1. The opening of negotiations between the United States and the Vietnamese, and their subsequent evolution, can be correctly understood only in the complex framework of the existing balance of forces between the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary forces, both on a world scale and in Indochina itself.
The basic weakness of the Indochinese revolution lies in its relative international isolation. The main cause of this isolation is the conservative policy of peaceful coexistence followed by the Moscow and Peking bureaucracies and by the Communist parties they control on a world scale. This policy has enabled American imperialism to carry out a systematic escalation of its murderous attacks on the revolutionary forces in South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam without an adequate response in the least way from the bureaucracies in power in Moscow and Peking. What aid they have given the Vietnamese fighters has been doled out drop by drop and has at the same time increasingly been used as a means of putting political pressure on these fighters to "moderate" their struggle.
The relative isolation of the Vietnamese revolution, which was partially ameliorated only by the growth of the worldwide mass movement of struggle against the war of imperialist aggression, worsened after the announcement of Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow. Nixon succeeded in demobilizing a significant part of the antiwar movement in the United States, enabling him to launch a new military escalation in Indochina. Under these conditions the Vietnamese revolution cannot win victory over imperialism on a purely military level. Hence the attempt to reach a negotiated solution in order to end imperialism's military intervention in Indochina.
The basic power of the Indochinese revolution lies in the unprecedented breadth and vigor of the revolutionary process initiated and developed in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos. Because of this, the imperialist intervention has experienced a series of strategic setbacks. First there was the failure of "special war," then of "local war," and today the props of the "Vietnamization" policy have been undermined.
The victories scored by the revolutionary forces in Cambodia (after Lon Nol's coup d'etat) and in Laos (after the battle of Bass Loo in February 1971) prevented the crushing of resistance in South Vietnam. The offensive unleashed in South Vietnam eight months ago destroyed the "pacification" program in the countryside and generally altered the relationship of forces in favor of the popular revolutionary forces. The agrarian revolution and the formation of organs of revolutionary power have moved forward in vast rural areas of South Vietnam. The air attacks on the North and on the liberated zones of the three countries of Indochina did not succeed in breaking popular resistance or in preventing the revolutionary armed forces from continuing their offensive.
In this context, the Vietnamese Communist party's attempt to win through negotiations a withdrawal of imperialist troops from Vietnam does not necessarily imply a step backward for the Vietnamese revolution. The immediate prospects for the Vietnamese revolution can be laid out and the tasks of revolutionary Marxists in relation to it can be defined only through a correct analysis of the military, political, social, economic, and psychological effects that the possible cease-fire accords may have on the various South Vietnamese social classes and their major political expressions.
2. In any event, withdrawal of the U. S. armed forces from Vietnam and cessation of the bombing of both the North and South would constitute a shift in the relationship of forces in favor of the Vietnamese revolution. This would reflect imperialism's inability to break the heroic resistance of the Vietnamese masses as well as its retreat before the strength of antiwar sentiment in the United States itself.
But in itself such a retreat does not guarantee the victory of the permanent revolution in South Vietnam. It only means that the revolutionary process will be able to develop with a reduced, but not eliminated, foreign interference. U. S. aid to the counterrevolutionary forces in South Vietnam will continue. The American fleet will remain in Indochinese waters, threatening the masses of these countries with a resumption of bombing should the revolution make fresh advances. The retention of U. S. bases in Thailand entails an analogous threat. Moscow and Peking's pressure on the Vietnamese CP will scarcely cease. The continuous rearming of the puppet army, the transformation of U. S. troops into "civilian advisers," the continuing financial and economic aid to the Thieu regime, the increase in Saigon's police terror, the sending of forces from an international control commission, which, inasmuch as it is composed of bourgeois armies will intervene in favor of the counterrevolutionary forces — all these factors show that U. S. imperialism will seize every opportunity oifered it by the continuation of dual power after the possible signing of accords of the type proposed in October 1972.
Under these conditions, everything will depend on the development of revolutionary mass struggles both in the cities and in the countryside, on the policy followed by the Vietnamese CP, and on the interrelation of these two factors and their impact on whatever counterrevolutionary military apparatuses Thieu's puppets will command.
3. The current situation in South Vietnam is one of dual power from top to bottom. On a countrywide level and on a provincial level, in countless villages and in various cities the workers and peasants' governmental structures and armed forces stand opposed to the governmental structures and armed forces of the counterrevolution, the big landlords and the comprador bourgeoisie, the puppets of imperialism. Some important regions have been completely liberated and are administered by revolutionary organs of power. But this dual power has yet to be extended to the country's principal cities. The success or failure of the revolutionary struggle of the masses in extending the formation of organs of revolutionary power and in destroying the bourgeois state apparatus — a struggle to be waged after the possible signing of a cease-fire agreement —will determine the outcome of the revolutionary process in Indochina.
It is in this context that the question of a "national coalition" government or structure must be approached. We must clearly explain that there is no possibility, in Vietnam or elsewhere, of "national concord" between the exploiting and exploited classes. The Fourth International remains opposed to coalition governments with the bourgeoisie, whatever the specific composition of these governments. Even when the bourgeois ministers are hostages of an already proletarian state power, their presence does not facilitate the consolidation of the revolutionary seizure of power and can only disorient the proletariat's class consciousness.
But this principled opposition to any coalition government with the bourgeoisie does not entitle us automatically to define all cases of such governments as popular-front regimes stabilizing and defending the economic rule and the state of the possessing classes. History offers us the example of France and Spain in 1936, France, Italy, Greece, Indonesia, and elsewhere at the end of the second world war, where this was the case. But it was not the case in Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and China, where the presence of bourgeois ministers in the central government did not prevent the socialist transformation of the revolutionary process from occurring. The decisive thing is the nature of the state, that is, the class character of those who control the armed forces. If the bourgeoisie is in reality disarmed, then the bourgeois ministers are hostages of the proletarian state (whether bureaucratically deformed or not). If the proletariat and poor peasantry are in reality disarmed, then the revolution has suffered defeat. If both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie retain their arms, then the "government" or structure of "national coalition" can only be an expression of dual power; that is, it represents but a momentary hiatus in an ongoing civil war that can be ended only by the victory of one or the other existing camp of class antagonists.
4. The revolutionary offensive of the South Vietnamese laboring masses will develop along already discernible lines that make any interruption in the political struggle less than likely:
(a) In the countryside, the deepening of the agrarian revolution — which in many areas has already reached the stage of forming cooperatives — and its extension to other regions, that is, its generalization throughout South Vietnam; elimination of the landed proprietors, usurers, big traders, and the gangster-watchdogs of the Thieu regime, and implacable opposition to their returning to villages from which they have already been driven.
(b) In the cities, the struggle against the high cost of living, speculation, gambling, hoarding of vital goods and basic necessities, exploitation of the masses by the industrial, financial, and big commercial bourgeoisie.
(c) In the cities and the countryside, immediate struggle for the release of the 200,000 political prisoners, for political rights, and for complete freedom of action for all organizations illegalized by the Thieu regime.
(d) In both the cities and the countryside, dissolution of the puppet military and administrative apparatuses through the combined effects of the processes just described.
All indications are that the cadres of the NLF and the Vietnamese CP are systematically preparing the South Vietnamese population for this mass political struggle. The U. S. withdrawal, like the perspective of reunification with the North and the acceptance of the principle of free elections with the participation of all political parties today consigned to clandestinity, will inevitably stimulate mass struggles and will further tilt the balance of forces in favor of the revolution.
5. The Vietnamese Communist party and the NLF leadership enjoy such prestige and authority among the South Vietnamese laboring masses that their orientation will significantly affect the pace and breadth of the mass mobilizations. To evaluate all the actions of this leadership it would be necessary to know in detail the situation in South Vietnam, which for us is impossible at present. We can only make some general observations.
First of all, a capitulation of the CP leadership, which would entail the dissolution of the revolution's independent armed forces, seems very unlikely in light of what happened both to the cadres and to the South Vietnamese masses after the Geneva accords. Further, if the Stalinist training of the Vietnamese CP leaders implies the possibility of opportunist maneuvers — which are reflected in the written public program of the NLF —the balance of the last fifteen years clearly demonstrates this party's tenacious commitment to the overthrow of the bourgeois state in South Vietnam. Finally, the relationship between the CP and the South Vietnamese mass movement is not simply a function of the CP's political authority, but also of the unusual pressure of the revolutionary masses on a party which in its practical orientation has broken with Stalinism's classical Menshevik line in the colonial and semicolonial countries and which is independent of the Moscow and Peking bureaucracies.
6. All opportunities for independent intervention in this process by revolutionary Marxists must be utilized to the fullest extent possible, with the principle aim of deepening the permanent revolution in South Vietnam and of helping it attain final victory. On the scene, this will involve action to strengthen the independent proletarian organizations in Saigon, in which our movement has a real tradition.
It is especially important to stress the role that devolves on us on an international scale, not only today, when imperialism's barbaric war is in full swing, but tomorrow as well, in the event a cease-fire agreement is signed. The revolution will go on after the signing. International solidarity with this revolution will remain more than ever a vital necessity, the more so as the Communist parties around the world sink further into immobility, if not into open abandonment of the defense of the Vietnamese masses' fight to complete their revolution. Our responsibility in developing mass actions to support the Indochinese revolution will thus increase, and we will have to fight against any attempt to demobilize active international solidarity.
The main lines of our activity are clear: extension of the support actions now being waged by our sections, especially against any imperialist intervention continuing after the signing of the possible cease-fire accords(for the complete withdrawal of the U. S. fleet and of U. S. "civilian advisers," for the elimination of the air-naval bases in Thailand, against the sending of "international control forces" composed of bourgeois armies); the development of increased propaganda against the "peaceful coexistence" policies of the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies, which substantially contributed to the deterioration of the international relationship of forces in which the Indochinese revolution is unfolding.
In case a cease-fire agreement is signed, our movement must explain that there must be no letup in support for the Indochinese revolution. It is around the line of complete support for the Indochinese revolution until total victory — a line carried out through concrete slogans in each country in accordance with the concrete situation of the mass movement —that we must mobilize militants and continue our mass work of support to the Indochinese revolution.
Today an international campaign must be prepared demanding the immediate release of South Vietnamese political prisoners and against the terror unleashed by the Thieu regime — terror for which U. S. imperialism bears full responsibility. From now on, the American government's responsibility for any massacre of these prisoners must be sharply stressed. This campaign must be carried out in the most united fashion possible.
The development of the situation in Laos and Cambodia must be closely followed. It will also most probably necessitate many solidarity actions.
7. The importance of the questions raised by the future of the Indochinese revolution necessitate a continuing discussion in the framework of preparation for the tenth world congress (fourth since reunification) of the Fourth International.
December 6, 1972