1. At the beginning of the fifties, the European sections of the Fourth International adopted in general the entryist orientation to accomplish their central strategic task—building mass revolutionary parties that can win away important sectors of the proletariat from the influence of the traditional reformist and Stalinist leaderships and lead these workers toward the overthrow of capitalism and the seizure of state power. The Trotskyist movement at the time was very weak numerically and unable to exert great influence on the development of the class struggle. In view of this fact, the entryist orientation flowed from the following considerations:
(a) Throughout the entire postwar revolutionary upsurge of 1944-48, the traditional bureaucracies maintained their control over the mass movements. These bureaucracies entered the new postwar period of European history—which opened with the end of reconstruction and with the upsurge of the colonial revolution—without having lost their dominant influence over the working class.
(b) Under these conditions, the most probable projection was that any new radicalization of the proletariat, any important growth of working-class combativity, would be expressed first inside the traditional organizations, increasing the differentiation within them and giving rise to important left currents of either a centrist or left centrist character.
(c) By promoting the organization of such currents and by striving to win political leadership of them, revolutionary Marxists could facilitate the breakup of the traditional organizations through large splits. Under the influence of a revolutionary Marxist nucleus, one or another of the groupings produced by such splits could develop toward becoming a mass revolutionary party.
(d) By limiting themselves to existing as independent groups, revolutionary Marxists would confine themselves to propaganda activities incapable of influencing the differentiation of larger currents inside the mass movement and incapable of influencing the actual course of the class struggle.
The so-called entryist orientation in constructing mass revolutionary parties did not signify abandonment whatsoever of the effort to build sections of the Fourth International. All the resolutions written in accordance with the decision to apply this orientation implied the maintenance of tightly organized and disciplined revolutionary Marxist nuclei, recruiting on the basis of their full program, and utilizing open Trotskyist publications for this purpose.
The decision to carry out a broad entryist turn in 1951-53 was accompanied by internal discussions and struggles on problems related to this turn but not identical with its tactical content (for example, the imminence of a world war and its possible influence in bringing the Communist parties to make a turn to the left, the forms of the disintegration of Stalinism, the internal functioning of the International, etc.). The present resolution is not intended to draw a balance sheet on the history of these internal struggles, which led to a split in the movement, but merely to recall the reasons that led to adoption of the entryist tactic as such and the reasons and perspectives of the tactical turn which all the European sections have decided on at present.
2. An analysis of the fifteen years that have passed since the adoption of the entryist orientation at the tenth plenum of the International Executive Committee enables us to determine, in general terms, which aspects of this orientation were correct and which were faulty.
(a) The prediction that any new radicalization of the proletariat would be expressed first by a differentiation within the traditional mass organizations of the workers movement has been completely borne out. The formation of the Bevan and Renard tendencies in the British and Belgian Social Democracies, the rupture in the Danish CP (the Larsen split), the formation one after another of left tendencies inside the Italian CP (the Young Communists, the Ingrao tendency), and the role played by struggle within the UEC [Union des Etudiants Communistes—Union of Communist Students] in the revival of the youth vanguard in France all confirm the analysis which led to the adoption of the entryist orientation. Even in Germany, which was the country in capitalist Europe where the radicalization was most limited during the period 1951-65, the only organization, however small, arising from what leftward movement there was—the SDS—was the product of a split from the Social Democracy.
(b) Throughout this period, no organization was able to score any significant success in trying to create a revolutionary party outside the traditional organizations. However, the adoption of the entryist orientation, in general, enabled the revolutionary Marxist nuclei to keep in better touch with the mass movement, to tie themselves intimately to it, and to better influence the development of the workers struggles.
(c) However, the long period of relative capitalist stabilization in Europe, which could not be foreseen at the time the International adopted the entryist orientation in Europe, severely limited the extent of the differentiation within the traditional mass organizations. Occurring apart from broad mass struggles, or only in their aftermath in the declining phase of these struggles, such differentiations could generally be contained essentially within the traditional apparatuses. Therefore, they led to the splitting off of small groups and marginal attrition rather than mass splits.
(d) It could have been otherwise if the revolutionary Marxist nuclei had forces within the left tendencies which arose in the traditional parties capable of organizing the bulk of the members or sympathizers of these tendencies. But while the revolutionary Marxist nuclei generally gained strength in this period, the gains remained very modest. They were, therefore, confined to exercising a political influence within these tendencies, rather than consolidating them organizationally. This situation greatly facilitated the maneuvers of the left currents in the bureaucracies, through which, in the last analysis, they were able to reduce the magnitude of the splits. In adopting the entryist orientation, as it was formulated in 1951-52, the inevitable relationship between the size of our own forces and those which we could draw away from the mass parties was underestimated.
3. Toward the middle of the 1960s, the situation in the workers movement of capitalist Europe began to change under the influence of the following three factors:
(a) A slowdown in economic growth, higher unemployment rates, and a sequence of recessions (Italy, France, Great Britain, West Germany) all aggravated the class contradictions and progressively stimulated a revival of workers struggles.
(b) The composition of the working class changed significantly under the combined impact of the accelerated industrialization caused by technological changes (especially in Italy, France, Spain, the Netherlands, and Flanders), and the speedup on the assembly lines (an important factor in lowering the age level of the workers in big plants). A whole new sector of workers, youths in the main, has appeared which is much less subject to the control of the traditional apparatuses. This has favored a trend for much larger sections of the working class to get out of hand than in the 1944-48 period.
(c) A new youth vanguard developed on the basis primarily of identifying with the advancing sectors of the colonial revolution (Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam, Palestine). This vanguard at the same time turned toward agitation in the universities and high schools, thereby acquiring a social base that made it a real factor in the political life of a number of important capitalist countries (France, West Germany, Italy).
The characteristic feature of this change has been the great loss in influence wielded by the traditional organizations over this new young vanguard, resulting from the deep degeneration of the Social Democracy and the intensified crisis of Stalinism. Thus, for the first time since 1919-23, a rather broad vanguard independent of the bureaucratic apparatuses appeared in Europe. This vanguard has begun to alter the relationship of forces within the workers movement and this in turn can exercise a growing influence simultaneously on the combativity, orientation, and forms of struggle of significant sectors of the working class. The same change explains why in Great Britain the growing opposition of the workers and the unions to Wilson's policies since 1964 has not given rise to a sharp differentiation within the local sections of the increasingly sclerotic Labour party.
4. This essential change in the situation in the workers movement of capitalist Europe and the forms taken by the radicalization of successive layers of the workers and youth is the fundamental reason for the decision of the European sections of the Fourth International to change their orientation regarding the avenues of developing mass revolutionary parties today. In the new situation in the working class and in the workers movement, it seemed most important not to lose the opportunity presented by the appearance of this new vanguard. This vanguard could not be left to founder between ultraleft spontanéism and reabsorption into the left wing of the traditional apparatuses, the inevitable alternative if no example were provided of at least a small revolutionary organization basing itself on the new wave of radicalization and aiming at consciously constructing a party of the Bolshevik type.
The content of the new orientation in working toward the construction of revolutionary parties which has been adopted by the European sections of the Fourth International can be defined as follows:
(a) Giving priority to winning political and organizational preponderance within the new vanguard with the aim of considerably strengthening our own organizations, and, if possible, qualitatively changing the relationship of forces vis-à-vis the bureaucracies in the working class.
(b) For this purpose, following a policy of taking the initiative in actions which will convince the new vanguard of the necessity of revolutionary Marxist organizations, not only on the theoretical and historical level but practically in the living struggle.
(c) Engaging in more extensive work among the rank-and-file workers in the factories and in the unions.
(d) Striving to build solid bases of support among the young workers from which confrontations with the bureaucracy can be mounted without risking elimination of the opposition nuclei from the unions and plants.
This orientation increases the importance of a widely distributed revolutionary Marxist press, of intense theoretical material in our theoretical journals, and numerous books and pamphlets giving solid support for our struggle to win preponderance within a new vanguard which is distinguished by a higher cultural and political level than similar vanguards in the past. At the same time, this orientation points up the need for our sections to function effectively and openly as real combat organizations capable of serving as poles of attraction for the best of the revolutionary youth who are repelled by Stalinism and reformism and for whom spontanéism has little attraction.
5. The change in orientation decided on by the European sections of the Fourth International does not mean that they underestimate the still decisive weight of the Stalinist and reformist apparatuses in the outcome of the great workers struggles which capitalist Europe is now experiencing and will yet experience in the years to come. Neither does it mean that they hold an exaggerated and utopian view of the possibilities for reducing this influence through the intervention of vanguard groups or youth organizations on the periphery of the organized workers movement proper.
The central strategic task of revolutionary Marxists remains that of building mass revolutionary parties. In countries where there is a long tradition of mass working-class political action, where the workers movement is still predominantly controlled by mass parties claiming to represent the workers, the achievement of this task is inconceivable without the occurrence of differentiations in these old organizations, including extensive ruptures and splits. It is clear that today our sections have much greater possibilities for individual recruitment than ever and that these must be utilized to the full. But it would be just as sectarian today as in the past to insist solely on recruiting to a small group on an individual basis and to exclude the possibility of the party's progressing through regroupments and similar operations once this stage is reached and the necessary forces have been accumulated to engage in such tactics effectively.
We must also reject the illusion that because the vanguard has the capacity to outflank the traditional bureaucracies, even in determining the objectives and new forms of combat adopted in workers struggles, that these bureaucracies cannot regain control of the mass movement after a certain point in the confrontation. The recent experiences both in the limited strikes in France and in the powerful wave of strikes in Italy clearly prove the opposite.
However, this change in orientation involves the following:
(a) An understanding of the fact that the differentiation within the mass organizations today is less a result of the internal dialectic of ideological debates and factional struggles than of the repercussions within these organizations of the mass struggle and the actions of the vanguard itself. In this sense, orienting toward the new vanguards is essential even for the purpose of accelerating the outbreak of conflicts within the old parties (see the revival of struggle inside the Italian CP, the Il Manifesto group; and inside the German Social Democracy at the Munich congress of the Jungsozialisten [Young Socialists, the official Social Democratic youth organization], which very clearly resulted from the pressure of the vanguard from the outside).
(b) A realization that in choosing the correct tactic at each stage of their struggle to construct a new revolutionary leadership of the proletariat, revolutionary Marxists must not fail to take into account their own forces, which is also an element in estimating the prospects of any tactic.
In any case, the new orientation set by the European sections continues to require them to follow attentively all developments in the mass organizations of the working class, especially inside the trade unions but also inside the mass parties claiming to represent the workers. The need for continuing or beginning fraction work inside these organizations must be examined at each specific stage in the class struggle, taking into consideration the forces at our disposal, the opportunities, the perspectives for the class struggle in the short and medium term, and the differentiation within the working class.
6. The exact organizational forms by which this new orientation in building mass revolutionary parties should be implemented depends on the particular conditions in each country and no general formula can be given. Broadly speaking, nowhere are the revolutionary Marxists able at present to constitute a party in the Leninist sense of the term, that is, a party capable of leading a significant minority of the proletariat and the other exploited layers in a revolutionary struggle. At best, as in France, the revolutionary Marxists constitute only the initial nucleus of such a party. There are various ways revolutionary Marxists can try to improve their situation for establishing themselves as the preponderant force within the new vanguard in the short run—giving priority to building a youth organization focused from the outset on the three areas of work (the universities, the factories, and the high schools); or giving priority to building an adult organization (where the vanguard movement has already passed a certain threshold or where the new vanguard is still in its incipient stages); or by a combination of the two. The precise form of the youth organization—whether it is an avowed revolutionary Marxist organization or a vanguard organization encompassing, besides a revolutionary Marxist nucleus, broader layers of youth developing toward revolutionary Marxism but not yet fully convinced—likewise depends on the specific conditions in each country. The Fourth International can maintain a great deal of tactical flexibility as to the precise organizational forms in each country, if it is well understood that the essential condition for carrying out the tasks of party building in the present stage is that the revolutionary Marxist nuclei show a public face, both through their publications and through practical work among the new vanguard and in the class struggle.
7. The main axes of political work by the sections of the Fourth International in the immediate future derive from: (1) a correct appreciation of the objective conditions which have arisen since 1965 and have been powerfully reinforced by May 1968 and the strike wave in Italy [see the editorial in the November 1969 issue of Quatrième Internationale, an English translation of which appeared in the December 15 issue of Intercontinental Press under the title "The Strike Wave in Europe"]; (2) a thorough understanding of the meaning of the turn taken by the revolutionary Marxists in the struggle to build mass revolutionary parties.
(a) The strategy of transitional demands continues to be the basis for propaganda, and, on occasion, agitation and active intervention in the struggle of the working class. This strategy centers more than ever around the themes of workers control.
(b) Propaganda for workers power and a more precise determination of the concrete implications of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Western Europe in our time assume growing importance in the present stage of rising workers struggles which have been accompanied by a succession of prerevolutionary and revolutionary crises (May 1968 in France, fall 1969 in Italy).
(c) A specific analysis must be made of the strategy for workers struggles in each country both as to the methods of struggle and the most appropriate organizational forms (action committees, strike committees, trade union fractions, oppositional formations in the trade unions).
(d) The struggle for workers democracy assumes prime importance in this new phase where the relationship of forces between the union bureaucracy and the working masses is beginning to change, but it cannot be said for sure that the workers are capable of rapidly eliminating the bureaucrats. Defending and strengthening union democracy are not only ways of altering the relationship of strength between the bureaucracy and the masses, thus releasing greater forces for the fight against capitalism, but they are also essential means of combating the growing integration of the unions into the bourgeois state and everything that goes with this (wage restrictions, limitations on the right to strike, prison sentences for wildcat strikes, etc.).
(e) The tendency toward a "strong state," the strengthening of the repressive apparatus, the reappearance of semifascist goon squads, and racist and xenophobic propaganda against immigrant workers all renew the vital importance of intransigently defending the workers' rights and civil liberties, and extending them to all the minorities which are excluded from these rights (foreigners, youth, soldiers), and consolidating them by building workers' self-defense groups.
(f) The crisis of bourgeois leadership, the crisis in the Common Market, and the sharpening interimperialist contradictions are creating a favorable climate for propagandizing for a Socialist United States of Europe as the overall solution for the problems afflicting and tormenting bourgeois society in Europe, that is, as a synonym for workers power on a European scale. The revival of proletarian internationalism, moreover, especially in the young generation, makes such propaganda more fruitful for the revolutionary vanguard. This campaign must be accompanied by an attempt to develop forms of international collaboration and coordination of struggles simultaneously among the revolutionary Marxist organizations, among the broader youth vanguards, and among certain sectors of the European working class where that becomes objectively possible.
(g) The appearance of university and high-school students as a distinct political force beginning in 1967 makes it necessary to formulate a definite strategy for revolutionary Marxists in this milieu so as to avoid the double trap of underestimating it (dismissing it as "petty bourgeois") or overestimating it (which is done primarily by the spontanéist tendencies who disregard its specific social strengths and weaknesses, its place in the productive process, the instability of its situation, and so forth). The predominance in the student vanguard of tendencies favoring a "worker-student linkup" makes it more important than ever to reaffirm that a revolutionary Leninist organization is the only means of achieving this tie effectively and giving it an objectively revolutionary meaning.
(h) More attention must be paid to the specific demands and problems of young working men and women. These superexploited layers are more capable of suddenly breaking out of the bureaucratic crust. In addition to specific demands, special forms of action must be investigated for tying up with these groups.
(i) Anti-imperialist action and solidarity with the principal sectors of the colonial revolution now in motion (Vietnam, Palestine, Bolivia) have lost none of their value as themes around which to agitate and mobilize. This is still the area where the differentiation among the various currents appears most clearly. It is still where the organizational and theoretical superiority of the Fourth International over sectarian and ultraleft tendencies, such as the Lambertists and the Maoists and primitive or superproletarian tendencies like the spontanéists and the Maospontex [pro-Mao spontanéist) groups, is most obvious.
(j) Action in solidarity with the antibureaucratic communist opposition in East Europe and the USSR also assumes growing importance as a result of the increasing sensitivity of the youth vanguard to this question produced by the events in Czechoslovakia and the acute crisis of Stalinism; and as a result of the splits that have occurred in the Communist youth organizations in Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium, and elsewhere. Finally, the importance of this issue is magnified by the opportunity it offers to advance our ideas about democratic centralism and workers democracy—which are the keys to projecting an image of communism radically different from that which repels the great majority of young workers, students, and high-school youth in West Europe today.