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All Out for November 6!

1 November 1971 · The Ninth World Congress and after (1969–1974) · 823 words

Vietnam and Indochina China

Published English text: Intercontinental Press, vol. 9 no. 38, 1 November 1971, p. 944 · United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

Transcribed from the scan of the issue: machine-read, then put in reading order and corrected against the page image. Printed misspellings are kept.

The following statement was issued by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International.

I

Since September 21, a massive series of raids have been made on the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam by U.S. bombers.

These raids illustrate once again Nixon's concept of American withdrawal from Indochina: fewer and fewer American casualties, more and more Indochinese casualties. The demoralized U.S. army has to be withdrawn, but the war of destruction — by massive bombings, massacres, uprooting entire populations — continues apace. The tonnage of bombs rained on Indochina keeps mounting. In August, more than 50,000 Cambodians were driven from their homes in the Prey Veng area by Saigon troops. In Laos, in Cambodia, in South Vietnam, U.S. imperialism is allocating more and more money for armies of Asian mercenaries whose task is to implement "Vietnamization" and "Asianization" of the war.

II

But the more U.S. imperialism persists, the more it gets trapped in the war. Despite the extension of the war into Cambodia, despite the offensive against the liberated zones of Laos in February 1971, despite the escalation of the bombings, U.S. imperialism has not been able to improve its position since 1968. Indeed, the opposite is true: the situation is extremely precarious for the armies on the U.S. payroll; and without U.S. support, the Lon Nol regime in Pnompenh and the Thieu regime in Saigon would collapse.

III

On the international level, the isolation of the Nixon regime is increasing. For over a year the White House has justified continuing the war by using the "prisoner of war" argument.

The Provisional Revolutionary Government's [PRG] seven-point proposal for settling the conflict, made on July 1, 1971, ties the repatriation of the prisoners to the withdrawal of American troops. In refusing to respond, to date, to the seven-point proposal, the Nixon administration proves that it doesn't give a damn about the fate of the prisoners. This has contributed to a new wave of protest throughout the world, particularly in the United States itself.

IV

The development of the antiwar movement is a decisive factor in the present situation.

Actually, since the war of aggression against Indochina is causing increasing deterioration of the American economy, part of the U.S. bourgeoisie has begun to call for an end to the war. But if growing protest against the war can be expected from more and more numerous layers of the U.S. bourgeoisie, these layers will not repudiate the neocolonial policies as a whole, since this would mean disavowal of the disastrous consequences of the capitalist system itself. It is thus up to the working masses of the United States to force imperialism to back down: the national minorities (Blacks, Chicanos, etc.), students, workers, the women's liberation movement, all together, united in demanding the immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops. It is up to the antiwar movement to expose the Nixon administration's dishonest tricks.

V

Two possibilities face the Nixon administration: ending the war before 1972, dealing, for that purpose, with the PRG; or playing for time until the elections in order to settle the problem after a possible reelection of Nixon, if necessary trying once again to crush the resistance of the Indochinese people.

Up to the present, Nixon has taken the second solution as his aim. The Kissinger-Chou En-lai conversations have permitted the Nixon administration to take the edge off the PRG's diplomatic offensive and to evade having to reply to the seven points.

But Nixon has only gained a breathing spell. Putting pressure, via China, on the revolutionary Indochinese leaderships to bring them to make costly compromises is a plan riddled with illusions.

The Chinese leadership itself cannot take the risk of repudiating the struggle of the Indochinese peoples. A large section of the Chinese masses would not tolerate it. Peking cannot betray the Indochinese revolution the way it betrayed the Bengali revolution.

Since August 3, 1971, therefore, the Chinese leadership has increased its messages of support to the revolutionary Indochinese forces.

VI

The situation for U.S. imperialism is thus a dismal one. In fact, it has never been worse. Never has U.S. imperialism been so vulnerable. That is why the time has come to strike together with all our force against a weakened imperialism. We must not let Nixon stall until he gets past the 1972 elections. The revolution in Southeast Asia will be decided in the months ahead. The victory of the Indochinese peoples will be the strongest boost to the revolutionary struggle in over twenty years.

The Fourth International has a decisive role to play in the advance of the anti-imperialist struggle, in the support of the Indochinese peoples. That is why it calls on workers, students, and all anti-imperialist forces to demonstrate in all the world capitals on November 6, in unity with the hundreds of thousands of people who will fill the streets in response to the call of the American antiwar movement.

Immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all U.S. troops in Indochina!

Solidarity with the U.S. antiwar movement!

Victory for the Indochinese revolution!

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