[p. 192]
The CC of the LSSP states that, while proceeding substantially from the same basic propositions as those embodied in the IS draft resolution "Rise and Decline of Stalinism," it has nevertheless some "fundamental disagreements" with that draft resolution. From these "fundamental disagreements" the CC of the LSSP infers that "the IS has opened the door to a departure from the basic propositions of Trotskyism regarding Stalinism" in respect to the specific points raised. Let us examine these points one by one and see if such a conclusion is justified.
### 1. Political Revolution in the USSR
The CC of the LSSP alleges that the "IS resolution has, in certain passages, presented a line of development which leads to an abandonment of the concept of political revolution in the USSR."
It arrives at that serious accusation by *interpretation* of two passages of the draft resolution "Rise and Decline of Stalinism."
But it does not draw the attention to the fact that in several passages the draft resolution *explicitly* states its conviction that only a political revolution, an uprising of the masses, can bring about the socialist regeneration of the USSR. It does not draw the attention in particular to section 21 of the resolution, which clearly says in its last paragraph:
[p. 193]
"At the same time our sections ought to resolutely combat any tendency toward apology or justification for the present political regime in the Soviet Union, a tendency which will manifest itself in petty-bourgeois circles inclined to make their peace with the Malenkov power. Even though 'liberalizing' itself, the dictatorship nevertheless remains a dictatorship. The proletariat remains politically expropriated in the Soviet Union. The new penal code, a genuine *habeus corpus,* will defend the bureaucratic privileges just as police arbitrariness has defended them up to now. The task of smashing the dictatorship and the privileges of the bureaucracy, the task *of a new political revolution in the Soviet Union* remains more burning than ever. The significance of the entire recent development is that the conditions which prepare and facilitate this revolution are ripening."
The comrades of the CC of the LSSP, before drawing hasty conclusions from a subjective interpretation of some sentences, should have confronted them at least with one passage of the draft resolution which dwells extensively on the very point the CC accuses the IS of "abandoning." In view of the fact that this passage states in a crystal-clear manner the perspective of a political revolution in the USSR, perspective for which the Soviet bolshevik-Leninists are called upon to regroup themselves and fight (section 21), only two conclusions are possible from such confrontation:
Either the authors of the resolution have wilfully introduced this whole passage in order to "mask" their real opinions which are "revealed" only in the sentences quoted by the CC, or the authors of the resolution have expressed their real opinions on the subject in the passage just quoted, and in that case, the sentences quoted by the CC should be interpreted in the light of that established opinion. We believe it to be the normal procedure to study any resolution in the first place by analyzing what that resolution *states* on a subject. Only in the case when some subject connected with the general theme of the document is not dwelled upon explicitly is one justified to analyze "hidden meanings."
Any different procedure replaces in fact *discussion of ideas* by *discussions of intentions,* which is not only sterile and fruitless but also dangerous from the point of view of normal comradely relationship in one organization.
Furthermore, the sentences quoted by the CC do not give any credit to the thesis that the IS has presented a line which "leads to an abandonment of the concept of political revolution in the USSR," while stressing that very same concept explicitly elsewhere in the resolution.
By quoting section 18, the CC has strangely enough stopped before the two final sentences which indicate, beyond all doubt, in what sense the authors view the "decline of the bonapartist dictatorship." We quote again this whole passage while underlining these two final sentences:
"Historically, the Malenkov era thus signalizes the *beginning of the decline of the Bonapartist dictatorship.* That regime can now maintain itself only by suppressing, temporarily or definitively, the most hideous aspects, this is to say, the most characteristic ones of the regime. It is not excluded that, before falling, the Bonapartist dictatorship will suddenly once again have recourse to the bloodiest terror. *The bureaucracy which knows its power and privileges to be threatened, will try in any case to utilize all the resources at its disposal, in order to defend itself against the rise of the Soviet masses. But history has proved that autocracies, once they are condemned to disappear, can save themselves neither by 'liberalizing' themselves, nor by hardening, nor by alternating both these methods.*"
By taking this passage as a whole, it is impossible to draw the conclusion which the CC of the LSSP seems to draw from it, i.e., that according to the opinions of the authors of the draft resolution the regime changes its very nature. On the contrary, this passage stresses precisely the point that the autocracy, the dictatorship, far from changing its nature, changes only the *methods of its self-defense.* There is nothing in this analysis which does not conform to the traditional Marxist, Trotskyist analysis of the decline of *any* political dictatorship in modern history.
Actually, the discussion in the Trotskyist movement does not evolve around the perspective of political revolution in the USSR, which, to our knowledge, no member of the IS or IEC has abandoned. The discussion is evolving around the *interpretation of events.* Some comrades *deny* that there has been some change of methods under Malenkov; they see today only the continuation of the same bloody terror which reigned in the USSR in the late thirties and the early forties. We, on the contrary, see a definite change of *methods as a means of self-defense of the bureaucracy against the rising revolutionary tide of the masses.* Given the changed relationship of forces between the masses and the bureaucracy, it would be incomprehensible to think that the bureaucracy can maintain its rule by the same kind of "bloody terror" it used when the masses were prostrated and without perspectives. One may or may not agree with this *interpretation of events.* But it is sterile to substitute to the discussion of events in the USSR a discussion of the intentions of the IS.
May we point out furthermore that no political movement can in the long run maintain itself by *denying facts?* Some comrades in our movement, by stressing over and over again that the very essence of Stalinism is "bloody purges" and saying that mentioning the fact that such purges are today milder than they were in the past, means "capitulating before Stalinism," pave the way for real tendencies of capitulation to Stalinism! For when the undeniable fact will enter their heads, that "terror" is at present without comparison with what happened between 1935 and 1941 and at the end of the war, comrades without a clear understanding will then draw the conclusion . . . that the bureaucracy has changed its nature! As always, sectarian rigidity only expresses the fear of succumbing to one's own temptations, as Trotsky said it so eloquently.
For us, as for Trotsky, the essence of the bureaucratic dictatorship does not lie in "terror," but in a definite social and political relationship: the stratification of means of production plus the political expropriation of the proletariat by a privileged caste. As long as these social and political conditions prevail, there is no question of "socialist regeneration of the USSR." This is the only Marxist basis to fight real tendencies of capitulation towards Stalinism. This enables us to understand why such a bureaucratic dictatorship, which used bloody terror so long as the relationship of forces allowed it to stabilize itself temporarily on such a basis, is forced today to look for other methods for achieving a similar stabilization, while being ready to switch over once again to bloody terror when the final onslaught of the masses will threaten it directly.
[p. 194]
The comrades of the CC of the LSSP take further exception to the following sentence in the preamble of our draft resolution: "The events which have taken place in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death do not constitute only the first stage of a process which must end in the *socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union.*" From the whole context of the resolution it is clear that the authors of the IS resolution meant by that passege: "The events which have taken place in the Soviet Union following Stalin's death do not constitute only the first stage of a process which, by revealing the growing pressure of the masses on the bureaucracy and thereby end in the socialist regeneration of the Soviet Union." It is our firm conviction that this process has already begun. One may or may not agree with this. We have the impression that the CC of the LSSP *does* agree with this, for it writes:
"The situation is thus being created in which the working class leading the working masses can launch an offensive against the bureaucracy aimed at the bureaucracy's overthrow and the restoration of Soviet democracy."
In any case, it is such a process the preamble of our resolution summarizes and not a process of "self-reform" of the bureaucracy, a process of which we explicitly deny the possibility in section 18 of our resolution.
Needless to say, we are quite willing to modify this or that sentence in order to eliminate all possible ambiguities. If the comrades of the CC of the LSSP have concrete proposals for modification of this or the other sentence, we shall accept them if they are in agreement with the general line of the document. But we should like to draw the attention of the comrades of the CC to the fact that, once one gets to thinking in terms of *suspicion of intentions,* any accepted amendment will instantly be interpreted as a "maneuver to hide one's real ideas." We only hope that the comrades of the CC will not follow those who introduced this poison into the political discussion.
As for the passage of Comrade Pablo's article, quoted as "evidence" by the LSSP's CC, we only see there two ideas expressed: (a) The bureaucracy tries to make concessions to the masses in order to hold them back from taking the road of action. But once these concessions are broadened, the march forward of the masses on the road of the real liquidation of the Stalinist regime will become irresistible. (b) This may provoke violent inter-bureaucratic struggles between different wings of the bureaucracy.
There is nothing in these two ideas which is not content with orthodox Trotskyism. On the contrary, Trotsky has always pointed out, as well in "The Fourth International and the USSR," as in "Revolution Betrayed," and in many other documents, that a revolutionary upsurge of the masses would split the Soviet bureaucracy into several conflicting tendencies. The East German events of June 1953 have confirmed this prognosis up to the hilt. Only those who consider the bureaucracy as a class, and not a caste without any social roots of its own, can reduce this perspective to the phenomenon of a few individuals lining up on the side of the masses. Such a thesis is in fact a revision of Trotskyism. Again, it would be better to discuss this *real* point of difference presently discussed in the Trotskyist movement, than to look for hidden meanings of Comrade Pablo's text. (Comrade Pablo's article in the same bulletin.)
May we add that there is nothing, in Pablo's article, as in our draft resolution, which leaves the slightest ground for the interpretation that the mass struggle is only an "auxiliary" factor to inner-bureaucratic struggles? On the contrary, we look upon the political awakening of the masses, upon their growing pressure against the bureaucracy, as *the motive force* for everything which happened in the USSR since Stalin's death. We formulate the clear perspective that this process will eventually lead to a mass uprising and violent overthrow of the dictatorship on the pattern of the Eastern German events. A not unimportant by-product of that process, which can be vital in the determination of the moment of the mass uprising and its occasion — as we saw it happening in Berlin — will be the inner-bureaucratic struggle provoked by the very awakening of the masses. It is only by understanding this dialectical relationship between the struggles of the masses against the bureaucracy and the inner-bureaucratic conflicts that we have a correct, Trotskyist appraisal of the events in the USSR.
The accusation of revisionism should be directed at those who *abstract* inner-bureaucratic struggles from the general relationship of forces between social layers, and declare at one and the same time that there is the beginning of a new upsurge of the Soviet proletariat, but that the inner-bureaucratic conflict is merely a result of a struggle for a new "dictator," heir to "Stalin's mantle". . . .
### 2. The Soviet Bureaucracy's International Policy
The CC of the LSSP accuses the IS of being of opinion that "the aims and content of the Soviet bureaucracy's international policy have changed in the present period."
It draws this conclusion by separating an interpretation of the final sentences of section 10, *which give a perspective of future intentions,* from a quotation of the beginning of that section *which is an analysis of past results of a given policy.* By such an artificial construction, once again an interpretation of IS intentions is substituted to an interpretation of facts. It is difficult to learn anything from such a course of discussion.
Let us look at the beginning of section 9. All sentences from the beginning of that section till the central sentence "Every overall attempt to utilize the colonial revolution as small change in the transactions with imperialism had to be abandoned" are written in the past tense. This is a general summary of the *actions* of the Soviet bureaucracy between 1948 and today. The comrades of the CC of the LSSP do not attempt to prove that this analysis is wrong. Indeed, it would be difficult to find any proof for such an allegation! If one understands the words "overall attempt" in their real historical significance, i.e., the line the Kremlin used in 1935-39 and again in 1943-47, it strikes the eye that nothing similar has been attempted in the period following the victorious offensive of Mao. There has been no "general sell-out" of the revolution in China, Korea, Indochina, Malaya and even Burma and Indonesia, i.e. all countries where mass revolutionary struggles of important scope have broken out since 1947, comparable to the general sell-out which took place in Spain, France, Belgium and some colonial countries in the late thirties, and again in France, Italy, Greece, Belgium, Indochina and Indonesia in the years 1943-47. We do not mean by that that the general policy either of the Kremlin or of the native Stalinist parties in these colonial countries has been generally correct since 1947. Far from it. As in the past, one can recognize easily the successive series of ultra-left adventuristic and rightist opportunistic turns in the policy of the CPs and, related to it, the different diplomatic objectives which the Kremlin tried to reach through the twists and turns of its "directives." If this would not have been the case, indeed, these parties would have stopped to be Stalinist parties, or even "centrist" parties of any kind. Our draft resolution doesn't imply anything of that kind. It only stresses the point that the revolutionary upsurge on the one hand, and the overall counter-revolutionary goals of the world imperialist united front on the other hand have limited more and more the *overall practical results* of the Kremlin's maneuvers.
[p. 195]
In other words: *not the aims* of the Kremlin, its objectives and purposes have changed, but its counter-revolutionary *possibilities.* They have changed for the simple reason that the relationship of forces between the classes leave less and less scope to such possibilities.
It is perfectly true that what is stated in section 9 for the future intentions of the Kremlin ("attempts to utilize the inter-imperialist contradictions," "attempts to win the support of certain bourgeoisies in the colonial and semi-colonial countries," "attempts to arrive at a temporary and partial agreement with imperialism") should be considered a fundamental and not a secondary exceptional aspect of the Kremlin's foreign policy for the whole period beginning with 1948. In section 46 it is even added that we do not at all exclude the possibilities of open counter-revolutionary actions of the Kremlin against isolated revolutionary uprisings in capitalist countries, even during the coming world war. All this remains a fundamental aspect of the Kremlin's *objectives.* There should be added to section 9 a passage explaining to what extent the Kremlin actually succeeded in implementing this orientation: the limitation of arms deliveries to the North Korean armies, the opportunist turnabouts of the CPs of India and Indonesia, etc.
But at the same time it remains true that the objective results of that policy are today *different* from what they were in the past, and that this reacts in turn upon the very scope of the maneuvers the Kremlin still attempts to put through. Of course, the decisive element in the situation remains the scope of the mass upsurge itself. Where it is still limited geographically and socially, e.g. in India, Indonesia and Ceylon, the scope of these maneuvers can be must broader than where it has become general as in China, Korea and Indochina. But one must be blind to think that the intervention of the Kremlin has had the same objective results in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars as it had in the Spanish and Greek civil wars ("general sell-out"). That is precisely meant by those self-styled "orthodox Trotskyists" who take exception to our pointing out the changes in the scope of the Kremlin's maneuvers. These self-styled orthodox are busy shouting about a "sell-out" in Indochina; they were proclaiming yesterday in editorials that the Berlin conference would be a new Yalta! Such irresponsible positions should be vigorously fought, and it must be understood that they are having for result: (1) to drive critical members of the CP back into the ranks of Stalinism, and (2) to develop a real danger of pro-Stalinism in our own ranks.
Is there any perspective that the Soviet bureaucracy could suddenly get the possibility of giving a greater scope to its treacherous *objectives* in the colonial countries? We must declare frankly that we don't see any such possibility in the future. The only basis on which the Kremlin could really arrive at any agreement with imperialism of the type of the Laval-Stalin or Hitler-Stalin pact, or of Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam would be its ability to deliver precisely the colonial revolutions to Washington in the same way as it delivered in the past the Spanish, French, Italian, Greek revolutions, etc. We think that such a possibility is practically excluded in the coming years, not because the Kremlin has become more "revolutionary," but because it has lost the degree of control over these revolutions which would make possible such a sell-out. The Kremlin being unable to "deliver the goods," the imperialists on their turn won't offer any acceptable conditions to the Soviet bureaucracy. The Kremlin people are not "against revolution" by principle but for self-defense. But for the same reason they are also for the defense of the Soviet Union, of course by their own methods. Under these circumstances, the Sino-Soviet alliance, and everything which this alliance implies, is going to be the general framework of the Kremlin Asian policy in the coming years. As long as there is no fundamental change in the relationship of forces concerning the Asian revolution, in the first place as long as the Chinese revolution does not retreat, there does not remain any objective basis for a "sell-out" in Asia. To understand this fact does not mean at all to open the road for a reappraisal of the Soviet bureaucracy. It only means to open the road for understanding the fact that the strength of the colonial revolution is destroying the basis of Stalinism, and that for this very reason the revolutionary upsurge is going to make headway inside the Soviet Union itself. Not to understand this fact means only to replace politics by fantasy, and to lose contact with the real revolutionary anti-Stalinist forces which are today growing in the world. It implies, furthermore, endowing the Soviet bureaucracy with an autonomous strength which is contrary to the really orthodox Trotskyist analysis of that bureaucracy.
### 3. The Role of the Mass Communist Parties
The CC of the LSSP alleges that our draft resolution implies the possibility of a Stalinist party projecting a revolutionary orientation without powerful mass uprisings, and that this possibility in turn implies "that the Stalinist leadership of the mass communist parties are capable of a revolutionary role."
The comrades of the CC come to that conclusion on the basis of a part of section 45 of the draft resolution "Rise and Decline of Stalinism." This part, they say prudently, "*appears* to put forward the perspective that, through gradual disintegration of Stalinist ideas . . . and through a leftward turn in their policies, these parties are capable of projecting a revolutionary orientation under mass pressure, even without powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses taking place."
[p. 196]
Now, in the very next section, section 46, this idea which to the comrades of the CC *appears* to be implied in section 45 is *explicitly rejected!*
In section 46 it is clearly stated that no abandon of the fundamentally zigzag line of the mass CPs is to be expected "as long as the pressure of the masses has not reached its culminating point" (and we hope that the comrades of the CC will admit that we understand by "culminating point" actual revolution!). It is further clearly stated that only "revolutionary mass movements" (not peacefully operating Stalinist parties) will free themselves more and more from the Kremlin control. And it is finally and explicitly stated:
"This process of disintegration of Stalinism by no means signifies that among the mass Communist parties there will take place a gradual transformation of these organizations into revolutionary Marxist parties. Crises and grand transformations will be necessary and inevitable for revolutionary Marxist parties under the banner of the Fourth International to emerge from this."
Isn't there a contradiction between this quotation and the sentences of section 45 quoted in the LSSP resolution, may ask some comrades? The next sentence of section 46 answers this objection in advance:
"But these transformations which will mark the complete end of Stalinism will come as the culminating points of a process which at present begins by stages in the course of which the Communist parties, compelled to seek to strengthen their ties with the masses, begin to shake off in often imperceptible ways the rigid ties of Stalinist obedience."
In other words: the appearance of mass revolutionary parties in countries where the working class is led by mass communist parties can only take place through a process which includes break-ups, splits, in these parties. In order to prepare these stages, we have decided to operate on a line of entry into these parties in most of these countries. But these breaks will not fall from the sky, full-fledged, under the single influence of "revolution." No serious revolutionist can hold such a simplified view. These break-ups are prepared in many stages, the first of which consists in the introduction of critical ideas into the heads of vanguard militants and cadres of these parties. During this whole preparatory stage, these critically minded militants will not leave these parties one by one — this is the disastrously *wrong* perspective the Bleibtreu group is working upon — but they will stay inside these parties and even tend to draw new layers of revolutionary workers into them. At the same time, part of the leading cadre of these parties will at least feel the growing criticism and demand for revolutionary strategy from below, and try to adapt themselves to it, be it in a completely empirical way. They will understand in a sharper way than in the past the *contradiction* between the general orientation of the Kremlin and the revolutionary desires of the masses. The more this mass pressure increases, the more the vanguard elements become critical, and the more the Stalinist leadership of these parties will be torn between these two conflicting forces of attraction upon it. And the more this process evolves following such a dialectical relationship between the Kremlin, the local Stalinist leaders and the masses, the more the objective conditions ripen inside these parties for a series of crises through which will be born the revolutionary mass parties under the banner of the IVth International.
In their eagerness to look for incriminating evidence of the IS bad intentions, the comrades of the CC have even overlooked the fact that the draft resolution under discussion introduces a *restrictive clause with regard to the theses adopted at the 3rd W.C.* Then we all defended the idea that under certain favorable conditions, Stalinist mass parties as such could project a revolutionary orientation *in the event of powerful revolutionary uprisings of the masses.* In the documents for the Fourth World Congress — "Rise and Decline of Stalinism" and "our integration . . ." — we state specifically that, concerning the evolution of mass Communist parties in economically developed countries, the projection of a revolutionary orientation from these parties, though possible in exceptional objective circumstances (powerful revolutionary movements of the masses) should not be understood as including also the ineluctability of the *victory* of the revolution, the *seizure* of power by such parties, as happened in Yugoslavia and China.
In these documents we orientate our comrades on the idea that before another mass CP will lead any revolution to victory in capitalist developed countries, it is much more likely that it will be broken up and transformed completely through a series of internal crises. But at the same time we must understand that the *beginning* of this process is precisely the penetration of non-Stalinist ideas into these parties. It is indeed an old principle of dialectics that every revolution is prepared by a long process of evolutionary molecular changes. There is nothing "revisionist" in this, on the contrary!
### Some Conclusions
It thereby appears that the comrades of the CC of the LSSP, by reading "behind the lines" instead of taking the ideas actually expressed in the draft resolution in their general context, have directed a series of mistaken and unfounded accusations against the authors of the resolution, and attributed to them ideas which they do not hold, they never held, and against which the discussion seems a loss of time and energy. At the same time they have not discussed the real points of divergence in the movement: the appraisal of the events in the Soviet Union since Stalin's death in the light of (a) the traditional conception of the USSR and the Soviet bureaucracy, (b) the present relationship of forces between the classes on a world scale and in Russia, point on which the CC states its agreement with the authors of the resolution. We are interested to know if the comrades of the CC draw from this analysis the conclusion, defended by most of the opponents of the IS in the movement, that there is an actue danger of capitalist restoration in the USSR, that Malenkov represents a pro-capitalist tendency inside the bureaucracy, that the bureaucracy as a caste is in favor of restoration of private property, and some other funny ideas thrown into the discussion. At the same time we wish to point out to the comrades of the CC of the LSSP who discover "revisionism" in the IS writings, by isolating some sentences here and there, that the same authors of the draft resolution under discussion who allegedly believe that the Stalinist bureaucracy will be pushed forward on the revolutionary road, were the only ones in the whole international labor movement *to predict mass uprisings against the Stalinist bureaucracy* as early as August 1952 and, consistently, from Stalin's death till May 1st 1953, i.e. before there was any question of German events! We recall in particular the May 1st 1953 Manifesto of the IS on this subject. Isn't it strange that these "capitulators" were the only people not to be taken by surprise by the magnificent workers' uprising in Eastern Germany, whereas the so-called defenders of "orthodox Trotskyism" were able to discover in the events before and after Stalin's death, only bloody purges, economic crises and internecine strife of bureaucrats, i.e. the exact repetition of the events of the thirties, when the mass movement in the USSR was at its lowest point! Surely, comrades of the CC, "orthodox Trotskyism" does not stand for political sterility and monotonous repetitions! We know from which school of politics these phenomena spring, and what a relentless struggle Trotsky carried all his life against them. It is not on such a basis that a revolutionary International can be built. We only hope that the CC of the LSSP will make a complete reappraisal of the draft resolution, on the basis of the ideas expressed in that resolution, and judging from the real and not the fake divergences which have developed in our movement. On the basis of such a reappraisal and a clear expression of political opinion on the controversial questions, I think that it will always be possible to redraft some passages in the draft resolution which comrades would like to clarify.
E. Germain
(for the IS Bureau)
April 1954