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The Third World Congress and the split 1950-1952 › The crisis and split in the French PCI (1951–1952)

Declaration of the Bleibtreu-Lambert Tendency on the Agreements Concluded at the International Executive Committee

The crisis and split in the French PCI (1951–1952) · 980 words

Published English text: Towards a History of the Fourth International, Part 4, vol. 2: Struggle in the Fourth International — International Secretariat Documents 1951-1954, Volume 2 of 4 volumes (Education for Socialists, Socialist Workers Party, New York, March 1974), pp. 53-54 · Bleibtreu-Lambert tendency (Central Committee majority of the PCI). Read from the scan and corrected against the page image. Reproduced with the permission of Pathfinder Press.
French text: Déclaration de la tendance Bleibtreu-Lambert sur les accords intervenus au Xe Plénum du CEI.

Ever since the Central Committee meeting of January 19 and 20, the Central Committee majority has affirmed its readiness to apply the tactical turn defined by the IS Bureau. It thus demonstrated once again its will for discipline, discipline which has been under all circumstances, total and impeccable in respect to the decisions of the World Congress and the French Commission of the World Congress, despite the strange accusation of "an undisciplined attitude" formulated by the IS Bureau.

But the Central Committee on January 20 refused to submit to the administrative measures taken by the IS Bureau in violation of the statutes of the International, because these measures were aimed to prevent a serious discussion of the problems posed by an entrist tactic, and to oppose the holding of its special Congress, and to destroy all guarantees of democracy in the party.

We unreservedly condemn the administrative methods employed by the IS Bureau, methods which the IEC could not approve but which it could only understand, methods which are the direct opposite of what a leadership should do when it has confidence in the correctness of its positions. Such methods are the price of political confusion and they express the logic of a revisionist tendency inside the International leadership which threatens the programmatic position of Trotskyism.

* * *

The political document adopted by the IEC is, in this respect, not free of confusion and contradictions, especially as it relates to the problem of Stalinism. Despite the confusion and the dangers of this document, the Central Committee majority will accept the discipline of the IEC because it is convinced that this discipline remains compatible with the defense, the safeguard and the reaffirmation of the programmatic ideas of Trotsky and his Transition Program; because it is sure that the Fourth International will in its entirety inevitably react against the threat of revisionism, as is normal in an organization which represents the only programmatic and political capital of the proletarian revolution. In such an organization, temporary faults and deviations cannot find favorable objective roots.

* * *

The organizational resolution of the IEC on the French Question contains in itself a partial confirmation of this opinion. On a number of points it represents an implicit condemnation of the ultimatism of the IS Bureau. It represents a formal disavowal of the Bureau by its decision to the effect that a special Congress be held which will discuss the problems posed by entrism without slapping on in advance a censorship on the members of the leadership.

It does not call into question the need of the party's being led in practice by the members in whom the party has political confidence.

But on several points serious sacrifices have been imposed on us:

The first and most serious one is the denial to the Central Committee elected by the Seventh Congress of the right to designate its Political Bureau. A Political Bureau has been imposed which gives to a member of the IS, designated by the IEC for six months, and responsible to the IEC, a deciding voice which places him in the position of an arbiter in all disputed questions.

[p. 54]

The same applies to the composition of the Secretariat.

Furthermore, the designation of Pierre Frank as Political Secretary was imposed on us against our will and we continue to consider this wrong for a number of reasons.

These measures were taken because the IEC, which could hear only two of the sixteen suspended comrades, was not sufficiently informed as to the reality hidden behind the accusation of an "undisciplined attitude" and has placed credence on the thesis of the IS which invoked "exceptional circumstances" as its justification.

* * *

Our acceptance of the decisions of the IEC demonstrates how erroneous and tendentious is the charge of being "undisciplined." How can one seriously affirm that a leadership representing the essential, living forces of the party, its big proletarian majority, seriously threatens the policy and the discipline of the International in January and in February accepts the decisions which were no different from the demands of the IS except for the guarantee of a discussion in a democratic congress which they include.

One cannot take seriously this story of a "menace" except if one thinks henceforth that democratic discussion of turns is a danger for the International leadership.

The majority of the Central Committee of the PCI has shown once again its unshakable will to preserve the unity of the party inside the International and to oppose splits even at the cost of heavy concessions.

As to its political discipline it had no need of making such a demonstration for no exact charge could be made against it! It nevertheless affirmed that even if the IEC, by taking measures of expulsion and split, formally placed it outside the International, it would continue to apply the political line of the Third World Congress and of the organs elected by it.

The crisis terminated at the Tenth IEC Plenum is not an internal crisis of the PCI but a conflict which sprang up between a disciplined section of the International on the one hand and Pabloism on the other, which utilizes the confusions and contradictions of the World Congress — where it could not impose itself—in order to assert itself after the World Congress. The responsibility for the conflict is entirely the fault of those who on the occasion of a tactical turn call into question the programmatic basis of the International, launch attacks against the Transition Program and against the fundamental tenets of Trotskyism on the nature and on the role of the Soviet bureaucracy.

We remain, as we shall continue to remain, on the side of the International. We will continue to fight for the defense of the program and principles which are the foundation of our International, the world party of revolution.

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