mass Communist parties and through a progressive leftward turn in their policies, these parties are capable of projecting a revolutionary orientation under mass pressure, even without powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses taking place.
14. The Third World Congress "Orientation and Perspectives" declared that such Communist parties can "under certain favorable conditions go beyond the aims set for them by the Soviet bureaucracy and project a revolutionary orientation." These favorable conditions were also described. "In the event of powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses ... it is not excluded that certain CPs with the bulk of their forces can be pushed out of the strict orbit of the Soviet bureaucracy and can project a revolutionary orientation."
Is it proposed to drop this qualification with regard to the conditions in which mass Communist parties can project a revolutionary orientation? The following lends strength to such a supposition:
a. The position taken in the resolution with regard to the international policy of the Soviet bureaucracy itself, dealt with under (2) above.
b. Comrade Pablo's Report to the 12th Plenum of the IEC, quoted under (2) above (section II), in which he states as follows: "The leaderships of the Communist parties seem to consider that its principal directive which concerns them is not the alignment with their respective bourgeoisies against the United States, but on the contrary . . . that they should consider themselves as 'the new shock brigades' having as their task and perspective the seizure of power in their respective countries following the example of the Russian CP."
If this statement were correct, it would mean that the class collaborationist perspective of the CP's of seeking an alliance with the national bourgeoisie against American Imperialism had changed to a basically revolutionary perspective of seizure of power against the bourgeoisie!
Conclusion
15. The three points discussed above have a logical inter-connection. When they are taken together there emerges the single governing concept that, in this period of the World Revolution's flow in which moreover, a durable compromise with Imperialism is ruled out for the Soviet bureaucracy, this bureaucracy and with it the Stalinist leaderships of the mass Communist parties, get pushed onto the revolutionary road under the pressure of the masses. This concept not only leads to a fundamental revision of the positions of Trotskyism in regard to Stalinism but also denies to the Trotskyist movement all justification for its continued independent existence. Accordingly the CC urges that the IS Resolution, "Rise and Decline of Stalinism" be re-drafted in respect of the three points mentioned above in such a manner as to remove any basis for a departure from the Trotskyist positions thereon.