The Beginning of the Proletarian Revolution
The flight of Somoza—who symbolized the unity of the state and held the National Guard together—through a combination of military activity by the FSLN and an insurrection of the masses of workers, both semiproletarians and peasants, signified the beginning of the proletarian revolution.
The insurrection meant the disarming of the National Guard, the beginning of land occupations, factory occupations, and the formation of thousands of committees. The plans of the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie, which had agreed to maintain a substantial sector of the National Guard as a bulwark for reconstruction of the state, were defeated.
The impact of the Nicaraguan revolution is spreading rapidly in Central and Latin America. The military coup in El Salvador, encouraged by the United States and supported by the Soviet bureaucracy, is an attempt to prevent a revolutionary upsurge. But its effects have reached as far as Bolivia, where an impressive general strike against the military coup shook the foundations of the state.
We are on the eve of a shift in favor of the proletariat throughout the continent which can overcome the defeats in Chile (1973) and Argentina (1976).
Nicaragua En dangers the 'Status Quo'
The danger that the Nicaraguan revolution may shake up the "status quo," makes all of the counterrevolutionary forces act in a concerted way.
U.S. imperialism is heavily involved. Direct military intervention cannot be ruled out, although because of the relationship of forces, this is highly improbable. Imperialist pressure is being applied with the help of the bourgeoisies in the region (Honduras, Panama, Costa Rica), through using aid and credits as a means of blackmail and trying to directly influence a sector of the Sandinista leadership.
For this reason, an international campaign of aid to the Nicaraguan revolution must have as its axis the struggle against imperialist pressure, and not, as Fidel Castro said on July 26 in Holguin, a campaign together with imperialism.
The Soviet bureaucracy has two arms with which to intervene in Nicaragua:
On the one hand, the three local Stalinist factions (PSN-R), (PSN-S), and (CP)—which, even though they are greatly discredited in the eyes of the masses, are active—and on the other hand, the instrument which is more effective because of its prestige, that is, Castroism or the Communist Party of Cuba. Castro in his own words, on July 26 in Holguin, supported the Government of National Reconstruction in its effort to achieve stabilization and give credibility to the proimperialist bourgeoisies bordering on Nicaragua, openly declared that he does not want another Cuba.
The Mass Movement and the FSLN
Nicaraguan Stalinism, which originally collaborated with Somoza and later subordinated itself to the anti-Somozaist bourgeoisie, is, together with Somozaist repression, primarily responsible for the organizational and trade-union backwardness of the Nicaraguan proletariat.
The FSLN, which arose in 1962 under the impact of the Cuban revolution and took up the anti-imperialist struggle of General Sandino, has a program that does not go beyond the nationalist and radical-democratic framework, calling for a policy of alliances with the bourgeoisie.
But we cannot compare the betrayals of the Stalinists with the militant struggles of the FSLN, in which hundreds gave their lives.
The masses struggle for their demands. To do this, they must get rid of the dictatorship. They need an organized instrument.
Owing to the absence of a mass-based working-class organization, the masses look to the FSLN, magnify it, endow it with all their demands and illusions and also with all their strength.
The policy of the FSLN leadership is caught in the contradiction between its compromise with the bourgeoisie and the activity of the masses to which it is not indifferent (unlike a Stalinist or Social-Democratic party).
The action of the masses was so impressive that in the final offensive only 15 percent of the combatants carried FSLN infantry weapons. For the anti-Somozaist bourgeoisie it was essential to collaborate with the leadership of the FSLN, and they did so under the leadership of Torrijos (Panama) and the Venezuelan and Mexican bourgeoisies.
The Government of National Reconstruction
After dismantling the bourgeois state, the masses conf err ed all power on the FSLN. Its leadership, determined to maintain the bourgeois-democratic stage, formed the Government of National Reconstruction.
Based on its policy, program, and composition, this government is one of class conciliation. It is bourgeois and is attempting to reconstruct the capitalist state. But this government needs the FSLN in order to develop its policy and carry out the tasks of government. The weakness of this government makes the political responsibility of the FSLN leadership all the greater, since it is the main support of the government vis-à-vis the masses.
The FSLN is not a bourgeois organization. Since the masses place their hopes in it, it is caught in a flagrant contradiction that is as yet unresolved.
A break by the leadership of the FSLN with imperialism and the Nicaraguan bourgeoisie is possible; the hypothesis contained in the Transitional Program is possible. But a hypothetical future possibility cannot provide a cover for current policy. We Trotskyists must press for this break through mass action. Polarization not only of the ranks of the FSLN but also of a large sector of its leadership is possible. The Fourth International must encourage this.
A Policy of Reconstructing The Bourgeois State
This is the program of the GRN. To carry it out, it needs three conditions: the political and economic reconstitution of the bourgeoisie; the reconstruction of the army as the bullwark of the state; and the dismemberment of the mass movement.
Let us look at the character of some of the most important measures that have been taken and how they fit in with these objectives:
• Nationalization of the Bank. With the destruction of capital, this means the nationalization of losses; as Le Monde said on October 12, the measure caused more relief than consternation to those affected by it. It is a measure that favors the reconstruction of finance capital.
• Partial nationalization of foreign trade (suspended for two years). With freedom of action for industrial exports and imports—which are controlled by the multinationals.
• Reconstruction of private organizations: chambers of Commerce and Industry.
• Private high schools and universities remain untouched.
• Establishment of the Supreme Court (judicial power) with the anti-Somozaist bourgeoisie.
• Convening of the Council of State (legislative power) for the upcoming year (May).
These are some of the measures taken in a situation in which the bourgeois parties are cautiously re appear ing and reorganizing.
In relation to the mass organizations:
• They propose to return the land of the anti-Somozaists to their owners, as Jaime Wheelock (minister of agriculture) said; this is leading to a struggle with the peasants, who are opposed to leaving the occupied lands.
• The government is attempting to control the Sandinista Defense Committees elected in the working-class neighborhoods to prevent their centralization.
• At first they called for the disarming of the militias, but because of the difficulties they are attempting to integrate them into the regular army.
• In the factories they are attempting to involve the committees and trade unions in comanagement of the companies, in "comanagement of reconstruction."
All this is tied to the attempt to restrict liberties, with the first arrests of working-class leaders (the "sectarians," according to Perspectiva Mun di al); the establishment of fees for publishing newspapers; restrictions on contraceptives; and the arrest in recent weeks of doctors who performed abortions.
In relation to the army:
The reconstruction of a disciplined army, the bulwark of the GRN and its policy, is fundamental for the bourgeoisie.
The current objective is the integration of the militias. To do this, it is necessary to select its members and detach them from the defense committees that are the sources of encouragement and mass support for the militias. This is the current task, the most difficult one, since many militias are opposed to being disarmed in the first place and being sent to the barracks thereafter.
From all of the measures developed by the GRN and applied by the leadership of the FSLN, with many difficulties and contradictions, we can see that the leadership of the FSLN is not oriented at the present time toward a break with the bourgeoisie.
Tasks That The Fourth International Must Propose To The Nicaraguan Masses
The repurchase of destroyed capital, guaranteeing of the exporters' profits, protection of the factories and land of the anti-Somozaists, and maintenance of the life style of high officials are not measures that can satisfy the needs of the masses. Satisfying those needs is incompatible with the survival of capitalism.
The Fourth International wants the reconstruction of Nicaragua, reconstruction in the interests of the working masses, the semiproletarians and peasants.
The Government of National Reconstruction wants the capitalist reconstruction of Nicaragua. The struggle for "bread, land and liberty" is incompatible with the bourgeoisie and imperialism.
The Fourth International must intervene in the Nicaraguan mass movement to help the masses win their demands. The Fourth International does not have a sectarian position toward the FSLN. It must help the FSLN to break its agreements with the bourgeoisie. Its work among the masses is aimed at this objective. We must explain that the GRN is not Somoza and therefore the break is called for based on the current level of the masses. The Fourth International and Trotskyist militants should under no circumstances encourage the FSLN's fatal illusions in its pact with the bourgeoisie. Trotskyists point the way toward a workers and farmers government with each concrete step taken by the masses. To do this we need a program and a party.
The struggle to satisfy the demands of the masses means the struggle for the independent organization of the masses as an indispensable instrument.
We say no to the disarming of the militias, no to their integration. We struggle for the coordination and centralization of the militias within a revolutionary militia nationwide, defending the gains of the revolution.
However, the militias have their reason for being as an armed expression of the CDSs and the factory committees, etc. No to their being sent to the barracks, no to their separation from the masses.
The CDSs must be democratically centralized on a national level and coordinated with the factories, trade unions and peasants, pointing toward an alternative power and toward a congress of the committees.
Somoza's labor code must be abolished, and full union rights must be established, oppose comanagement and the attempt to convert the Sand in ist trade-union federation into the "single federation." For a congress of trade unions.
The Fourth International struggles with the masses, for the independence of their organizations from the state, for what the masses urgently need.
For thoroughgoing agrarian reform. Occupation of both Somozaist and non-Somozaist estates. For guaranteeing of buying power and the right to a job. For the demands of women and youth; against the disarming of the militias, for the right of trade unions to organize and be independent.
For the completion of democratic tasks not yet completed, against all repressive measures (arrests), for freedom of the press. For a constituent assembly where the illegitimacy of the presence of bourgeois figures in the government could be raised without making a fetish of this slogan, as a slogan to be raised episodically in conjunction with the struggle for the organization of the masses (committees, trade unions) and break with the bourgeoisie, enabling us to raise concretely the demand for "bourgeois ministers out." This will help us in the fight for a workers and farmers government (whose exact composition means a Sandinista government without bourgeois figures or something else that would be determined by the Nicaraguan Trotskyists).
The Construction of a Trotskyist Party
The repetition of the Cuban model is possible; but even in this case we need an independent party—just like we need in Cuba.
The guarantee of the political process in Nicaragua developing in favor of the working class is a revolutionary program and party.
We must struggle to win the majority of FSLN militants, but to do this we need real Trotskyists who intervene with their own program in mass actions (not from editorial offices, but as part of the masses).
It is possible that a fitting tactic would be to enter the FSLN with flags un fur led, like a faction that defends its program. But this is not the problem in this discussion.
At the present time, the leadership of the FSLN is carrying on a debate over the Sand in ist party and its formation. The Stalinists of the PSN consistently defend a single party, a single trade-union federation, women's and youth organizations that are arms of the party, ultimately of the state. They are trying to emulate the Cuban PSP that transformed the July 26th Movement.
We Trotskyists intervened in this polemic. We are for a workers party, not a single party, that breaks with the bourgeoisie, without bourgeois figures. And we demonstrate in mass action what program it must have.
The Fourth International outside Nicaragua has a great responsibility, not only to give a good political orientation to Nicaraguan Trotskyists and not impose its decisions, but first and foremost to carry out a solidarity campaign. But this campaign should not hide the deficiencies and dangers or the character of the government. It should not confuse the banners of the Fourth International with the present policy of the FSLN leadership.