[p. 81]
New York, N.Y.
India
Dear Comrade Kolpe,
I am sorry about the delay in answering your letter of April 21. The trip to Cuba, which Farrell Dobbs and I made was most useful in bringing us up to date on the situation there, but it certainly interfered with other very important matters, including answering your letter promptly.
We appreciated what you said about the situation in the International. Frank expressions of comradely opinions such as you voiced are most certainly best calculated to help re establish the disrupted ties. I shall try, in the same spirit, to answer the important questions which you raise.
First, on the problem of unification. From some of the things you say it occurs to me that you might not be aware of the details of the major effort that was already made to reach a viable solution. Could it be that you were not informed of the developments at the time? Just to make sure, I am enclosing copies of the five principal documents that establish the record. I will also offer some comment on these.
The first item is a letter from Comrade Cannon to Comrade Goonewarden. This was intended to note the apparent narrowing of political differences between the positions of the International Secretariat and the International Committee and to acknowledge that in principle this narrowing called for a similar narrowing of organizational differences; that is, steps toward unification. Comrade Cannon suggested that the chief obstacle appeared to be strong differences of opinion and even suspicions on organizational matters and that the first step to take in removing them is to recognize their existence. Existence of suspicions does not provide justification, of course, for continuation of the split, but they do call for special practical measures. What is needed specifically is an organizational bridge that can provide a basis for common work and activity in the course of which the old attitudes and perhaps unjustified suspicions could have the best chance of being resolved. He proposed a "sweeping organizational compromise."
Comrade Goonewardene forwarded the letter to the International Secretariat. What his recommendations were I do not know. The IS sent a comrade, Patrick O'D. [Sherry Mangan], to discuss the question more concretely with Comrade Cannon, who was quite willing to place his experience at the disposal of the international movement in a consultative way.
He outlined his suggestions in the form of an eight-point memorandum dated April 27, 1957. The key suggestion was a proposed joint agreement between the IS and the IC to recommend to the coming World Congress that the incoming International Executive Committee be elected on a parity basis; that is, with equal representation from the two international factions. Comrade Cannon explained the reasons for his proposal as follows:
First, it was made on the assumption that both sides were genuinely seeking unification. If this condition did not exist, then, of course, the proposal would not work and indeed would most likely prove unacceptable. The proposal would therefore constitute a way of testing the sincerity of both sides on the very serious question of unification.
The second assumption was that besides a genuine desire for unification, a good deal of mutual suspicion also existed. An executive committee elected on the basis of parity would accomplish two aims. (1) It would remove any fear of organizational reprisals or abuses. (2) with the removal of this fear, the best possible atmosphere would be established for the two factions to engage in common work and activity. Under these new conditions, with good will on both sides, it could be expected that the old differences would recede and, as new political problems arose, the International could confidently count on former alignments dying out.
In conversations, Comrade Cannon adduced a number of examples where in his own experience parity of this kind had not only proved highly successful but, as a matter of fact, had turned out to be the only practical means of achieving a unification. He recalled instances where this means was used even where one side obviously had the preponderant majority. Parity proved to be a most effective means of demonstrating to the minority that its rights were really guaranteed. Later, in the normal course of comradely activity and by common agreement, the arrangement was transcended.
The next document enclosed is a copy of the counterproposal made by the IS representative. This included "two exceptional measures." (1) "An exceptionally large representation, in the sense of voting rights . . . of the parties that left the International in 1953 . . . at the Fifth World Congress . . . and a strong recommendation to the Congress that it give similar exceptionally large representation in the IEC that it elects." (2) "A temporary revision of the powers of the IEC . . . and of the IS . . . in the sense of a much lesser delegation of powers than has been the practice since the Second World Congress . . ."
This counterproposal was taken as a rejection by the IS of the proposal for parity. Since the intent of the parity proposal might possibly have been misinterpreted, Comrade Cannon specified in more detail in his letter of April 29 ways in which the parity proposal could operate in the immediate situation and also how it could be applied in places where factional differences were particularly tense.
This was taken up by the IS and they replied in their letter of May 7, 1957. The essence of their reply was again to reject the parity proposal.
* * *
You mentioned that Comrade Livio Maitan of Italy told you during his visit to India that Comrade Pablo is "prepared to keep out of any key position on the new setup for the sake of unity." As you can see from the documents enclosed, this was not even mentioned as a condition for unification. Under the parity proposal such a proposal would be excluded. The comrades who accept Pablo's leadership would naturally be entitled to elect him to represent them on the executive committee if they should so choose. Those in the opposing faction would, of course, elect leaders in whom they place the most confidence. Unfortunately the parity proposal proved unacceptable to Comrade Pablo.
[p. 82]
In the three years since then, it is my personal opinion that the political positions have tended to converge still further. To read the press of the two factions of the main world issues, no difference exists justifying the continuation of the split. Yet the split has continued and has even become more bitter. Naturally every leading Trotskyist in the world must feel deeply concerned about this and wish that it were otherwise. To make it otherwise, however, we must seek, as a beginning at least, to attempt to explain the continued existence of the split.
The focal points are obviously Britain and France where the sharpest differences have centered. Of the two places, Britain is at the moment of the greatest interest since the comrades there have registered the 1 most impressive successes in the recent period whereas the movement in France appears, at best, to be marking time.
Our British comrades have given considerable attention to the reasons for the continued factionalism. They are quite puzzled. This puzzlement is not at all a factional pose; it is quite genuine.
Whether they are right or wrong about it, here is how the situation appears to them: Of all the sections of the Fourth International they have had the good fortune to move ahead the most rapidly in recent years. They have achieved such national weight and importance that they have become the target for considerable harassment from the side of reaction; in fact, they have been and still are the object of a witch-hunting campaign.
The witch-hunt does not exist in their imagination. It is an objective fact known to everyone in Britain interested in politics and to all those of similar interest outside Britain who follow the British press. The Militant has done its best to give an objective report of the facts.
Against this witch-hunt and in defense of Trotskyism, the British comrades have waged the best struggle they possibly could, not budging an inch.
Now what are the duties of Trotskyists in other lands in a situation like this? The most elementary requirement of international solidarity is to defend them, is it not? This would hold true even if they were not Trotskyists, if they were only any kind of socialists, any kind of workers' tendency, or Stalinists or simply bourgeois democrats.
Yet take a look at the Trotskyist periodicals under the influence of the IS and what is the record? Do they defend comrades with whom they say they have such political agreement that unification is called for? On the contrary, they display the most shameful silence! (I say "shameful" as about the mildest word that can be applied here. It would probably be more accurate to say that it is a blot on the record of the Trotskyist movement. How the British Trotskyists feel about it I leave to your imagination.)
But something happened in addition to that. The IS utilized the situation to seek factional advantages. Comrade Pablo himself personally took time to visit individuals who buckled under the witch-hunting pressure.
The British Trotskyists measured this kind of activity against the norm of international solidarity and were very unfavorably impressed. They could not help feeling that if the IS were really interested in unification that it would have done everything possible to demonstrate international solidarity with the British Trotskyists in their difficult situation. The IS would have done this, the British comrades felt, no matter what the tactical differences it might hold in regard to their course.
To the British comrades the IS actions were only the culmination of a policy followed toward them since 1953. In view of this policy they were suspicious of the genuineness of the unity proposals in 1957. They felt that their suspicions were justified by the IS's rejection of the parity proposal and still further confirmed by the factionalism of the IS in Britain since then. Nevertheless, like Trotskyists elsewhere they were faced with the necessity of finding an objective explanation for the continued existence of the split.
They tried to find it in political differences, since it seemed to them that such sharp organizational differences as they were up against constantly could only be explained in the light of warring political concepts. This I think was the reason for the article which you mention as "launching a broadside against Pablo and his colleagues." Personally I would agree with you that this article was not well conceived. Nevertheless, how are we to account for the continued split?
Another explanation I have heard voiced by the British in private conversations is that the IS some ten years ago or thereabouts foresaw an early third world war. The war would leave the various workers' organizations, especially those dominated by Stalinism, no choice but to move toward the left. Since the time was too short for us to win a big following before the outbreak of war, we had to find our way into these various organizations and await developments—in other words practice "deep entry." The overall perspective proved completely erroneous. Instead of recognizing this, however, the IS persisted in the tactical prescription, converting it into a kind of principle. The British comrades are of the firm opinion that the consequences of this proved devastating in a number of countries. It did not have similar consequences for them, they believe, because they resisted its application.
(Since you mention the question of the entry tactic and our attitude toward it, let me say at this point, that we never agreed with "deep" entry. To us it looks like a suicidal tactic. We do not have as rich an experience in this as the British comrades, but I think our approach is fundamentally the same. When we entered the Socialist party in 1935, it was not an entry into the SP as such, but a simple move to meet the leftward moving currents which had appeared in the SP at the time. After fusing with them, the possibility of our becoming a majority in the SP opened up—we did constitute the majority of activists—but the right wing in charge of the party machinery cut off this possibility by expelling us. We could have stayed only by changing our tactic of entry into "deep" entry; that is, remaining silent about such issues as the Spanish Revolution. We, of course, refused to remain silent. The whole tactical operation took only fourteen months. It should be added that Trotsky was worried that even this was too long!)
Another possible explanation of the continued split in the Fourth International, which I have heard expressed by some leading American comrades, is that two different organizational concepts animate the two sides and that these are strong enough in the circumstances to cut across the common political positions. The IS holds to the concept of a highly centralized world party. The opposing position is that this is unrealistic at present. Comrade Cannon has noted in relation to this that among other reasons the poverty of the various sections makes it impossible for the key leaders in even the main countries to get together frequently, much less operate from a common center. Yet it is the national leaderships that constitute the real international leadership of the world Trotskyist move ment; it cannot be otherwise and any attempt to substitute for this real leadership inevitably tends to become a caricature. In the light of this reality, it is best not to attempt extreme organizational centralism. It is sufficient for the time to rely on common political agreement, to seek to further this, to seek common actions that can foster closer fraternal relations and better organizational coordination; above all, not to attempt to dominate the organizational life of each section from an international center that under existing conditions must inevitably limp on the democratic side of democratic centralism.
[p. 83]
For myself I have reached no definitive explanation for the continued existence of the split. I am quite open to consideration of other explanations. The only point I would stick fast to, is that the opinions of the British and French comrades, who are in better position, possibly, than any others to observe the IS at close hand and to experience its methods and its organizational policies, are very weighty, and that it would be a serious error to dismiss their views as simply "factional."
* * *
Now on some of the specific points you raise. I am under the impression that the IC is postponing its Congress although I have seen no official communication as to this.
We have been following the position of the Chinese CP on peaceful coexistence with a great deal of interest, having reported it in the Militant as you have no doubt noted since you wrote your letter. . . .
We are very much interested in your opinion about the electoral and parliamentary course of the Ceylonese comrades. We have written them that we feel disturbed but we have not yet received a reply to explain their reasons for offering to support a bourgeois government. Do you have any information about this?
With comradely greetings,
Joseph Hansen