The Economic Situation and the Political Consequences
At end of point 7, following ". . . take in this area" insert:
The basic choice faced by the toilers in Nicaragua, and by the FSLN is clear. There is nothing wrong in principle with limited tactical economic concessions to the capitalists. However, it is absolutely illusory to believe that any serious relaunching of the capitalist economy can take place with purely cosmetic concessions to the bourgeoisie. Any serious increase in production on a capitalist basis would only be undertaken if accompanied by really significant moves of austerity against the working class—moves which would disorient and demobilize sections of the toilers, slow down mass mobilizations, and give greater room for capitalist political maneuvers.
Above all, however, what the bourgeoisie would demand for a significant increase in production on a capitalist basis would be guarantees against its own expropriation—guarantees which could not be purely verbal but which would have to involve placing a brake on the mass mobilizations and organizations. This crucial condition is not today fulfilled in Nicaragua, nor could it be without a process which would seriously endanger the revolution. For this reason no serious relaunching of production on a capitalist basis will in fact take place in Nicaragua.
Any illusion that, by "clever" concessions, a prolonged period of coexistence with bourgeois economy can be maintained in the present political relationship of forces is, therefore, extremely dangerous. The FSLN will not be able to avoid the basic choice of moving to expropriate the capitalist class, or of blocking the mobilizations of the masses in order to maintain an alliance with sections of the bourgeoisie. This latter course would inevitably result in a significant move in the political relationship of forces in favor of capitalism.
This choice will be made even more stark by the policy which imperialism will adopt. It is quite false to believe that the policy of economic concessions and of incessant military pressure are counterposed ones for imperialism. On the contrary, the two complement each other. The aim will be to provide the Nicaraguan masses with the apparent choice of bloody intervention by imperialism if they move toward a "Cuban" solution and the establishment of a workers state, or of economic aid and relief if they make concessions to capitalism. This twin interlinked approach will undoubtedly be increasingly applied in the coming months as the economic situation continues to deteriorate—particularly as next year is entered, as real conditions of economic dislocation, mass unemployment, and literal mass hunger develop further.
It is also by these means that the capitalist class in Nicaragua, which is today greatly weakened, can have the weight of imperialism put behind it. The capitalist forces in Nicaragua, including those in the GRN, will attempt to appear before the masses as promising real economic relief and aid to immediate problems if their solutions are adopted. This combination of external military threats and simultaneously of promised economic concessions, the policy of "Marshall aid," is a classic one of imperialism.
In this interplay of economic and political developments, it is the latter which are decisive. Any limited economic concessions to the capitalists which are found useful today must be placed firmly in the context that it is only increasing the scope of mobilization and organization of the masses that can develop the existing relationship of class forces. Any blocking of this process of mass mobilization and organization is far more dangerous in Nicaragua today than any failure to make tactical economic concessions to capitalist sectors.
On the Government
At the end of point 10, paragraph 9, following ". . . this transitional phase," insert:
Although at present gravely weakened, the presence of representatives of sectors of the bourgeoisie within this government gives to the capitalist class a potential point of leverage for slow ing down, and at a later stage challenging, the progress of the revolution. This will be particularly the case as they are intertwined with international imperialist and capitalist interests—a policy which will be consciously fostered by imperialism. Any serious development of the revolution will inevitably involve a confrontation with these bourgeois forces and a split in the government. The social and political transformation to a workers state in Nicaragua therefore cannot be executed without a split of the GRN. It is, in the final analysis, despite its radical measures, a bourgeois government.
* * *
Point 10, paragraph 11, delete second sentence:
"It can lead either to the course followed by the Algerian revolution or the path traced by the Cuban revolution."
Insert:
Either the bourgeois forces in the country, intertwined with imperialism, will slow down and stall the revolution and thereby permit the rebuilding of bourgeois power, or the government will split—inaugurating a workers and peasants government and a clash between the classes which can only culminate in the creation of a workers state or the defeat of the workers and peasants government (i.e., a Cuban or an Algerian development).
* * *
At end of point 11, following ". . . most effectively prepared for" insert:
A workers and peasants government based on the popular mass organizations can lead the revolution in the final confrontation with the bourgeoisie and the creation of the second workers state in Latin America.
A political line for state power and resolving the question of government in Nicaragua today must concentrate on the construction, consolidation, and centralization of the mass organizations which grew up during and following the civil war. The coordination of defense committees (CDSs) and militias shows the way forward.
The goal is to build up the necessary base for a national structure of mass organizations with the aim of creating a workers and peasants government independent of the bourgeoisie.
On the Role of Cuba
Point 10, paragraph 9, after the first of three amendments entitled 'On the Government,' following "... a bourgeois government," insert:
A major element in attempting to confront these problems is the role played by the Cuban leadership. Wide sectors of the FSLN leadership were given their political and military training on a Cuban line. Cuba has put major material resources into Nicaragua, and the prestige and links of the Cuban leadership with the top cadre of the FSLN and with the masses in Nicaragua is immense.
In relation to the material aid given by the Cuban workers state, this is exemplary. If the bureaucratic leaderships of the other workers states, and in the first place the USSR, put even a tiny part of the resources available to them, compared to Cuba, into aid to Nicaragua the political and material situation would be transformed. The imperialist and bourgeois offensive to present the only alternative to following their line of imperialist aid and capitalist economy as being that of mass economic dislocation and poverty would lose a considerable amount of its effect. The fact that the USSR refuses to do this in the interests of "de tente" with the United States once again demonstrates the nature of the Soviet bureaucracy. The fact that the Cuban state is prepared to put major material aid into Nicaragua is hailed by all revolutionaries.
When it comes to the political advice and proposals put forward by the Cuban leadership, however, such unequivocally enthusiastic support cannot be given. The Cuban masses unequivocally wish to see the destruction of capitalism in Nicaragua and the creation of the second free territory of the Americas. But in the international relationship of forces which exists today in Central America, such a goal will require not only honest and earnest intentions, but also a clear political orientation to the creation of a workers state and the steps and dynamic necessary to achieve this.
On the political level, however, the orientation of the Cuban leadership today does not give such a clear orientation of the type which is needed—particularly in relation to alliances with bourgeois forces. In Ethiopia, Angola, and Jamaica a policy of long-term alliances with sections of the bourgeoisie has been put forward. Such an orientation for Latin America was explicitly reaffirmed at the 1975 Havana conference of Communist parties. In relation to Nicaragua, Fidel Castro has unequivocally raised the slogan of "Long live the Nicaraguan Government of National Reconstruction"[1]—that is, a government of coalition with sections of the bourgeoisie, and paid tribute to "something new in Latin American relations, something that sets an example for other regions in the world; namely, the way in which the governments of Panama, Costa Rica, and Mexico, as well as the member countries of the subregional Andean Pact—Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela—acted in concert and solidarity to achieve a just solution of the Nicaraguan problem."[2] Fidel has talked of "a great democratic, pro-independence, and anti-interventionist front developed tacitly in Latin America, something of historic significance and enormous importance," and stated that, "In the creation of this democratic anti-interventionist front which has formed, we must mention the names of people as well as countries: the names of Torrijos, Carazo, López Port il lo, Man ley, and Bishop. And it is also only fair to recall the name of a person who, although he is no longer president of his country, contributed a great deal to the development of its solidarity with the Sandinista struggle, the former president of Venezuela, Carlos Andrés Pérez."[3]
We must state openly that we do not agree with these views at all. These statements are not those of the real road taken by the Cuban revolution but by the leaders of the USSR and the Communist Party which have served the people of Latin America so badly for so long.
If Torrijos, or López Port il lo, or Pérez aided the struggle in Nicaragua, it was because of the pressure of the masses of their country who felt solidarity with the struggle of the Nicaraguan people and not because they are part of a "democratic anti-interventionist front" seeking a "just solution in Nicaragua." Torrijos, López Port il lo, or Pérez, and those like them, are implacably opposed to the creation of a workers state in Nicaragua—the only road which can truly gain national liberation and meet the just needs of the Nicaraguan people. They would prefer Nicaragua to be brought under the heel of imperialism than to see a second Cuba in Latin America. To take, and ask for material aid from Panama, Venezuela, or any other country is correct. But to place any political confidence in the present leaders of these countries, or to believe that they would seriously defend it against imperialist attacks, would be a grave error.
Also in Nicaragua itself we do not say with Fidel "Long live the Government of Reconstruction." On the contrary, the bourgeois in this government will attempt to slow down and destroy the revolution. Any progress to socialism, the only solution for national liberation in Nicaragua, will lead to a clash and split with the bourgeoisie in this government, and not to its long life. To attempt to slow down the revolution, to attempt to have a long-term alliance with sectors of the capitalist class would be disastrous.
We believe the only road forward for Nicaragua is not the one which Fidel puts forward now but the one which the Cuban people themselves undertook in actions in 1959 and 1960. To remember that the only choice is either socialist revolution or a caricature of a revolution. The capitalist members of the GRN are not part of a "democratic anti-imperialist front" but the Urrutias, Pazos, and Fresquets of Nicaragua. To honor the Cuban revolution is not to follow some of the words of its leaders now but to remember its great deeds when it overthrew capitalism and created the first state really free of imperialism in Latin America.
We welcome the undying friendship of the Nicaraguan and Cuban people. We hail the aid given by the Cuban government and people to Nicaragua. We welcome every call made by Fidel and the other leaders of Cuba to follow the real road taken by that revolution when it was born. But we call for struggle against all views, even when they come from Cuba, which tie the Nicaraguan workers to the capitalist class in the government, in the economy, or internationally. The great lesson that Fidel Castro and the Cuban people taught to Latin America was not of a "democratic anti-interventionist front" but that the only choice is either socialist revolution or no revolution at all.
On the Section of the Fourth International
Point 14, delete last three paragraphs, insert:
In order to carry out the line of this resolution it is necessary to build a section of the Fourth International in Nicaragua. Given the concrete situation in that country the correct way to do this is to work as an organized current in the FSLN and the mass organizations it controls or has built.
Given the character of this organization, its leadership in the revolutionary overthrow of Somoza and the heroic and revolutionary role of its militants, this activity is not at all that of the type of entry ism in the mass reformist parties. We do not today place any limits on any section of the FSLN, including its leadership, to develop to revolutionary Marxist positions and our approach is on this basis. As long as the FSLN defends the revolutionary interests of the working class we operate as organized, loyal militants of this organization seeking to win it to the positions we consider correct by means of democratic discussion. We argue for the FSLN to establish a mass working-class party in Nicaragua and not to delay this process. If it moves to establish a party of a different type we should argue for it to become such a workers party. We should argue and act in any party set up by the FSLN in the same way.
In the event that the FSLN will not agree to our participating as an organized current in this way, or fails to establish a party, and that we are, therefore, forced to set up an independent group, we nevertheless should continue to operate toward the FSLN with the same attitude outlined above. We should show by our action that there is no contradiction whatever between our program and the aspirations of revolutionary militants of the FSLN—on the contrary we aim to show by honest comradely debate and struggle that our ideas best express the revolutionary ideals the Sandinista fighters are struggling for. We are not maneuvering but honest in expressing our position that we will be exemplary loyal militants of an FSLN which defends the revolutionary interests of the working class. All our militants must conduct themselves with this spirit even if today we are outside the FSLN, and must seek to show by their activity in Nicaragua itself, and by the international campaign of the FI, the right of Trotskyists to take their place as an organized current within the mass Leninist Party which must be built.
Notes
1. Speech, "The Triumph of Nicaraguan Independence," July 26, 1979.
2. Speech to the United Nations, October 12, 1979.
3. Speech, "The Triumph of Nicaraguan Independence," July 26, 1979.