In the Jan. 12 Militant, in an article written several weeks before Eisenhower took office, I called attention to the fact that the "logic of the international situation . . . calls for a turn in the diplomacy of the State Department."
Having inherited a bad diplomatic situation from the Truman administration, one of the problems facing the new Eisenhower regime, I said, was how to change this — to wipe out the impression "that Washington wants war" and to "appear in the international arena as the advocate and champion of peace."
Gen. Eisenhower, I observed, "in hastening the preparations for war will certainly raise the defense slogan of peace . . . and may well go quite far in 'peace' gestures." Hitler himself, I noted, had found it advisable to follow such a policy in getting ready for World War II.
Dulles' main course up to now as Secretary of State might seem to have shown this analysis to be wrong. The Stalinists in particular paint Dulles as the main villain in the Eisenhower administration whose principal concern is rattling the saber. And if we were to let the headlines impress us too much, we might feel compelled to say that the diplomacy of Dulles is nothing but a simple continuation of the diplomacy bequeathed to him by Dean Acheson; namely, the brass-knuckles-and-blackjack attitude associated with the Korean war.
It is quite true that Dulles has deliberately contributed to this impression. After the Republican election campaign picturing the State Department as under the influence of "Communist spies," he could not afford for a time to engage in diplomacy that might appear "soft." Moreover, he is under compulsion to convince the American people of the inevitability and justice of a war on the Soviet Union. That requires war-mongering and inflammatory incidents and fear propaganda.
But this is only one side of the street. The other side must be worked too. It is necessary to create the illusion that "the enemy" is the aggressor and "our side" the peace-lover. Otherwise it is not possible to imbue people with even a semblance of feeling that the war they are asked to fight is morally right. And of course among the allied powers, where the people are war-weary and already convinced in large numbers that only socialism offers a way out, the capitalist rulers feel that such a turn by the State Department is imperative.
The evidence now indicates that the top councils of the Eisenhower administration feel such a shift must be attempted.
At the beginning of September, the well-informed correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, Joseph C. Harsch, observed a "curious dualism" in Eisenhower's foreign policy. It has been reported, he said Sept. 3, that the Dulles-Lodge team "seriously contemplates the possibility that the Korean peace conference will lead to the admission of Communist China to membership in the United Nations." "On the surface this would sound almost incredible," yet Harsh offered as evidence "the actual record" in the Far East where instead of widening the war as many expected when Eisenhower took office, Dulles actually followed a policy of "disengagement," leading to the Korean truce.
Five days later, this same correspondent reported that "German and British and other diplomats are giving their first attention to ways and means of reassuring Moscow that it can become more 'secure' through a negotiated settlement with the West. . . ." This would involve among other things a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Eastern Germany. In return for this, the diplomats "are prepared to pay a substantial price. . . ."
Harsch recognized that "to American ears" the "very idea of security for Soviet Russia sounds either fantastic or nonsensical." However, far more influential figures than the Monitor's correspondent seem to consider such a diplomatic move neither fantastic nor nonsensical.
On May 11, British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill suggested that the ideas contained in the Locarno Treaty might well be applied today to guarantee the present frontiers of Europe and thus ease the anxiety of the Kremlin about the aggressive intentions of the western powers.
The Locarno Treaty of 1925 was essentially a promise by England to help France if she were attacked by Germany or to help Germany if she were attacked by France. In the present situation a new edition of Locarno would mean a promise to come to the defense of the Soviet Union in the event Germany launched another invasion on Russian soil. Such a pact would, of course, have about as much value in preventing World War III as the Locarno Treaty had in preventing World War II.
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Churchill's proposal did not seem to meet with any response in Washington at the time. But this may be ascribable to an accidental gap in Anglo-American team work due to the temporary removal of Churchill and Anthony Eden from public activity, and the illness and death of Senator Taft. (Churchill suffered a stroke and Eden underwent a serious operation.)
Then Stevenson returned from his world tour. On Sept. 15 he urged Eisenhower to take the initiative in new peace talks that would consider disarmament and "durable assurances" for the Soviet Union of "non-aggression." This statement was in effect a political announcement that the Democrats would support Eisenhower in any moves along these lines. What is especially significant is that such a diplomatic demarche (change of direction) would mark an about-face from the policy followed by Truman.
Two days later, Dulles followed up with an important speech in the United Nations. The core of it was "The Russian people, like the French people have not forgotten what their nation suffered from Hitlerite Germany during the Second World War. They expect, and they are entitled to, assurance against a repetition of such events."
As if to demonstratively emphasize that bipartisan agreement had been reached on the line of diplomacy, Eisenhower arranged to have Stevenson "brief" him on his world tour. Stevenson told the press Oct. 1 that he had advised Eisenhower to meet Soviet fears of military encirclement by guarantees that they have nothing to fear from us. It would certainly clarify the atmosphere somewhat if the guarantees were offered and rejected." In response Eisenhower told Stevenson he was giving careful consideration to the proposal.
Following Dulles' UN appearance, capitalist statesmen took up the theme in a series of declarations. Lester B. Pearson, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, assured the Soviet Union Sept. 23 that the West had no plans to undermine the security of the Communist part of the world. Selwyn Lloyd, Britain's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, on the following day "arrayed Britain beside the United States and Canada in an effort to reassure the Kremlin. ..." On Sept. 25, Maurice Schumann, France's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, likewise assured Moscow that the West was willing to consider plans for guaranteeing Europe's present borders. And on Sept. 28, Churchill indicated that he favors a Big Four Meeting.
Dean Acheson came out of retirement to say Oct. 1 that negotiation with the Soviet Union "is possible, is desirable, and may — but only may—be productive."
Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, Under Secretary of State, reputed to be especially close to Eisenhower, said Oct. 2 that the State Department has under active consideration a non-aggression pact between the West and the Soviet Union.
How have these moves been interpreted in the capitalist press? Here are some typical reactions:
Representing liberal opinion, the New Republic said Sept. 28: "All signs point to a meeting of the leaders of Britain, France, the Soviet Union and the U.S."
The conservative Business Week said Oct. 3: "For the first time since the start of the cold war, world events have reached a stage where there's a possibility of a negotiated settlement between East and West."
And finally, the New York Times, which is the voice of authority for many editorial offices, said Oct. 4: "American thinking has taken the direction of offering the Communists 're-assurances' — not only by conciliatory words, but concretely in the form of non-aggression pacts, both in Germany and Korea. . . . The reasoning is that if the Russians will agree to non-aggression pacts, then real negotiations can take place and a settlement may follow. If they do not accept them, then all their charges of 'aggressive intent' on the part of the U.S. will be exposed as a sham and a stalling tactic. Moreover, any Soviet refusal to the U.S. proposals, it is held, will at least have the positive advantages of demonstrating that it is not the U.S. that is inflexible; of uniting the West, and of raising American prestige in the neutral Asian countries."