[p. 53]
1902 Hyperion
Los Angeles 27, Calif.
Dear Farrell:
Doric De Souza has been in California on some private business. During the past week we had a number of talks with him. This week his business will take him to Ann Arbor. While he is in Michigan he will look up our friends in Detroit, whose addresses I gave him. He told me that he will be in New York about the first of the month and will remain there three or four weeks. He will look you up at the headquarters as soon as he gets some time free from his business engagements.
Our talks here covered two subjects: one, the situation in Ceylon, and, two, the problems of the international movement.
The detailed information he gave us about the situation in Ceylon was very interesting and illuminating. Since you will be seeing him, I will not report on that here.
On the international question, we had a pretty full and frank exchange. It seems that on the broad political questions which have been involved in the split his position is very much the same as ours. On the crucial question of the functioning of the international and the degree of "centralization" possible and workable at the present stage of the development of the world movement, his opinion seems to be substantially the same as ours. This applies also to the evaluation of the leading people in the Pabloite center.
He did emphasize, however, that the Ceylonese people favor a positive policy of reunification and think the responsible leaders of organizations in both camps should work together to advance it. We assured him that this was our policy too. We gave him a pretty full and frank exposition of our attitude as it was summed up in the discussions at the Political Committee on the eve of the Plenum. At the beginning of our talks, he was inclined to write off our parity proposal as some kind of a gimmick on our part. But when we explained to him that we meant it in earnest and cited the precedents for such a procedure, as I did in my convention report, I think he began to take a more serious view of it.
We told him that our proposal was not presented for bargaining purposes; and that we do not intend to retreat an inch from it. If the Pabloites had been serious and honest in their talk about unity they would have accepted our parity proposal at once. Their refusal, and subsequent actions and maneuvers, have in effect taken unity off the agenda as an early prospect. This is the present reality, and it must be recognized. But it does not change our basic position, as previously stated.
We told him that, in our opinion, it would be stupid to count on an early realization of the reunification. The new attack of the Pabloites rules that out. Reunification can be brought about, if it can be brought about at all, only when the responsible leaders of functioning organizations make their influence and pressure for unity felt in the Pabloite organizational set-up, as well as in the International Committee.
The Pabloite strike-breaking attack on the British section in the midst of its struggle with the Labourite right wing, and his flirtation with the Marcyites in this country, call not for unrealistic chatter about a quick unification, but rather for an all-out fight against the latest eruption of Pabloism on these two fronts. The unity perspective must be maintained, but serious discussion of unity as a project to be realized will again make sense only when a definitive victory over Pabloite disruption on these two fronts has been registered and recognized by all.
[p. 54]
Pablo's attempted new adventure in the United States by way of the Marcyites, has, of course, no serious organizational significance. It is useful, however, as another demonstration of Pablo's unscrupulousness and treachery and as another warning about the insane folly of anyone in our ranks entertaining illusions about him. The real battlefield now is in Britain, and our consistent stand for an eventual reunification of the international movement takes now the concrete form of all-out support of our British comrades.
This support must not consist simply of applause from the sidelines; it must include active participation in the fight, with critical suggestions in regard to the tactical line of the British comrades at every stage of complicated battle.
As we see it, Pablo's new intervention in Britain has two aspects. On the one side, it appears to be a startling revelation that Pablo construes his liquidationist policy of "deep entry" as a principle to be imposed upon national sections by centralized, international discipline. On the other side, the new attack was obviously designed to break up the trends for genuine unification recently manifested in his own ranks, notably by the Ceylonese and the Italians, but probably also by others.
We must make sure that we do not facilitate this Pabloite game by abandoning our own policy of unification, as agreed upon at the Toronto Conference. We cannot hope to influence the pro-unity organizations in the Pabloite "international" if we abandon our own program of unification and call or appear to call for a deepening and hardening of the international split.
We knew that before, and the discussion at the pre- Convention Political Committee meeting showed that all the leading comrades are agreed upon it. The opinion expressed at this PC meeting was also stated in Breitman's letter to you. Our conversations with Doric showed quite conclusively that this is the correct line to follow on the international field.
The Ceylonese want a general reunification, without supercentralization, and with organizational guarantees against Pabloite domination of the reunified movement. But they don't want any more splits, and they don't think the cause of reunification can be served by any attempt to split off single organizations from one side or the other in the two international set-ups. If we had started out with the demand that the LSSP withdraw from the Pabloite "international," our discussion with Doric would have ended before it got started. But when we explained our policy in its essence and in detail, we began to get a sympathetic response from him.
The upshot of our discussion was a general agreement that we should make a deliberate attempt to create a climate for eventual unification by beginning a more active and open fraternal collaboration between our two parties. Doric agreed to our proposal that the LSSP should appoint a comrade to serve as correspondent of the Militant to keep our readers informed of all developments there. For his part, he suggested that Leslie [Goonewardene] and I should conduct an informal, confidential correspondence about all questions of mutual concern, which would include such critical suggestions and proposals as we might be able to offer about LSSP policy and practice in the developing crisis in Ceylon.
I gave him the Detroit addresses and suggested that he talk with our leading comrades there as fully and frankly as he did with us in Los Angeles. He will do the same with you when he comes to New York. I think it would be highly advisable for the PC comrades to schedule as many discussions with him as possible during his three-week stay in New York. It will be good if arrangements can be made to put him up so that meetings can be facilitated.
He will be interested to get from you some detailed information about the SWP; its organizational strength and where its branches are located; its structure and methods of work; its number of full-time functionaries, etc. We had scheduled such a discussion with him here, but didn't get around to it before his time ran out.
When Doric leaves New York he will return home by way of Europe and plans to visit at least Britain, France, and Italy.
It is our opinion here that if we can improve fraternal relations and open collaboration with the LSSP it can strengthen the unity trend and become a solid contribution toward eventual unification on a workable basis. Far from hampering the concrete fight in Britain, which cannot be soft-pedalled, an improved understanding with the LSSP should help that fight too.
Fraternally,
James P. Cannon
JPC:jh