On February 23, the Spanish parliament was about to give a vote of confidence to Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo, who had been put forward by his party—the Democratic Center Union (UCD)—to be prime minister in the most reactionary government in Spain since the 1976 resignation of Arias Navarro. Just as the parliamentary session was beginning, it was interrupted by an attack led by two Civil Guard companies, commanded by Lieut. Col. Antonio Tejero Molina.
Tejero Was Not Alone
At the same time, the ultrarightist general of Valencia, Jaime Milans del Boschone of the most influential members in the Spanish military command—decreed a state of emergency in the region under his command. He proceeded to set up a military occupation, declared a curfew, and banned all activities by political parties and trade unions. He also issued a decree, which in large part was similar to former dictator Francisco Franco’s call proclaiming the “uprising” of July 18, 1936.
A company of the Spanish army’s main task force brigade—the Brunete armored unit, under Milans del Bosch’s commandtook over the state-run radio and television, and broadcast martial music, Many other significant sectors of the army took a wait and see attitude.
Tejero had been one of the main instigators of another coup attempt—the so-called Galaxy Plot in November 1978. Despite this, he maintained his responsibilities in the army.
In the weeks leading up to the events, several military officers had publicly declared they favored the “restoration of order” by the army.
And, on February 23, the police were conducting a “silent strike.” This was an extension of various signs of rebellion against the government in preceding days. The police were protesting against the exposure of their systematic use of torture, following the death by torture of Basque nationalist activist José Ignacio Arregui while in police custody.
Only several hours after the coup attempt had begun, could it be safely said that the putsch was becoming a lost cause. King Juan Carlos’s February 24 speech, made at 1:00 a.m., more than six hours after the parliament had been seized, showed that a lot of time was necessary to bring the situation in the army under 286 control. It took twelve hours to obtain Tejero’s surrender and to free the members of parliament and cabinet ministers.
This was not an adventure by some fringe grouping of civil guards led by someone a bit deranged. It was a real attempt at a military pronunciamentonumerous examples of which have already been part of Spain’s history. It was an extremely serious attempt, which had as its declared objective to pressure the king into forming a military government that would do away with democratic rights and repress the workers movement and nationalist organizations.
A State Apparatus Built By the Dictatorship How could an attempted coup of this scale have developed? The answer to this question lies with the very character of the political regime and the institutions that developed out of what was called the “reform” that began at the end of 1976. The king was the main protagonist in this process, which was to lead to the setting up of a parliamentary regime. This was on the condition that the state apparatus inherited from Francoism—especially the military command, the police, and the judicial system—be completely preserved. The majority workers parties—the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) and the Spanish Communist Party (PCE)— accepted this blackmail and compelled the workers to accept it. Since then, not only have these parties refused to have anything to do with any mass action against the many attacks and provocations carried out by this state apparatus, but on several occasions they supported this repression under the pretext of the “fight against the ETA,” the Basque Nationalist organization. Last June they even ended up voting for an ultrareactionary “antiterrorist” law. The repressive Francoist apparatus is, and will remain intact, despite some inevitable, though probably quite light penalties against sections of the military most directly implicated in the coup attempt.
The problem is not the existence of “a few fascists,” which could be resolved by some small reforms. Rather, there is a repressive apparatus, built up over forty years of dictatorship, which must be radically eliminated if the threats that emanate from it are to disappear.
The Winning King
Why did the coup fail? Everyone has emphasized the role played by the king. And everyone appeared to be pleased with the new strengthening of his authoritystarting with the PSOE and PCE leaders. The truth is that the occupation of parliament revealed the extreme instability of the regime’s political institutionsthe parliament, senate, and government. Only the king retained some authority, although the facts show that he had only limited authority over a significant sector of the military command.
Only a small minority of social layers wanted a coup right away. The vast majority of the bourgeoisie wanted to continue ruling within the framework of the present political institutions. Moreover, this was also the position of the major imperialist governments. Thus, once the occupation of parliament became known, it was quite normal for the king to receive unconditional support from the bosses’ organizations, the bourgeois parties, and the nationalist governments of Catalonia and Euskadi (the Basque Country).
What is really quite serious for the future of the workers movement and the nationalities of the Spanish state, is that the trade unions and majority workers parties immediately gave the king a blank check. They explicitly called for a total demobilization, with only a few hesitations on the part of the PCE.
Given these conditions, the king did not have any difficulty playing the role of the “constitutional” head of the bourgeois state and army. His Bonapartist role has now appeared more clearly than before, given the obvious crisis in the bourgeoisie’s policies. It was the king who presided over the meetings of the only political body of the state that remained functioningeven after the members of parliament were released—the junta of the armed forces. And it was the king who convened an “informational meeting” on the afternoon of February 24, with leaders of the People’s Alliance (AP), the UCD, PSOE, and the PCE. After this meeting, PCE head Santiago Carrillo expressed the “total agreement of all the participants” with the king. The king’s powers have certainly been strengthened. But in no way does this mean that democracy has been reinforced as the reformist leaders are trying to say. The reactionaries’ threats, which hang over the working masses, have not diminished. They have increased.
First, the ability of the repressive apparatus to exert political pressure has increased. It is true that the military figures most visibly implicated in the attempted coup have been punished. But those who represent the future danger are the heads of the “loyal” army, especially the most reactionary ones—those whom the king thanked for their “loyalty.” The king is going to use his authority to compromise with them and it will not take very long Intercontinental Press before the effects are felt in the Spanish state.
Second, there is now a greater possibility that Calvo Sotelo’s new government will be able to implement its program—but in an even more right wing form than previously planned. Indicative of this is that the Catalan nationalists, who before the coup attempt had decided to abstain in the vote to endorse the Calvo Sotelo government, today say they will vote for it.
Lastly, and more fundamentally, the attitude of the leaders of the reformist workers parties towards the monarchy adds to the workers’ political disorientation.
The Reformists Demobilize
Nobody can question the willingness of the working class and the peoples of the Spanish state—who suffered under Francoism not so long ago—to oppose a reactionary coup d’etat. Through their own experiences, they have learned the effectiveness and need for mass mobilizations to answer these attacks.
It is true that within the Spanish workers movement there is a certain demoralization and confusion, organized for some time now by the PSOE and PCE leaders. These leaders showed themselves to be incapable of responding to the attempted coup.
But despite this, just a few days before the coup attempt tens of thousands of people demonstrated against police torture in the largest demonstration in the history of the Basque country. And during the last several weeks, tens of thousands of workers carried out struggles, both in the crisis-ridden industrial sectors and in the public transport sector.
The Spanish workers have maintained their ability to engage in action and to respond. Even the hesitations of the reformist leaders following the coup attempt reflect this. While the leaders of the Workers Commissions (CO) and the General Workers Union (UGT) in their first published communiqué called solely for calm and confidence in the king, the Catalan Workers Commissions called for a two day general strike and the Communist Party of Euskadi also called for a general strike. And even the first communiqué from the PCE central leadership, although quickly modified, included a similar call.
At the urging of our comrades of the Revolutionary Communist League (LCR) in Madrid, the PCE and LCR called a demonstration the night of the coup in front of the parliament. But the PCE later called it off. Similarly, the leaders of the UGT and CO also changed their attitude somewhat. Following the king’s speech, they called for a two-hour strike on February 24, except for the public service sector, and maintained their stand against street demonstrations, reiterating their confidence in the king.
It is not the willingness to struggle that March 23, 1981 is lacking. What is lacking is a desire on the part of the leadership of the majority parties of the working-class movement to take action. What they have plenty of, on the other hand, is cowardice. They have not learned anything from experience, or from the defeats they brought about in the past, from which they themselves suffered. They have not learned that the only sure weapon against a reactionary coup attempt, is the general strike, the immediate mobilization of the workers in the streets, and the control of all public services by the strikers. Even those sectors that went a little further immediately following the coup attempt—such as the Euskadi CP leaders or the Workers Commissions of Catalonia—very quickly pulled back from their first positions. In reality, they had done virtually nothing to implement their own slogans and fell over one another throwing themselves at the king’s feet, along with their countrywide leaders.
These are the people responsible for those dramatic scenes that took place in so many workplaces—where the shopsteward’s committees, together with the most committed members and vanguard trade unionists remained glued to their radios, waiting to find out what actions to take. (This was the same radio that several hours earlier had been occupied by the putschists). And these were the people who, once again, had to justify their capitulation in advance by explaining that the “relationship of forces” was not adequate. But they are the ones who prevent the real relationship of forces from being expressed politically and who prevent the workers movement from putting itself forward in a fighting way, rather than being the victim of the reactionaries’ attacks.
United Mobilization is Possible
It was necessary and possible to act differently. For example, as soon as news of the attempted coup became known, the LCR mobilized workers for a general strike, calling for united action, the dissolution of the repressive bodies, a purge of the state apparatus, punishment of all officers implicated in the coup attempt, and for defense of democratic rights. The first calls for struggle heard by the Spanish workers were signed by the section of the Fourth International in the Spanish state.
Big events test political orientations and parties. In the present case, the tests are clear and the lessons evident. It is vital to learn from them.
Whatever artificial and temporary atmosphere of “national unity” may prevail, only a united mobilization of all the workers parties, unions, and revolutionary nationalist organizations is capable of defending democratic rights and fighting for the dismantling of the state apparatus inherited from Francoism.
Only by fighting against any type of pact with the bourgeoisie and against any confidence in the bourgeois state institutions—especially in the monarchy—can the workers movement again gain confidence in its own strength and ability to lead all the exploited and in particular, the peoples of the oppressed nationalities. This is the only way possible to confront and smash the next—and probably more serious—coup attempts.
For Ongoing International Vigilance
The Spanish events took the international workers movement by surprise. After the fall of the Portuguese, Greek, and Spanish dictatorships, it appeared that there was no longer a danger of military coups in capitalist Europe.
Although ‘there is a special situation in Spain, due to the maintenance of the repressive Francoist state apparatus, this coup attempt must remind us—especially the European workers movement—that there are sectors of the bourgeoisie who resolutely defend the bourgeois system by using the strength of the army and police to massively repress the working class and its allies. Solidarity with the working class and oppressed nationalities in the Spanish state, from the working class in capitalist Europe can demonstrate a determination to defeat any reactionary operations. At the same time, such solidarity can serve to educate the working class vanguard about the stakes in the coming class battles.
It is necessary to get out the truth within the international workers movement about what really happened in Spain and about the threats that still hang over the workers there. The international workers movement must be ready to respond in a united way to any attacks on democratic rights and must support the Spanish workers movement in its struggle to put an end to Francoism. It must maintain a constant state of alert to be ready to aid the workers and peoples of the Spanish state in all the difficult times that still lie ahead.