The Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union will without doubt be regarded as a milestone in the history of the USSR and the postwar communist labor movement.
Everyone understands and proclaims this fact now, but not necessarily in the same profound way or for the same reasons as the Fourth International. The most experienced bourgeois observers have concluded that the congress had, in fact, “smashed the idol” of Stalin and had even “danced on the debris,” thus, according to this point of view, opening a new era in the history of the USSR and the international communist movement.
Others spoke of this congress as “ten days that shook Stalinism” and emphasized its long-term consequences in these areas.
In its fundamental assessment of the USSR and Stalinism, as well as in its analyses of the objective developments since the outbreak of the last war, our movement was naturally the best prepared not to be “surprised” by the “sensational” character of this congress and at the same time to understand its profound significance.
Particularly since the death of Stalin, we have followed literally day by day the developments in the USSR, which in a way were confirmed as well as amplified by the Twentieth Congress of the CP of the Soviet Union.
The Twentieth Congress was shaped essentially by factors and considerations of a domestic order in the present Soviet situation. This can be proved by a critical analysis of the main themes of the reporters and speakers; a critique of Stalin and the “personality cult,” “collective leadership,” economic and political concessions to the masses, all under the new slogan, “Back to Lenin.”
The Twentieth Congress effectively shattered the idolization of Stalin and repudiated his absolutist regime. Naturally, this was not done in a frank or political way, but essentially bureaucratically.
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It made him appear to be—and occasionally this time even explicitly designated him—responsible for the most repugnant aspects of his regime—arbitrary rule over the party and state, falsification of history, terror and crimes against revolutionary opponents—and cast discredit on his credentials as a “theoretician” or “classical authority” on Marxism.
His most famous writings, History of the Communist Party (Bolshevik) and The Economic Problems of Socialism—which until his death were considered to be holy scripture, the Bible of the Stalinist church—were put on the index as “inadequate” and even “erroneous.”
The vague, apolitical way these books were criticized, without reference to specific ideas, is naturally the worst way it could have been done, a truly Stalinist way. No one will dare look for what might be correct in these writings, after such a condemnation.
History offers few examples of such a scandalously rapid transition from supreme glory to oblivion and discreditment as the one that took place between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Congresses of the CPSU at Stalin’s expense, and this at the hands of his closest collaborators.
The Twentieth Congress allowed the profile of Stalin, the chief culprit, to appear behind the hated shadow of Beria. It made him, in his turn, the scapegoat, responsible for a whole series of “the most negative” consequences to “the party’s life and activity” during his regime.
Naturally, this is only the beginning.
Now that Stalin has been removed from his pedestal, it seems that his cult is being replaced by the “collective leadership.” But this time, the flattery which studs the speeches and the accounts by the press of the Communist parties has a new meaning. On the one hand it creates an unfavorable climate for any attempt to impose a new supreme “leader,” and, on the other, it reflects a real broadening of democracy among the highest bureaucrats.
When Khrushchev found himself obliged to recall the verse of the Internationale, “We need no condescending saviors. ...,” this was no mere oratorical trick; he wanted to show that he was “loyally” playing the role of reporter—at worst a leader—of a team, nothing more.
The congress gave more important evidence, as well, for the existence of the “collective leadership” and greater democracy at the level of the Presidium and the Central Committee of the party. The congress did not seal an exclusive victory, politically or organizationally, for any one clique. The Central Committee held private, internal discussion sessions. There were not yet open manifestations of crystallized tendencies based on a whole program, but divergent points of view in the leadership, whose representatives were not organizationally penalized in orthodox Stalinist fashion.
As we will explain in our analysis of the results of the congress, Khrushchev’s report, and even more so the political resolution adopted, reflect the centrist, compromising tendency which now dominates the leadership, a tendency midway between different opinions, further to the right and left, which also exist and have been manifested in the leadership of the bureaucracy. The composition of the Presidium was not changed; the representatives of these divergent viewpoints were not left off.
Khrushchev did criticize those who took viewpoints other than his own, thus revealing where the differences lie. He referred in a critical tone to “some comrades” who “showed a certain distrust toward the workers in the State Security institutions” and compared them to “Chekists.” He also referred to those whom “the Central Committee had to reprimand, who sowed confusion on clear-cut issues that had been decided a long time ago by the party. . . .In their conversations, they had used erroneous formulations, claiming that all that had been created in our society so far was the bases for socialism, that is, the foundations of socialism”; and also to some who “on the problem of the evolution of socialism” go to the “opposite extreme.”
“There are those who believe that the theory of the gradual transition from socialism to communism is even a call for the immediate application of the principles of communist society.
“Some hotheads have decided that the construction of a socialist society has been completed.[1]
“It is proposed that the replacement of Soviet commerce by the direct exchange of goods be accelerated. . . .”
Finally he attacked “the smart alecks” who “counterpose light industry to heavy industry, arguing that it was necessary to give priority to heavy industry only in the early stages of the Soviet economy, etc.”
It is unlikely that these divergences—whose future importance cannot be underestimated—are unrelated to each other, or that they don’t very often merge with each other on the basis of a similar logic: that of a tendency which, starting with the fact that only the basis for socialism have been established in the USSR, has a different view of economic, social, and cultural problems of socialist construction, properly so-called (which, in a sense, has only just begun in the USSR).
The fact remains that all these manifestations, limited as they are, nevertheless constitute a real revolution compared with the methods in use during Stalin’s lifetime, if you judge from the standpoint of the proletarian democracy of Lenin’s time.
What are the dynamics and the future prospects for these changes? The broadening of democracy at the top levels of the bureaucracy, already accompanied by signs of divergent points of view, embryonic tendencies, has only two possible outcomes: either it will be extended to the base of the party and the masses, or it will be rudely cut short, marking the consolidation of power by a single faction and its leader, after an ephemeral “democratic” interlude.
The answer to this crucial question, by far the most important among all those posed by the Congress, is partly indicated by the breadth of the economic and political concessions granted or promised to the masses. They reveal the pressure the masses exert on the bureaucracy, the relationship of forces between them, and the dynamic of this relationship of forces.
It is significant that on the question of consumer goods production as well as on the question of wages, the congress decided more in favor of what might be called the “Malenkov-Mikoyan” tendency than the “Bulganin- Kaganovich” tendency. What Khrushchev did on these two questions in his “centrist ” speech as well as what was said in the final resolution, indicate that there was a compromise in favor of a rapid increase in consumer goods production and a rise in the lowest wages.[2]”
The reduction of the workday, the improvement of the system of pensions and vacations, the promise of a new work code, and the improvement of food service in the factories and for all wage-earners, are all measures which move in the same direction and show the bureaucracy’s concern about promising satisfaction to the worst-paid layers of the working class, which certainly exert the greatest pressure on it at the present stage.
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The proposed measures concerning the kolkhoz members, the most underprivileged mass of the Soviet population up to now, are no less indicative of the same tendency.
The leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy seems to be about to make a major turn in this area, which would be at the same time an equally important abandonment of the orthodox Stalinist policy: consolidation of collectivization and turning it toward effective socialization by not only supporting a larger technical base in the form of machines, but also rapidly increasing the remuneration of the kolkhoz members, allowing them more rights and initiatives within the framework of the kolkhozes and supplying them with a greater quantity of cheap merchandise, with variety and high quality. In this way the bureaucracy hopes that the kolkhoz members will voluntarily abandon working their private plots in order to devote themselves exclusively to collective production and thus sharply increase this production.
The congress’s promises of social and political measures are equally important: the abolition of tuitions and the generalization of secondary education, the announcement of a new penal code and of a reform of the judiciary system, the stress on measures to make sure that “Soviet legality” will be respected, the many suggestions, especially in the speeches by Mikoyan and Voroshilov—on the need for more effective participation by the masses in the management of the economy and the state through democratization of the soviets, trade unions, etc., are all signs that the bureaucracy finds itself obliged to extend economic concessions into the social and political domain as well.
Naturally, one should not exaggerate the practical importance of these promises, nor the actions which will be taken to carry them out, nor the differences between what the official reporters said on many of these points and what was said by individual speakers in the discussions.
Taken as a whole, however, promises, actions, and differences that were pointed out clearly indicate the fundamental fact which should help us understand the real meaning of this congress and show us the course of future developments: The bureaucracy is under pressure, in different forms, from a Soviet society liberating itself from the Stalinist yoke. It is beginning to differentiate itself at the top under the influence of these increasing pressures. The future development of this process will be determined by the interaction of this pressure, the direct action of the masses, and the struggle of tendencies within the bureaucracy.
This evolution is only beginning. It would be an unpardonable error to imagine that this evolution will proceed, as before, in a straight line ending quickly with the restoration of real proletarian democracy in the USSR and a “return to Lenin” in domestic as well as foreign policy. To arrive at such a result, it will be necessary to reach a stage where the politicization of the masses, going over to direct action, combines with a sharper differentiation, an actual break, between the developing revolutionary wing and the more and more isolated thermidorean wing of the bureaucracy. This process of political revolution will culminate in the overturn of the bureaucratic regime and the reestablishment of Soviet democracy.
But what must be understood is that these two processes will interact; and that, on the other hand, the objective conditions, both in the USSR and internationally, are now favorable. Abrupt halts and even retreats on the part of the conservative bureaucracy are not only possible but inevitable. But it is unlikely, if not impossible, in the framework of the current relationship of forces in the USSR and internationally, for this wing of the bureaucracy to annul all the concessions promised to the masses or already carried out, and for it to return to a policy of force and to the methods of the orthodox Stalinist era.
The Twentieth Congress took place under the Khrushchev regime—let us not forget—and, on more than one point, not only maintained the positive acquisitions that have evolved since the death of Stalin but enlarged them.
The Twentieth Congress, as we emphasized, was shaped fundamentally by factors and considerations of domestic order. For that reason, the progressive aspects are manifested, and will be manifested, only inside the USSR and, by their consequences, inside the satellite “people’s democracies.” But since it was not at all a “self-reform” with the leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy sincerely returning to the Leninist traditions and program, its policy toward the rest of the “non-socialist world” takes on a different character which is, in short, traditional: Utilize the workers’ movement to neutralize imperialism, not to overthrow it.
The Twentieth Congress’s major themes of “theoretical” innovation in this area, on “the inevitability of war,” “peaceful coexistence,” and the “new roads to achieving socialism,” are tied together by the same logic. They tend to justify a policy of class collaboration by the Communist parties with “anti-American,” pacifist wings of the bourgeoisie of the metropolitan and dependent countries. Combining mass pressure with flexible diplomacy, the Soviet bureaucracy hopes thus to “neutralize” the most aggressive forces of imperialism, to maintain the status quo and, in this atmosphere of “peace,” proceed to consolidate the gains achieved by the “socialist world.”
The theory of “socialism in one country,” with all its consequences for the international workers’ movement, is carried over to the category of countries that “are in the process of building socialism.” The final collapse of capitalism is seen as resulting from the striking confirmation, through “peaceful coexistence,” of the overwhelming superiority of the “socialist world”[3] purified of the most hideous aspects of Stalinism, “reformed,” and developing henceforth more freely and amply.
Moreover, the congress’s analysis of the present situation of capitalism is based on the perspective of the forthcoming outbreak of an economic crisis. In the framework of such an evolution and counting on the inability of capitalism—according to the congress’s theory—to resort to war at the present time, the logical conclusion is to foresee a sort of “self-destruction” of capitalism, without any major battles either internally or internationally. One couldn’t imagine a rosier view of historical evolution, a more “consoling” theory, to present to the masses justifying “socialism in one, part of the world.”
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The “theoretical” innovations of the congress are designed to justify a historical evolution now seen as possible, which best corresponds to the needs and interests of the new leadership of the Soviet bureaucracy at the present time.
The theory that war is avoidable from now on—since it is challenged every day by the international reality and by the incessant preparations of imperialism—is put forward in a conditional way, leaving the door open for retreat.
The “vigorous social and political” forces that now exist and possess “serious means for preventing the imperialists from setting off a war” should, however, “practice extreme vigilance” and be ready if it is necessary (this is not excluded) to inflict a crushing counterblow to the aggressors in the eventuality that they “make an attempt” to start a war. Thus, the theory of “non-inevitable war” is put forth in order above all to make the supposedly “Leninist” theory of “peaceful coexistence” seem more plausible.
The bureaucracy seeks this “peaceful coexistence” strictly on the basis of the status quo. As a concession to imperialism it can only offer the revolutionary movement’s renunciation of taking power in the capitalist and dependent countries at any price by revolutionary means. This is a way of proposing to exchange “social peace” for “peace” between the bureaucracy and imperialism.
Not everything that was said at the congress about “new paths for achieving socialism” was so new. It is reminiscent of the argument advanced, expecially in the 1945-47 period, by the theoreticians of “new democracy” in Germany, France, Italy, and elsewhere, as well as the argument of the Chinese leadership before its victory and during the first few years after. Moreover, the policy of the Communist parties in recent years has rarely been much different from the line endorsed and “theorized” by the Twentieth Congress.
It may be that the relationship of forces in some country at some time might soften the fierceness of the class struggle and civil war and weaken the bourgeoisie’s capacity for resistance. It could be that the form and peculiarities of the revolution and the proletarian dictatorship which would follow the victory will be quite diverse from country to country. But this is not the issue raised by the Soviet leaders, Mikoyan with more embarrassment than the rest.
Is it possible to come to power in collaboration with the bourgeoisie? Can the machinery of the bourgeois state then be used, without its being smashed and without building another, proletarian state machine?
These are the real issues, which summarize the essence of the Leninist doctrine on revolution and the state. History provides no examples—such as might “enrich” the theory in a different way—of a proletariat coming to power along with a representative wing of the bourgeoisie (not a phantom wing under exceptional circumstances); nor of making a revolution by using the bourgeois state machine. The examples given by Mikoyan to illustrate his own concept of these “new paths” and to combat “reformism” lead one to believe that, on this question too,[4] he was carrying on, with embarrassment, a kind of criticism or a veiled polemic against the argument of the reporter, who failed to convince him. Giving Czechoslovakia and the other “people’s democracies” as an example to illustrate the “paths” of “peaceful transition” to revolution and socialism is only a bad joke.
The occupation of these countries by the Soviet Army, after the war created exceptional conditions for forcing the bourgeoisie (already dislocated during the war) to abandon its positions “peacefully.” Even here, in the case of Czechoslovakia in particular, it was necessary for an extraparliamentary movement of armed workers to develop.
The Communist parties will certainly interpret the “new paths,” endorsed by the Twentieth Congress, in the most opportunist way possible. The French CP has already done so in its policy toward the socialist-led Guy Mollet government and the Algerian revolution.
Instead of a united-front policy with the mass Socialist parties, with the perspective of a CP-SP workers’ government based on united-front workers’ committees, which would begin to apply a real anticapitalist program, the CPs practice opportunist adaptation to the bourgeois policy of the social-democratic leaderships and even to the “Mendesist” bourgeoisie’s policy in the metropolitan countries and to the policy of the “Nehruist” bourgeoisie in countries like India.
This policy naturally does not in any way lead to revolution and socialism. It could only end in stagnation, setbacks, and even defeat of the workers’ movement, despite the objective conditions which are everywhere favorable.
It will be rejected by the masses, who will take the only path which the realities of capitalism and imperialism allow them: that of revolutionary struggle to overthrow both.
* * *
The Fourth International determines its attitude toward the changes and developments marked by the Twentieth Congress, not by subjective considerations but by what they represent objectively for the future of the USSR, the international workers’ movement, and socialism.
Whether or not the Soviet bureaucracy rehabilitates the Trotskyists, whether it continues to put them in the category of tendencies always hated by the workers’ movement and in the company of “bourgeois nationalists and other champions of the restoration of capitalism,” this will not influence our judgment nor cause us to depart from our principles.
We know that it is now obliged to rehabilitate a whole series of revolutionary victims of the Stalinist terror and to disavow a whole series of lies about the history of the revolution, the Soviet CP, and the Third International.
The bureaucracy will do this under the increased pressure of the masses and of tendencies within it that will be the most affected and the most sensitive to these pressures, in an eclectic, indirect, limited way, without saying too much and especially without giving frank explanations, as the bureaucracy has operated in the past. It is impossible to say now how broad or in what order these now-inevitable rehabilitations will be. But one thing is certain: the last assault which the bureaucracy will attempt to maintain will be that which it has kept up against Leon Trotsky and the movement he founded, the Fourth International. For to sincerely rehabilitate Leon Trotsky and his movement would in reality mean recognizing in them the proletarian tendency which defended the real positions of living revolutionary Marxism in relation to the economic, social and political problems of the USSR as well as in those of the international workers’ movement. Sincerely rehabilitating Leon Trotsky and the Fourth International would mean recognizing not only the correctness of our positions on the Stalinist degeneration of the USSR, the abolition of proletarian democracy in the party, the soviets and the trade unions in the USSR, the zigzags and errors in economic policy in the USSR even before the first five-year plan, etc., but also the correctness of our positions on the reactionary character of the theory of “socialism in one country” and the whole policy of the Third International and the Communist parties that followed it. The rehabilitation of the Trotskyists would in reality signify a genuine and complete return to Lenin, which would be inconceivable without the destruction of the bureaucratic regime which still holds power in the USSR and in the Communist parties, as well as the abolition of the privileges of the Soviet bureaucracy, and the restitution to the workers of control and management of the economy and the state.
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For this reason, the Fourth International, while welcoming the results of the Twentieth Congress without sectarianism, has no illusions. It knows that the struggle for a genuine renewal of proletarian democracy will be a long one. But the Fourth International has shown that it has all the tenacity that is required.
We note with satisfaction and salute the first results of the revolutionary rising of the Soviet masses which are beginning to break the fetters of Stalinist absolutism. We understand the immense long-term significance of these results, signifying the definitive decline of Stalinism. We are strengthened in our determination to remain closely attentive to the developments, to the inevitable shake-ups which we foresaw for the Communist parties. But we will refrain from mistaking the melodious themes such as are found in an operatic overture for the full melodies, which will only be played in the future and under a different conductor than the bureaucracy. What is in sight and counts immensely is the recognition of our tendency by a larger and larger number of revolutionary elements as a legitimate tendency in the workers’ movement. We are confident in the revolutionary activity of the proletariat of the USSR and throughout the world, and in its evergreater victories, which will help it to recognize the expression of its aspirations, its goals, its tactics, its strategy for revolution and for socialism, raised to the highest levels in the whole program of Trotskyism and the Fourth International in the new, more critical, freer atmosphere that will exist from now on in the international communist movement. Despite the inevitable drawbacks of centrist and outright opportunist confusion which the “thaw” of Stalinism produces, the program and ideas of the Fourth International will make their way forward more easily and will triumph. March 15, 1956
Footnotes
1. According to Khrushchev’s science, socialism is already “constructed” in the USSR but not “completed.” More than a nuance is seen in the distinction—justifiably, since his “constructed” socialism is really only a preparatory phase of socialism (“completed’’).
2. “While maintaining the rapid pace of development in heavy industry, we can and must give more scope to the development of consumer goods production.”
Further: “Now that we possess a powerful heavy industry, fully developed, there is a practical possibility to quickly advance not only the consumer goods industry but also the production of current goods for consumption” (Khrushchev’s report).
“The Communist Party considers it absolutely necessary to continue to put priority on the development of heavy industry. ... At the same time the congress considers the level of social production now attained makes it possible to develop at a rapid pace not only the production of capital goods, but also the production of goods for mass consumption” (resolution passed by the congress).
“The Congress fully approves of measures, etc., aimed at continuously increasing the real wage of workers and employees and the income of kolkhoz members, as well as raising the wages of the lowest-paid categories of workers. . . .” (resolution passed by the congress).
3. “We are convinced that all the workers of the world, after considering the advantages of communism, will sooner or later take the road of struggle to build the socialist society” (Khrushchev’s report).
4. As he did in relation to the criticism of the past, the policy on wages, “proletarian democracy,” “Soviet legality,” etc.